









































Epistemological theories of the patristic authors seldom attract attention of the re-
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controversy, Eunomius’ language theory and Gregory Nazianzen’s cognitive theory, 
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Actual knowledge is identical with its object.2 
After a brief excursus into Aristotle’s concept of ‘actual knowledge’ Hubert 
Dreyfus and Charles Taylor in the first chapter of the book Retrieving Real-
ism describe, as they call them, the modern contact theories of epistemology 
characterized by an attempt to re-embed thought and knowledge in the bodily 
and socio-cultural contexts in which it takes place.3 Taylor remarks that these 
theories launched primarily by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein 
do not depend on ancient philosophy, and indeed, as we know, these modern 
thinkers very often decisively rebelled against some of the ancient concepts. 
Yet one cannot help noticing a certain parallelism between, on the one hand, 
Aristotelian holistic and multivocal ontology and epistemology broadly ap-
plied and developed in the Hellenistic period,4 and, on the other hand, some 
of the modern epistemological and hermeneutical discourses bridging textual, 
historical, philosophical, linguistic, socio-cultural, ethical and anthropologi-
cal contexts and frameworks.5 
Speaking of the epistemological discourse of the Hellenistic epoch and 
the period of Late Antiquity6 the following cluster of problems should be 
mentioned. An enigmatic provenance of the Corpus Aristotelicum entails 
questions concerning the reception and hence interpretation of Aristote-
lian legacy.7 Since recent scholarship suggests new readings of Aristotelian 
treatises and rethinking the impact of Aristotelian concepts on the Hellenic 
2 Cf.: τὸ δαὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι (Arist., De anima 
430a20; transl. J.A. Smith, 1931, available on-line).
3 Dreyfus, H. / Taylor, Ch., Retrieving Realism. Cambridge 2015, 25.
4 In his recent monograph Edward Feser draws a vivid picture of an Aristotelian 
revival in modern scholarship and particularly in the spheres of epistemology, on-
tology and scientific and philosophic methodology. Feser, E., Aristotle on Method 
and Metaphysics. New York 2013.
5 In her seminal monograph Elizabeth Clark outlines the key trends of 20th century 
literary theory and in the last chapter of her survey offers an interesting review of 
Patristics within the framework of literary theory. Clark, E.A., History, Theory, 
Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn. Cambridge 2004.
6 For the sake of precision and accuracy I use the term Hellenic for designation of 
the Greek language, pagan culture, nationality, paideia, and the assimilated folks, 
the term Hellenistic for designation of the period from Alexander the Great and 
until Augustus.
7 A survey of the scholarly discussions concerning the provenance of the Corpus 
Aristotelicum sketched by Jonathan Barnes pinpoints the systematic problems of 
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and Christian philosophy and theology,8 it also appears to be an ideal time 
to rethink and question patristic texts in terms of Hellenic epistemological 
and methodological discourse developed in a productive dialogue between 
the representatives of the philosophical schools, non-affiliated thinkers, and 
Christians (some of whom held a philosophical affiliation).9 
Taking into account the problematic setting of the Hellenistic epistemology, 
I suggest considering patristic texts within the multidimensional and complex 
Hellenistic framework including socio-cultural, institutional, historical, and, 
especially important in this case, intellectual contexts characterized by an undi-
vided and productive collaboration of humanitarian and scientific disciplines.10 
Aristotelian studies, still actively discussed in scholarship. Barnes, J. (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge 1995, 6–22.
8 Based on his new reading of De anima and Metaphysics, Kurt Pritzl challenged 
the traditional approach to Aristotelian epistemology and bridged Aristotelian 
philosophy with Christian theology. Pritzl, K., Aristotles’ Door, in: Pritzl, K. (ed.), 
Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence. Washington 2010, 15–40. A fresh look at 
Aristotelian ontology comprising epistemology and cognitive theory is offered by 
Aryeh Kosman. Kosman, A., The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotles’ Ontol-
ogy. Cambridge / London 2013. Based on his interpretation of the Metaphysics 
Theta, Jonathan Beere gives an insightful approach to the Aristotelian theory of in-
tellection. Beere, J., Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotles’ Metaphysics 
Theta. Oxford 2009. David Bradshaw offered a broad survey of Aristotelian recep-
tion and a deep study of the key terms of Aristotle’s epistemology. Bradshaw, D., 
Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom. Cam-
bridge 2004.
9 A classical survey of Aristotelian reception is found in: Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle 
Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence. Ithaca / New York 
1990. A keen overview of Aristotelian impact on the Hellenic scientific and philo-
sophic epistemology and methodology is offered in: Gentzler, J. (ed.), Method in 
Ancient Philosophy. Oxford 1998. Jonathan Barnes, in his massive volume of 
Logical matters, gives a deep investigation of the Aristotelian methodology and its 
later development mastered by the representatives of various philosophical schools 
(cf. Barnes, J., Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient Philosophy II. Oxford 2012). 
10 Among the epistemological issues at stake in various disciplines were: in linguistics – 
a correlation between facts and words; in psychology – between the faculties of 
sense-perception and intellection, in theology – between the human body and soul, 
and along with it, the problems of incarnation, resurrection of flesh, and vision 
of the ascetic practice, exegesis and textual criticism of the Bible. Iain McGil-
christ suggested an interesting overview of the history of European epistemology 
and scientific methodology from a perspective of contemporary neuroscience. He 
pinpointed the significance of an undivided and holistic methodology that is more 
discernible in ancient than in modern science (cf. McGilchrist, I., The Master and 
His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World. New 
Haven 2009).
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Following from this methodological setting11, an initial ambition of my re-
search is to map and outline various contexts relevant to the texts of Origen, 
Basil of Caesarea, Eunomius and Gregory Nazianzen that I study. Sketching 
a multicolour background of the texts allows me to question them in various 
ways and to engage with various problematic settings that were at stake when 
these texts were composed. 
A chief purpose of my research project is to study how Christian and Hel-
lenic authors of the third–fourth centuries regarded knowledge, language and 
intellection. Within these chronological frontiers the intellectual milieus en-
gaged in the discussions of epistemological issues primarily included members 
of the philosophical schools, specialists in medicine and grammar, Christian 
educated elite, and members of the monastic communities. The daily routine 
of these groups of intellectuals was shaped by the life of the scholarly and 
philosophical communities, libraries, and scriptoria and for some of them, 
by the life of the church institutions. 
Whatever religious beliefs and philosophical teaching these communities 
supported, they were similarly engrossed in studying, copying, interpreting 
and producing texts,12 and, hence, in pondering various strands of the epis-
temological and exegetical issues. One of these strands belongs to the field 
of language theories. Linguistic discussions sharpened by the socio-cultural 
challenges and shifts accompanying the processes of Hellenization, revolved 
around the legacy of the classical Greek and its literature (e.g., the phenom-
enon of the Second Sophistic13). From early on, linguistic problems featured 
11 Notoriously, importance of the socio-cultural and embodied context for under-
standing of the text was underlined by Gadamer who introduced a notion of 
hermeneutical horizon; by Wittgenstien, who in his later Philosophical investiga-
tions argued that the language unfolds before the agent who is actively engaged 
with the context; by Julia Kristeva, who established a notion of intertextuality 
shaping hermeneutical horizons of the textual and suggesting a comprehensive 
approach to the interpretation. Cf. Gadamer, H.-G., Truth and Method, transl. 
J. Weinsheimer. New York 2004. Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, 
transl. G.E.M. Anscombe. Basil 1953. Kristeva, J., Σημειωτικὴ: Recherches pour 
une Sémanalyse. Paris 1969. 
12 Gregory Snyder aptly defined the philological obsession of the Late Empire as 
the reading-writing culture of the Hellenic epoch (cf. Snyder, G.H., Teachers and 
Texts in the Ancient World: Philosophers, Jews, and Christians. Religion in the 
First Christian Centuries. London 2000).
13 Graham Anderson and Simon Swain in their monographs highlighted a socio-
cultural and political aspect of the Second Sophistic. Anderson, G., The Second 
Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire. London, New York 
1993. Swain, S., Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the 
Greek World A.D. 50–250. Oxford 1996 (cf. footnote 87).
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prominently in the agenda of Hellenic grammarians and textual critiques 
and later on made their way into the Jewish and Christian exegetic milieus.14 
Another strand of epistemological discussions featured also within philo-
sophical and theological context. In such a way, studies of the physiological 
prerequisites of human intellective capacity featured in the Hellenic philo-
sophical and medical discourse and proved particularly useful to some of 
the patristic authors in their partaking of the Trinitarian and Christologi-
cal controversies.15 At the top of all the philosophical and scientific puzzles 
adopted by the Christian authors from their environment, the legalization of 
Christianity in the Roman Empire was followed by the entrance of big politics 
in the Christian church agenda.16 
It is no surprise that appreciation of the multidimensional intellectual 
horizon of Late Antiquity enhances our understanding of the language, 
explicit and implicit ideas and nuances of patristic texts. Yet, although sketch-
ing a historical context of the text is a traditional tool of the historical-
philological method, I am unsatisfied with the traditional lineaments of this 
research methodology. What I find problematic and insufficient about this 
method is that it frequently predisposes patristic scholars to question theo-
logical texts chiefly within the Christian theological framework and to make 
little of other relevant contexts. As a result of a long-term privilege of the 
14 Maren Niehoff traced a trajectory of Aristotelian methodology of the textual 
studies in Alexandrian and Jewish contexts. Niehoff, M., Jewish Exegesis and 
Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria. Cambridge 2011. On Origen’s reception of 
Alexandrian and Jewish philological methodology cf. chapter 2.
15 In his treatise De anima, whose major part (DA 38.12–92.14) is devoted to dif-
ferent cognitive capacities (perception, the individual senses, the common sense, 
imagination, intellection and an excursus on desire and action; DA 73.14–80.15), 
Alexander of Aphrodisias polemicizes with Galen of Pergamum and rejects seeing 
the compound of soul and body in the terms of reductive materialism. Instead, 
he argues that although the capacities of the soul emerge from blend (sc. κρᾶσις) 
or mixture (sc. μίξις) of material factors, these capacities do not belong to any 
of the material constituents (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Soul. Part 1, 
transl., introd., comm. V. Caston. London / New York 2012, 10–12). The notions 
of κρᾶσις and μίξις were used by Gregory Nazianzen in his description of the 
hylomorphic compound of the soul and body in human being (cf. Greg. Apolo-
getica [Or 2] PG 35, 464.11). Later on these notions featured in the formulation 
of the doctrine of the unmingled union (ἀσύγχυτος ἕνωσις) of the divine and 
human natures in Christ found in the treatise On the Nature of man by Nemesius 
of Emesa, one of the key figures of the anti-monophysite polemics (cf. Nemesius, 
De natura hominis 3.171).
16 A relevant example from the life of Gregory Nazianzen cf.later, chapter 3, section 
2.2.
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historical-philological approach, investigation of the epistemological theories 
of the Christian authors is seldom a topic of the patristic studies. 
For instance, the heritage of such a prominent Christian author as Gregory 
Nazianzen, as far as I am concerned, has never been questioned within the 
problematic field of Hellenic epistemological discourse. This fact appears 
particularly surprising in light of Gregory’s brilliant classical education and 
professional status of teacher of rhetoric, which he never completely aban-
doned.17 Not only did Gregory feel at home with contemporary philosophi-
cal discourse but pedagogical and methodological issues were also some of 
his preeminent concerns.18 Bowing to Gregory’s heritage Byzantine authors 
named him the Theologian par excellence and included his orations in the 
curriculum of rhetorical school.19 Distinguished Christian theologians such as 
John Damascene, Maximus the Confessor, Gregory Palamas and others bor-
rowed widely from Gregory’s orations and teachings. Nevertheless, in spite of 
all this evidence, the general scholarly consensus apropos Gregory’s heritage 
proclaims him mostly a philosophical rhetorician20 and such a conclusion natu-
rally precludes further investigations into Gregory’s pedagogical methodology 
and philosophical epistemology. I problematize this status quo and look at 
Gregory’s theological orations within the framework of the epistemological 
discourse of Late Antiquity shaped by various intellectual, institutional and 
socio-cultural contexts. Viewed in the light of epistemological discussions the 
theological orations show a new anthropological and cognitive strand of Greg-
ory’s teaching and also reveal a remarkable Peripatetic aspect of his doctrine. 
As Gregory borrowed many of his insights from Origen and Basil of Cae-
sarea, I also devote significant attention to the epistemological and linguistic 
theories of these authors, and especially to Origen. Despite the richness of 
Origenian studies, the epistemological teaching of Adamantius has not been 
sufficiently investigated. In the introduction to his recent monograph Robert 
17 For details about Gregory’s education cf. McGuckin, J.A., Saint Gregory of Na-
zianzus. An Intellectual Biography. New York 2001, 35–85.
18 Frederick Norris pictures a fruitful alliance between the classical paideia and 
Gregorian theology in his fundamental for the Nazianzens studies monograph: 
Norris, F., Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: the Five Theological Orations of 
Gregory Nazianzen. Leiden 1991, 17–39.
19 About the Byzantine reception of Gregory’s heritage see: Nimmo Smith, J., A Chris-
tian’s Guide to Greek Culture: the Pseudo-Nonnos Commentaries on Sermons 
4, 5, 39 and 43 by Gregory of Nazianzus. Liverpool 2001, xxx–xxxvi. Bady, G., 
Le «Démosthène chrétien»: Grégoire le Théologien dans les Rhetores graeci, in: 
Somers, V. / Yannopoulos, P. (eds.), Philokappadox. In memoriam Justin Mossay. 
Leuven / Paris 2016, 285–307. 
20 Norris, 1991, 38. 
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Somos expresses his complaint.21 His book opens the door to a further inves-
tigation of this topic and indeed there is a way to go. Concentrating on the 
study of Origen’s method of argumentation Somos drew revealing parallels 
with Aristotelian logic and Platonic teaching. Focused on the doctrine of 
Origen, he did not take into account such important institutional contexts 
as Hellenic grammar studies and Alexandrian and Jewish textual criticism, 
which had a decisive influence on Origen’s scholarly method and without 
which a picture of Origen’s epistemological teaching cannot be sufficient. 
Before Somos, scholars did pay attention to Origen’s relation to the meth-
odological heritage of Hellenic grammarians and textual critiques,22 but these 
studies never exceeded the format of an article and I believe this field still 
holds a potential for new discoveries. 
Investigation of the epistemological and methodological concepts of Origen 
and Gregory embedded in their peculiar socio-cultural, intellectual and in-
stitutional contexts not only reveals some new aspects of their teaching and 
connections with various Hellenic intellectual milieus, but also allows one to 
approach the ancient text with clear recognition of the inevitable limitations 
of our reading. That is to say, it is difficult to be optimistic when looking 
at the text as a reflection of the complex life of the society, and as a result 
of a long and enigmatic track of transmission and reception. Nevertheless, 
I believe that this approach holds an extensive academic potential for inter-
disciplinary studies. In my investigation I follow methodological guidance of 
contemporary scholarship, which bridges cognitive and literary theories and 
contends that the epistemological framework23 and environmental context24 
of a literary composition is just as important for the formation of meaning25 
as words and sentences, which constitute the textual tissue. 
21 Somos, R., Logic and Argumentation in Origen. Münster 2015.
22 For details cf. later chapter 2, section 2.
23 Cf. a framework of the project “Modes of Knowing and the Ordering of Knowl-
edge in Early Christianity c. 100–700” headed by Lewis Ayres and the relevant 
publications of the major investigators of the project. 
24 A project entitled “New Contexts for Old Texts: Unorthodox Texts and Monastic 
Manuscript Culture in Fourth- and Fifth-Century Egypt” guided by Hugo Lund-
haug focuses on issues of textual transmission and environmental context of the 
codices (cf. Lied, L.I. / Lundhaug, H. [eds.], Snapshots of Evolving Traditions: 
Jewish and Christian Manuscript Culture, Textual Fluidity, and New Philology. 
Berlin / Boston 2017). A project “Early Monasticism and Classical Paideia”, run by 
Samuel Rubenson concentrates on studying the transmission of the Apophthegmata 
Patrum, within various relevant institutional, linguistic and historical contexts.
25 Evans, V. / Green, M., Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Mahwah / New 
Jersey 2006.
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Owing to the amplitude of this research methodology I was obliged to limit 
my investigation of Knowledge, Language and Intellection from Origen to 
Gregory Nazianzen to a selective survey of the relevant issues. Among these 
issues are particularly influential events of the Christian intellectual history 
of the third–fourth centuries. 
The first major focal point of my study focuses on the biblical studies of 
Origen, which comprised the Hexapla project, the formation of the bibli-
cal canon, and an attempt to create a Christian research institution akin to 
the Alexandrian Mouseion and to formulate a coherent system of Christian 
theological knowledge. 
The second focal point of my research revolves around the linguistic-onto-
logical-cosmological debates that arose from the teaching of Aëtius and Eu-
nomius, and the comprehensive anti-Eunomian polemic of the Cappadocian 
fathers, which resulted in the formation of the chief Christian doctrines and 
hence structured the Christian system of education, monastic communities, 
Church rituals, etc. Thus, in this monograph I explore the heritage of Origen, 
Eunomius, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory Nazianzen, and trace the intercon-
nections between their concepts and the relevant teachings of Hellenic and 
Jewish philosophers, grammarians, scientists and exegetes. 
My study comprises two major parts. The first part provides an introduc-
tion to those aspects of Hellenic social life and culture (libraries, schools, 
scriptoria) which are relevant to the formation of the Christian paideia and 
biblical exegesis. It also surveys the notions of Peripatetic and Stoic logic, 
linguistics and grammar and shows how these terms and conceptions were 
adopted by Origen, Eunomius, Basil and Gregory in their theological argu-
mentation. On the whole, the purpose of the first part is to sketch a com-
prehensive background for the discussions about knowledge, language and 
intellection, which featured in the doctrines of the mentioned authors and 
occasioned the composition by Gregory Nazianzen of his theological orations.
The second part of the monograph illuminates the crucial clusters of epis-
temological, linguistic and ontological puzzles which resound throughout the 
theological orations of Gregory Nazianzen (written in reaction to Eunomian 
teaching); it also shows in what way the epistemological and cognitive theories 
that had emerged in Hellenic philosophy penetrated Gregory’s theological dis-
course and shaped his anthropological, Christological and Trinitarian teaching.
In the conclusions to each of these two parts I highlight various aspects 
of the knowledge, language and intellection peculiar to the theological dis-
cussions of the third–fourth centuries that were shaped by different relevant 
institutional, socio-cultural and intellectual contexts. On the whole, I hope 
that the selective survey given in this book will provoke further question-
ing and investigation of the epistemological theories of the patristic authors 
within their relevant multidimensional contexts. 
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Part One: Language and Theological 
Knowledge in the Teachings of Origen,  
Basil and Eunomius 
Introduction to Part One
The first part is an introduction to the epistemological and pedagogical de-
bates which formed the framework for the third–fourth century theological 
discussions and particularly Eunomian teaching. By briefly surveying Hel-
lenic philosophical discussions concerning the scientific method,26 cognition 
(sense-perception, imagination, reasoning and intellection27) and language28 
I outline the chief issues and methodological patterns which surfaced within 
theological debates and drove the formation of Christian doctrine. This part 
is divided into five chapters. 
The first chapter is an overview of the epistemological and pedagogical 
issues debated during the Hellenistic epoch and Late Antiquity. While epis-
temology, or the study of knowledge (viz. understanding, or justified belief), 
investigates the process and methodology of thinking, it also involves such 
disciplines as linguistics, logic, and psychology since they specifically explore 
the faculties of sense-perception, imagination, conceptualization and nam-
ing, discursive and intuitive thinking. The Christian and pagan authors of 
Late Antiquity were deeply concerned with these issues. Naturally enough, 
epistemological discourse resonated in the Hellenic and Christian paideia, 
scholarly environments and theological discussions. 
In the second chapter, I examine the epistemological and didactic prin-
ciples of Origen’s biblical studies. I survey the methodology of such Hel-
lenic institutions and environments as the Alexandrian Mouseion, Homeric 
scholarship, Jewish exegesis, and Hellenic grammatical scholarship. These 
environments had a pronounced effect on Origen’s influential exegetic and 
theological methodology.
In the third chapter I consider Eunomian teaching within the framework 
of the historical circumstances, socio-cultural and philosophical debates of 
Late Antiquity. Coming closer to the analysis of Eunomian doctrine in the 
26 By the scientific and philosophical method in this book I mean the way of solving 
a conundrum of correlation between the empirical and theoretical. Hence, meth-
odology, i.e. deliberate system of the scientific and philosophical argumentation, 
depends on the solution of this conundrum.
27 For a detailed account of various cognitive capacities cf. part two, chapter 3.
28 The linguistic discussions chiefly revolved around the problem of correlation be-
tween things and their names (sc. words). For details cf. chapter 4.
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fourth chapter, I discuss the core linguistic and ontological strands of his 
teaching. This section also includes an excursus on relevant terminology,29 
and an outline of the logical, linguistic and theological concepts of Origen 
and Basil of Caesarea, which echoed in the Post-Nicene theological discourse 
and especially in Gregory Nazianzen’s teaching.30 
Chapter 1. Epistemological and Pedagogical Debates of Late 
Antiquity: Language, Logic and Theology 
1.  Epistemology from the Hellenistic epoch to Late Antiquity: 
Aristotelian methodological turn
Although questions about the sources and justification of knowledge had al-
ready emerged in the discussions of the Pre-Socratic philosophers,31 I start this 
survey with Aristotle because his comprehensive approach to epistemology 
constituted a point of no return in the philosophical and scientific theory of 
knowledge. Aristotelian epistemology embraced logical, linguistic, physical, 
physiological, anthropological, ethical, ontological and cognitive aspects of 
the theory of knowledge and hence outlined a framework for the complex and 
interdisciplinary studies of those perennially big questions that are equally 
relevant to various scientific and humanitarian disciplines. 
It would be unfair to talk about the Aristotelian scientific method without 
acknowledging that his ideas were, although in many aspects genuinely in-
novative, nonetheless an evolution of Platonic philosophy. Plato distinguished 
between opinion (sc. δόξα) and knowledge (sc. ἐπιστήμη): in his view, jus-
tified knowledge (i.e. knowledge which is acquired by causal reasoning) is 
29 I focus on the following terms: thing signified (sc. σημαινόμενον), name (sc. 
ὄνομα), common quality (sc. κοινῶς ποιόν), individual quality (sc. ἰδίως ποιόν), 
relation (sc. σχέσις), concept (sc. ἐπίνοια), essence (sc. οὐσία) and hypostasis (sc. 
ὑπόστασις).
30 Gregory acknowledged Basils mentoring role in his intellectual upbringing. E.g., 
in his pahegyric to Basil Gregory praised Basil’s excellent command of rhetoric, 
grammar and philosophy (sc. “the practical and the theoretical [philosophy] and 
also that which concerns logical proofs and antitheses and tricks”, cf. Or 43.23; 
here and afterwards transl. C.G. Browne / J.E. Swallow, 1894, unless otherwise 
mentioned). As for the influence of Origen, I tend to accept that Gregory and Basil 
compiled the Philocalia, mentioned in Gregory’s letter to Theodoretus of Tyana 
(Ep 115) as “a small volume of choice thoughts from Origen, containing extracts 
of passages which may be of service to scholars,” a volume which he compiled 
together with Basil.
31 Cf. Graham, D.W., Heraclitus: Flux, Order and Knowledge, in: Curd, P. / Graham, 
D.W. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Pre-Socratic Philosophy. Oxford 2008, 
169–189.
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superior to right opinion (cf. Meno 98a). Aristotle significantly elaborated 
upon this principal distinction for he distinguished different kinds of knowl-
edge (cf. EN 1141a–1143b) and outlined a method for the process of causal 
reasoning.32 Hence, Aristotelian epistemology provided a basis for the com-
prehensive scientific and philosophical studies whose pillars were classifica-
tion and method. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claimed: 
…a man knows a thing scientifically [sc. non-accidentally] when he possesses a 
conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which 
that conviction rests are known to him with certainty33 (EN 1139b20). 
In other words, according to Aristotle, to know a thing scientifically and 
non-accidentally (sc. μὴ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός) means to know it meth-
odologically, therefore recognition of the method must be a prerequisite of 
any scientific exploration (APo 71a4ff). 
The method of scientific research, according to Aristotle, rests on first 
premises, or first causes (sc. αἰτίαι), which are immediate, primitive, true, 
uncontroversial, basic truths (APo 71b20).34 In the Prior Analytics, he asserts 
that the starting points (sc. ἀρχαὶ) of scientific explanation are grasped by 
the sense-perception35 (sc. αἴσθησις). In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
contends: 
All teaching (πᾶσα διδασκαλία) starts from facts previously known (ἐκ 
προγινωσκομένων) … since it proceeds either by way of induction (δι’ 
ἐπαγωγῆς), or else by way of deduction (ἣ δὲ συλλογισμῷ). Now induc-
tion supplies a first principle or universal (ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ 
τοῦ καθόλου), deduction works from universals (ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν 
καθόλου) (EN 1139b25–30). 
This methodological approach to epistemological issues led to the demarca-
tion of the demonstrative or theoretical (sc. ἀποδεικτική), and inductive 
or empirical (sc. ἐπαγωγική), kinds of knowledge (and hence, of the theo-
retical and empirical disciplines). In this fashion, all the sciences, including 
philosophy, were defined by Aristotle as probative disciplines, whose task 
32 For a general account of Aristotelian epistemology cf. Taylor, C.C.W., Aristotles 
Epistemology, in: Everson, S. (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemol-
ogy. Cambridge 1990, 116–142. 
33 Here and later I quote the translation of Nicomachean Ethics by H. Rackham 
(1934), available on-line. 
34 For the details and scholarly discussion of the two kinds of the starting points cf. 
Reeve, C.D.C., Dialectic and Philosophy in Aristotle, in: Gentzler, J. (ed.), Method 
in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford 1998, 227–252.
35 Cf.: “The majority of principles for each science are peculiar to it consequently; 
it is for our experiences concerning each subject to provide the principles” (APr 
46a17–20; transl. R. Smith, 1989, 49).
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consisted in the collecting, arranging and analyzing of empirical data, noting 
regularities and deducing reasonable and logical explanations of phenomena. 
Metaphysics occupied a special place in the Aristotelian system because 
its stated purpose was to “investigate universally about the things which ex-
ist insofar as they exist” (Met 1003a21–6).36 In other words, as opposed to 
other disciplines focused on the studies of various attributes and relations of 
things and phenomena, the domain of metaphysics is the substance of things 
or existence per se. 
Aristotle introduced logic as a basic scientific method. He proved the effec-
tiveness of his methodology in various scientific and humanitarian disciplines. 
Eventually, the identification of a common methodological framework of 
various disciplines had a remarkable effect on the general development of 
science, humanities and educational institutions.37 The Peripatetics and Pla-
tonists unanimously considered logic as an effective instrument for scientific 
and philosophical investigations.38
In the Middle Academy Aristotelian logic was integrated in the school 
program. Pophyry’s Isagoge put a watershed between the reception paradigms 
of the Middle-Platonic and Neoplatonic schools. While Middle-Platonic ex-
egesis tended to attribute Aristotle’s insights to Plato, Porphyry put forward 
the integrity of Aristotelian logic. Thus, from the third century and onwards 
the studies at the Neoplatonic school began with the Isagoge, followed by 
the exegesis of Aristotle and then of Plato.39 
Along with Aristotelian “categorical” syllogisms the logical training in-
cluded the study of the ‘hypothetical’ syllogisms (introduced by the Stoics) 
and the “relative” syllogisms (discovered by Galen40). In general, the place of 
36 Here and later I quote the translation of Metaphysics by W.D. Ross (1924), avail-
able on-line.
37 About the use of logic in antiquity cf. Barnes, J., Argument in Ancient Philosophy, 
in: Sedley, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy. 
Cambridge 2003, 20–41.
38 Alexander of Aprodisas starts his Commentary on the Prior Analytics by say-
ing that “logic and the syllogistic discipline (λογική τε καὶ συλλογιστικὴ 
πραγματεία) comprises the demonstrative and dialectic and experimental and 
sophistic methods (ἀποδεικτικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική τε καὶ πειραστικὴ ἔτι τε καὶ 
ἡ σοφιστικὴ μέθοδος) and that it is not a part but an instrument of philosophy 
(μὴ μέρος αὐτὴν ἀλλ ὄργανον φιλοσοφίας)” (ComAPr 1.5–2.1; transl. mine). 
Plotin held the same view (cf. Enn 1.3.5.9). 
39 Praechter, 1990, 41.
40 E.g., Hippolytus of Rome at the beginning of the third century asked rhetori-
cally: Who did not know that Aristotle had “turned philosophy into an exper-
tise and was given to logic (εἰς τέχνην φιλοσοφίαν ἤγαγεν καὶ λογικώτερος 
ἐγένετο)” (Ref 1.20.1); and later declared that it was the Stoics, not Aristotle, who 
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logic in the Hellenic intellectual mindset was a debatable issue: some scholars 
regarded it as an instrumental, others as an independent discipline.41
On the whole, the influence of the Aristotelian mode of argumentation 
went beyond the employment of logic and could likewise be seen in the liter-
ary domain. For example, the simplicity and accuracy of Aristotelian style in 
the Organon were recognised by the Peripatetics and Stoics as the character-
istics of a proper scientific style.42 Accordingly, of obscurity (sc. ἀσάφεια) 
which occasionally occurred in Aristotelian works, Theophrastus stated that 
Aristotle applied it to attract the readers’ attention (Demetrius, De Elocutione 
1.158). By contrast, the Neo-Platonists regarded Aristotelian obscurity as a 
sign of esoteric writing.43
A more detailed description of Aristotelian epistemology and methodology 
is provided in the second chapter, in which I identify how Peripatetic ideas 
resonated in the theological thought of Gregory Nazianzen. Presently, it is 
important to highlight the particularly significant consequences for Hellenic 
thought and the Hellenic educational system of the recognition of a common 
epistemological framework.
1.1  The epistemological conundrums of the Hellenic  
grammatical and medical studies
Although the principle of the logical (sc. cause-and-effect) correspondence 
between various theoretical and empirical phenomena was generally accepted 
by the Hellenic scientists (c.f., e.g., Galen, De methodo medendi 10.32.2), the 
nature of the correlation between empirical evidence and theoretical reason-
ing never ceased to puzzle the minds of scholars and philosophers in Classi-
cal and Late Antiquity. For this reason there emerged in the Hellenistic age, 
in different fields of philosophical and scientific studies,44 a methodological 
debate revolving, in one way or another, around the understanding of the 
ἐμπειρία – θεωρία correlation.
made philosophy more syllogistic (ἐπὶ τὸ συλλογιστικώτερον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν 
ηὔξησαν)” (Ref 1.21.1; transl. mine).
41 Cf. Hadot, P., La logique, Partie ou Instrument de la Philosophie? in: Hadot, I. 
(éd., trad., com.), Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories, fasc. 1. Leiden 
1990, 184–188.
42 In such a way, the Stoics elaborated a teaching about the virtues and vices of dis-
course, where clear expression was conceived as “containing just what is necessary 
for the clarification of the sense (τοῦ πράγματος)” (Diog., 8.59).
43 E.g., Themistius, Oratio 36 (Ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγειν ἢ πῶς τῷ φιλοσόφῳ λεκτέον) 
319c.
44 Cf. Barnes, 2003, 20–41.
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One example from the field of medicine is the debate in the third century BC 
between the so-called Dogmatists and Empiricists, which involved questioning 
the possibility of drawing reliable theoretical inferences from empirical data.45 
Galen (who had a compromised position in the debate though he officially 
sided with the Dogmatists46) tells us in his treatise On sects for beginners that 
this debate turned out to be crucial for the development of medicine.47 He also 
noted that the issue at stake in the debate was of an epistemological nature: the 
Dogmatists believed that theoretical generalizations and detection of the initial 
causes of a disease could help a doctor properly identify an efficient treatment. 
Empiricists contested the value of rational generalizations and preferred to rely 
on a practical approach and on tested treatments.
A comparable epistemological debate emerged in the field of grammar.48 
Many Hellenic grammarians49 supported the principle of analogy in gram-
mar and consequently became known as Analogists (or Rationalists). The 
Analogists claimed that the principle of grammatical regularity provides an 
effective and reliable tool for establishing grammatical and syntactic rules and 
correcting mistakes. Their opponents (the so-called Anomalists) deprecated 
the value of grammatical analogy as a fundamental linguistic principle. The 
Anomalists asserted that the observation of the everyday use of language is a 
better tool for grammatical analysis than seeking to impose grammatical regu-
larity (cf. Sextus, M 1.191). Some scholars, however, argued for a position 
of compromise.50 Thus, Apollonius Dyscolus postulated that a correct form 
should be observed in everyday usage and justified by rational demonstration 
(sc. ἀπόδειξις) of a relevant grammatical regularity (Pron 72.20, Adv 126.3, 
Constr 162.4).
45 For the details cf. Hankinson, R.J., Philosophy and Science, in: Sedley, D. (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy. Cambridge 2003, 
271–299. 
46 Galen suggested constantly checking the logical conclusions (sc. λόγος) against 
experience (sc. πεῖρα), instead of adherence to either of them. The same methodo-
logical approach can be detected in Basil of Caesarea’s Homilies on Hexaemeron 
6.11.
47 For details cf. Bates, D., Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions. Cam-
bridge 1995, 37.
48 For details cf. Frede, M., An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism, in: Ever-
son, S. (ed.), The Cambridge Companions to Ancient Thought: Epistemology. 
Cambridge 1990, 225–250.
49 The Alexandrian grammarians (Callimachus, Aristarchus of Samothrace, Diony-
sius Thrax, Apollonius Dyscolus et al.) and their Pergamon colleagues (Crates of 
Mallus and his pupils).
50 E.g., Galen and Apollonius Dyscolus (Greek grammarian of the second century 
AD).
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These debates, which prima facie appear to be of a singularly technical 
nature, in fact touched upon capital epistemological notions such as law (sc. 
νόμος), analogy (sc. ἀκολουθία), paradigm (sc. κανών), and most signifi-
cantly – the conundrum of the correlation between facts or phenomena and 
concepts or ideas. In classical and late antiquity this conundrum surfaced in a 
philosophical discussion about the nature of human language and the process 
of naming. Thus Plato, in his Cratylus, thoroughly scrutinized the heuristic 
potential of discursive thought, which is bound with words (or names, sc. 
ὀνόματα) and to a certain degree depends upon the norms of language. The 
participants of the dialogue survey the issue (which is also known as the ques-
tion of the correctness of names) from various perspectives and suggest that 
either things receive their names conventionally (sc. θέσει) or that names are 
inherently, naturally (sc. φύσει) bound with things. 
In Hellenic discourse51 the investigation of the correlation between things 
and their names (sc. πράγματα and ὀνόματα) turned out to be particularly 
important. In this discussion, the positions of the major philosophical schools 
were generally allocated as follows: the Peripatetics believed that names were 
bestowed by arrangement (cf. Origen, Cels 1.24), Platonists inclined towards 
the natural provenance of language52 (cf. Plato, Cra 383a–b). The Stoics 
supported a compromise solution. They conceived of names as assigned (sc. 
θέσει) to things in accordance with their nature and thus correct (sc. φύσει). 
Although the Stoics believed in the original correctness of names, they 
nonetheless contended that over time the correct names of pristine language 
were misused by corrupted humanity in such a way that the current linguistic 
reality (of their time) represented rather messy material, whose original ap-
pearance should be reconstructed by means of etymology53 (cf. Philo, Opif 
150). Stoic linguistics believed that the natural agreement between signifiers 
and things they signified had been confused by incorrect derivation and had 
eventually led to ambiguity and homonymy. Hence, the Stoics considered it 
51 This issue never ceased to surface in different contexts within various methodologi-
cal debates: Sluiter, I., Textual Therapy. On the Relationship between Medicine 
and Grammar in Galen, in: Horstmanshoff, H.F.J. (ed.), Hippocrates and Medical 
Education. Leiden 2010, 25–52.
52 Plato in the Cratylus argued for the substantial character of names, saying that 
they bring out the power (sc. δύναμις) of the thing named (Cra 384d–e). He 
also affirmed that the sounds or “elements (sc. στοιχεῖα) of which names are 
composed” imitate both the function (sc. δύναμις) and the essence (sc. οὐσία) 
of a thing named, hence bestowing on a name prominent heuristic power (Cra 
432b1–7). In later times this issue became a commonplace of philosophical 
discourse.
53 Cf. Blank, D.L., Ancient Philosophy and Grammar: the Syntax of Apollonius 
Dyscolus. Chico 1982, 21.
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a task of the philosopher-grammarian to analyse the process of the develop-
ment of language and to reconstruct the etymologies of words (cf. Ammonius, 
ComInterpr 42.30 = SVF 2.164).54 
One of the products of Stoic linguistic studies55 was a theory of the se-
quential provenance of parts of speech. The Stoics taught that it is peculiar 
to nouns (personal names and appellatives) to signify substance and to be 
succeeded by verbs, which signify a certain state of substance (cf. Diog., 
7.57 = SVF 2.147, 148). Stoic etymological theory echoed in their allegorical 
interpretation of the classical texts56 (e.g., the works of the classical poets). 
Although the Stoics were primarily associated with creating allegories57 this 
method of textual analysis was widespread among all scholars irrespective 
of their philosophical affiliation. 
In such a way, Aristotle states in his Poetics that a metaphorical reading 
of an epic text should be adopted when the poet employs a metaphorical 
or analogical resemblance between different things (Poet 1457b16–19). He 
states that metaphor is a transfer of a name that belongs to something else 
(Poet 1457b6). Hence Aristotelian metaphorical interpretation implies detec-
tion of “the habitual use of the phrase” (τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως), that requires 
a comprehensive comparison of various employments of the word or phrase 
(Poet 1461a31–3). 
Platonists also made use of allegory. As opposed to the Peripatetic, the Pla-
tonic version of allegory was an obscure spiritual reading,58 or in a definition 
of Porphyry, allegorical interpretation should be considered as the “conjec-
tures of ingenious men” (Porph., Nymph 18). 
54 Cf. von Arnim, H.F.A. (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, in 4 vols. Leipzig 
1903–1931 (available on-line).
55 I distinguish between linguistics and logic using modern notions in order to clarify 
my research objectives, although in Stoic doctrine there was no strict distinction 
between grammatical and logical matters (Stoic logic consisted of rhetoric and 
dialectic, which included grammar, sc. the conception of τὸ σημαῖνον, and logic, 
sc. the conception of τὸ σημαινόμενον (cf. Diog., 8.41 = SVF 2.45).
56 Cf. the examples of the Stoic etymologies in the fragments 156–163 of the second 
volume of von Arnim’s SVF (Chrysippi Fragmenta logica et physica). E.g., frag-
ment 156, Schol. Il. Δ 295: “ἀλάστωρ – a sinner or acording to Chrysippus – a 
killer, got his name because his deed deserves outcasting (ἀλᾶσθαι) that is to say 
he should be banished” (transl. mine).
57 The Stoics were known for their attempts to support their teaching by the authority 
of Homer (cf. Eustathios, Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem 11.32–40).
58 Cf.: “Since this narration is full of obscurities, it can be neither a fiction casually 
devised for the purpose of [the readers’] delight nor an exposition of a topical history, 
but something allegorical must be indicated in it by the poet, who mystically places 
an olive near the cave” (Porph., Nymph 2.14–17; transl. T. Taylor, 1917, 173).
29
By contrast, the Stoic version of allegorical interpretation59 was character-
ized by its appeal to the etymology of a word. Crates of Mallus, a founder of 
the Pergamon school of grammar and an adherent of Stoic philosophy, was 
known as an expert in allegory.
The hitherto described epistemological problems later on surfaced in the 
Christian theological and exegetic context; various kinds of allegorical and 
metaphorical interpretations also made their way into Jewish and Christian 
biblical studies. 
1.2 Philological paradigm of Hellenic paideia
As I have already noted, from the Hellenistic epoch and onwards interest 
increased in the linguistic and psychological aspects of epistemological prob-
lems60 (sc. the processes of naming, sensual perception and conceptualization). 
Consequently, one way or another, linguistic questions surfaced within the 
different parts of philosophy, and the development of grammar61 as a sys-
tematic discipline produced a significant impact on science and philosophy. 
The grammarians of the Alexandrian and Pergamum schools took ad-
vantage of Stoic and Aristotelian linguistic studies. They chiefly (though not 
exclusively) occupied themselves with grammatical technicalities and shifted 
grammatical studies away from basic questions towards specific philological 
issues and textual criticism. Their study of the grammatical regularities and 
solecisms of the Greek language resulted in the systematization of the basic 
rules of grammar and syntaxis, and in the significant development of textual 
criticism. Notably, the formalisation of language per se is a telling milepost in 
the intellectual maturation of Hellenic society. It underscores a characteristic 
59 The allegorical method of exegesis was chiefly associated with the Stoic doctrine. 
Thus, Cicero said that Chrysippus in his writings gave a definitive statement of the 
principal Stoic doctrines, and that he “wanted to harmonize the myths in Orpheus, 
Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer with his own views… about the immortal gods, so 
that the earliest poets, who had not the slightest idea about these views, would 
appear to have been Stoics” (De natura deorum 1.41; transl. H. Rackham, 1933, 
available on-line).
60 Cf. Charles, D., Aristotle on Names and Their Signification, in: Everson, S. (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companions to Ancient Thought 3: Language. Cambridge 1994, 
37–74.
61 We should not take grammar as a mere complex of morphological, syntactical 
and phonetical rules since in the period under consideration it was regarded more 
widely: according to the Suda Lexicon (available on-line) the parts of grammar 
are: reading, interpretation, correction and evaluation (sc. ἀναγνωστικόν, 
ἐξηγητικόν, διορθωτικόν, κριτικόν). The representatives of the Old Stoa in-
vestigated grammar (above all, semantics and logic) from the philosophical 
perspective.
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interest in cultural introspection, when representatives of a certain culture 
seek not merely to transmit but also to analyse their own cultural heritage, 
or, to put it differently, to observe it as if from the outside. This introspec-
tive tendency surfaced in particularly marked fashion in Plato’s critique of 
the classical poets and in Aristotle’s justification of Homer and the other 
Greek poets in his Aporemata Homerica and Poetica. Aristotelian philological 
studies provided a seminal foundation for Homeric scholarship, especially 
for the Alexandrian school. Consequently, the achievements of the Hellenic 
philologists resonated in the contemporary educational system, which was 
built around the interpretation of authoritative texts.
Guglielmo Cavallo vividly showed in his study of the evidence from the 
library of Herculaneum that the philological-philosophical investigation of 
manuscripts with the authoritative texts constituted the backbone of the 
Greek paideia.62 Within these circumstances, discussions about how to pre-
serve and copy, how to read and understand,63 and, consequently, how to 
study and interpret authoritative texts (sc. how to see the text in the light of 
certain philosophical traditions, historical context and merely literary theo-
ries) naturally penetrated into the educational and philosophical agenda. This 
scholarly and critical treatment of Greek literature framed a natural process 
of digesting Greek cultural heritage. 
The systematisation of Hellenic grammar had represented an influential 
example of methodological investigation. At the root of this system lay the 
belief in the rational arrangement (sc. τάξις – ordering) of linguistic phenom-
ena such as words (orthography and morphology) and sentences (syntaxis 
and grammar). The second century Greek grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus 
started his treatise on syntaxis (De constructione 2.3) by affirming that, just 
as sequentially arranged letters form words (sc. λέξεις), so the reasonable 
62 Cavallo’s study of the library at Herculaneum shows that among the functions 
of the ancient library there were the collection, copying and commenting of the 
manuscripts, and also training the scribes. Ergo, he concludes that the ancient 
library comprised the functions of a library, scriptorium and scholarly institution 
(cf. Cavallo, G., Scuola, Scriptorium, Biblioteca a Cesarea, in: Cavallo, G. [ed.]. 
Le biblioteche nel mondo antico e medievale. Bari 1989, 65–78). 
63 An interesting observation apropos the ancient reading practice is preserved in 
Galen’s treatise About Sophistry or Deception in Speaking where he asserts that 
according to the Stoics, the reader of the manuscript should first of all rightly put 
spaces in between the uninterrupted sequence of written letters, then he should 
make a grammatical analysis of the words (define parts of the speech, cases, tenses. 
etc.) that would enable him to make correct syntactic connections between the 
words (cf. Galenus, De sophismatis seu captionibus penes dictionem 4; transl. 
Edlow, 1977, 56f).
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sequence (sc. ἀκολουθία) of words creates phrases (sc. λόγοι) and principles 
of regularity or correct phrasing (sc. καταλληλότης).64 
Although philosophers and grammarians were officially opposed to each 
other, they were similarly engaged in the philological studies and used the 
same methods of textual analysis.65 Accordingly, among the key competences 
of the professional scholar were prominent exegetic skills. The representa-
tives of different philosophical schools produced numerous commentaries 
on the works of Plato and Aristotle.66 In this context, so-called secondary 
literature (περί-literature, incl. paraphrases, questions-and-answers, intro-
ductions, etc.), whose purpose was to arrange the relevant fragments on the 
specific topics preserved in the authoritative texts,67 became very popular.68 
On the whole, the focus on the authoritative text, understood as a linguistic, 
conceptual, and material (sc. manuscript) unit, characterized, to use an apt 
definition of Gregory Snyder, “the writing-reading culture” of the Hellenistic 
epoch and of the period of Late Antiquity.69 
In such a way, the debates between the philosophical schools often concerned 
disagreements about interpretation or criticism of authoritative texts. This 
philological preoccupation of philosophers was furthermore fed by a popular 
64 Apollonius also professed that the rules of syntaxis (sc. σύνταξις) can be ascer-
tained by examining the tradition (sc. παράδοσις) and history (sc. ἱστορία) of 
the normal usage (sc. συνήθεια) of words and their combinations along with 
solecisms and in detecting (sc. συναγωγή) analogy (sc. ἀναλογία), and reasoning 
(sc. διαίρεσις) out of it the occurrence of irregularities (cf. Constr 2.3–3.2).
65 E.g., Porphyry reported that Amelius took notes in the seminars of Plotinus, 
which he published in one hundred books under the title Scholia (cf. Porph., 
VitPlot 3.22).
66 E.g., among the commentators of the Organon were: Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
Porphyry, Themistius, Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus, pseudo-Philoponus, 
Boethius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, David, Stephanus and Anonymous com-
mentaries; for details cf. de Haas, F.A.J., Late Ancient Philosophy, in: Sedley, D. 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy. Cambridge 
2000, 246–249.
67 Themistius in his Paraphrase on Aristotles De anima concludes a series of quota-
tions of Theophrastus by stating that “someone could best understand the insight 
of Aristotle and Theophrastus on these [matters], indeed perhaps also that of Plato 
himself, from the passages that we have gathered” (Paraphr 108.35; transl. R.B. 
Todd, 2014, 134).
68 For details cf. Sluiter, I., The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary 
Literature and Genre in Antiquity, in: Depew, M. / Obbink, D. (eds.), Matrices 
of Genre. Authors, Canons, and Society. Cambridge 2000, 183–203.
69 Cf. Snyder, H.G., Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World: Philosophers, Jews, 
and Christians. New York, London 2000.
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tendency towards harmonization of Aristotelian and Platonic teachings.70 This 
trend emerged in the Middle Academy (e.g., Atticus, Alcinous71) and pro-
gressed in the New Academy (e.g., Simplicius, ComCat 2.5–25). 
One of the efficient ways of harmonizing disagreements between authorita-
tive philosophers was to suggest a bridging interpretation of their texts. This 
technique can be traced back to Aristotle, who explicitly proclaimed in the 
Metaphysics:
If one were to infer that Anaxagoras recognized two elements, the inference 
would accord closely with a view which, although he did not articulate it him-
self, he must have accepted as developed by others (Met 989b4f). 
Ergo, Aristotle permitted philosophers and exegetes to make conjectures in 
the writings and doctrines of authoritative authors. This however did not 
mean that he approved of irrelevant exegetic liberty; on the contrary, Ar-
istotle endorsed properly contextualized and justified interpretations. His 
close followers developed this principle. Thus, Aristarchus coined a κατὰ 
τὸ σιωπώμενον technique based on a presumption that an author had left 
something unsaid. This technique entitled Aristarchus to resolve contradic-
tions in the Homeric text by suggesting conjectures based upon his knowledge 
of Homer’s style and lexicon (cf. Schol. Il. 21.17a). 
In such a way, a creative and liberal interpretation and transformation 
of the authoritative text characterised the reception paradigm of the philo-
sophical schools of late antiquity. Well-documented evidence of this reception 
paradigm is provided by an uninterrupted tradition of Neoplatonic com-
mentaries on Aristotle that cover a period from the 2nd until the 7th century 
AD. In his seminal review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Karl 
Praechter highlights some essential characteristics of the Commentaria.72 He 
underscores that the written commentaries “published” by the students of 
the school stemmed from of the oral lectures they attended. Thus, the Com-
mentaria is a witness to the oral discussions and routine exegetic practice 
of the Neoplatonic School. Naturally, lectures were sometimes repeated (at 
least partially), and normally transcribed by a few students. Consequently, 
70 E.g., Alcinous in his Handbook and the Neo-Platonic commentators on the Cat-
egories discussed how the works of Plato and Aristotle should be classified and 
arranged in the school program, how to study them, etc. For details cf. Hadot, I., 
Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition. Vol. 18: Athenian 
Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato. Leiden 2015, 43–50.
71 Alcinous in his Handbook to Platonism (Did 158.17–159.30) claimed that Plato 
knew the syllogisms of the Peripatetics and the Stoics. 
72 Praechter, K., Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, in: Sorabji, R. 
(ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and Their Influence. 
Ithaca / New York 1990, 31–55, (41).
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lectures were captured in varied transcription and this variety was the norm of 
the school routine. This status quo is attested to in the Commentaria, where 
contradictions and duplicates frequently occur. 
This evidence manifests the reception paradigm of the philosophical 
schools characterised by creative transmission of the authoritative text and a 
rather liberal approach to authorship. In accord with this conclusion, Elias, 
one of the 6th century Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, asserts that: 
One shouldn’t alter oneself in accordance with whatever one is expounding, 
like actors on stage that play different roles and imitate different characters. 
Don’t become an Aristotelian when expounding Aristotle; don’t say that there 
was no such a good philosopher. Don’t become a Platonist when expounding 
Plato’s work; don’t claim that there was no philosopher to equal Plato73 (Com-
Cat 122.27–29). 
In the fourth century, Themistius, another commentator on Aristotle, who 
himself was a Peripatetic philosopher (active career from the late 340s to 
384) and a Constantinople politician, vividly exemplified the above-described 
reception paradigm. Despite his eloquent admiration of Plato, which had been 
noticed by his contemporaries (inter alios, Gregory Nazianzen, cf. Greg., Ep 
24), Themistius remained faithful to Peripatetic teaching.74 Its worth noting 
here that Gregory Nazianzen was personally acquainted with Themistius, 
held him in high regard, and even in one of his letters called him “a king of 
arguments” (cf. Greg., Ep 140). 
Now, to draw brief conclusions from this survey of the epistemological 
and methodological discussions that dominated intellectual life in Hellenic 
society, I would like to emphasize that logic and philological training were 
considered a compulsory part of Hellenic education75 and that grammatical 
studies owed a debt to logic.76 Logical expertise was both admired and at-
tacked by different thinkers but once firmly established in the curricula of the 
philosophical schools it could no longer be dethroned. The intrusion of logical 
matters into the philosophical agenda gradually influenced the very process 
73 Translation mine.
74 Blumenthal, H.J., Themistius: the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle? in:  
Sorabji R. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and Their 
Influence. Ithaca / New York 1990, 113f.
75 For the constituent elements of the Hellenic Paideia and the famous trivium and 
quadrivium, which formed the cycle of the seven liberal arts, cf. Hadot, I., Arts 
Libéraux et Philosophie dans la Pensée Antique. Contribution à l’Histoire de 
l’Éduaction et de la Culture dans l’Antiquité. Paris 2005.
76 Cf. Ebbesen, S., Theories of Language in the Hellenistic Age and in the Twelfth 
and Thirteenth Centuries, in: Frede, D. / Inwood, B. (eds.), Language and Learn-
ing: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenic Age. Cambridge 2005, 299–320. 
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of philosophizing. Thus, a passion for justifying philosophical theories by 
appealing to empirical data became widespread not only in the scientific but 
also in the philosophical debates of the Hellenic age. 
Besides, it is important to stress the philological (grammar, exegesis and 
textual criticism) and institutional achievements (libraries, where the manu-
scripts of the authoritative texts were collected, preserved, copied, studied and 
commented77) of the Hellenic grammarians and textual critics.78 The Alexan-
drian grammarians along with their Pergamum colleagues79 established the 
rules of Greek grammar and a canon of literary and textual criticism which 
has not been significantly altered since. It was due to the study of language 
that questions of grammar and syntax, both per se and in regard to exegeti-
cal practice, became a matter of philosophical contemplation (chiefly within 
the logic agenda; e.g., the logical structure of propositions and homonymy). 
2. Logic and a verified belief in Christian education
In the period of Late Antiquity, Christian intellectuals were actively engaged 
in the methodological and pedagogical discussions spread throughout Hel-
lenic society. At the beginning of Christianity we cannot ascertain any such 
specific educational interest. Being chiefly spread among the lower orders of 
society, Christianity could achieve almost nothing using academic claims. But 
as the situation changed and the higher and more educated classes took an 
interest in the new religious doctrine it began to move more closely towards 
the classical image of the philosophical school. 
Since the emergence of Christianity, the adherents of the new religion had 
been repeatedly ridiculed for their blind and artless faith, whose simplic-
ity could only be attractive to the illiterate and low classes.80 Some Chris-
tian authors felt quite comfortable about this social standing, others, on 
the contrary, were deeply vexed and spared no effort in discrediting this 
“reputation”.81 Justin the Martyr in his Dialogus cum Tryphone performed 
77 Cf. Williams, G.A., Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: Origen, 
Eusebius, and the Library of Caesarea. London 2008, 49–53.
78 For details cf. MacLeod, R. (ed.), The Library of Alexandria. New York 2005.
79 Aulus Gellius reported that “two distinguished Greek grammatici, Aristarchus and 
Crates, made a habit of defending with the utmost vigour, the former analogy, and 
the latter anomaly” (NoctAtt 2.25.4; transl. J.C. Rolfe, 1927, available on-line).
80 E.g., Galen, DiffPuls 8.579: “It would have been much better to have added some-
thing – if not a solid proof then at least an adequate argument, so that you would 
not start by reading out unproved laws as if you had entered a school of Christ or 
of Moses” (transl. mine). Cf. also a critique of Christian argumentation by Celsus. 
81 A vivid example is represented by father and son Apollinaris, who according 
to church historians together rewrote parts of the Bible in conformity with the 
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brilliant skills of argument à la mode of the Platonic dialogues.82 Clemens 
stressed that logical training is necessary for the intelligent Christian (Strom 
1.28.176.3–177.3, 6.10.4–81.1). Gregory Thaumaturgus and Eusebius re-
ported that Origen included logic in his school’s curriculum83 (Greg., Orig 
7, cf. Eus., HE 6.18.3); Eusebius of Caesarea in his Demonstratio Evan-
gelica and Praeparatio Evangelica affiliated Christian doctrine to Hellenic 
philosophy.84 Jerome demonstrated excellent knowledge of certain logical 
literature, mentioning Categoriae, De Interpretatione, Analytics of Aristotle 
and Cicero’s Topics, and professes that he himself in his course of logic had 
also studied Alexander’s commentaries and Porphyry’s Isagoge (Ep 50.1). 
Augustine contended that he read Aristotle in his early years (Conf 4.16.28). 
The Cappadocian fathers systematized the achievements of their predecessors 
by formulating the methodological principles of paradoxical theology, which 
achieved the long-desired accordance of logic and faith.85 
This evidence seems to confirm that a propensity for a critical and dis-
cursive way of reasoning was animated and supported not only by Hellenic 
philosophers but also by prominent Christian theologians, who after the 
legalization of Christianity found themselves responsible for guiding public 
opinion. While the pagans became interested in the harmonization of philo-
sophical doctrines through the backdating of Aristotelian innovations, the 
affirmation of the superiority of Plato over Aristotle and the worshipping of 
divine Pythagoras, the Christians sought to match Hellenic philosophy with 
their doctrine by noting the similarities between the Bible and concepts of 
the Hellenic sages. 
conventions of classical genres in order to teach the forms of classical literature by 
means of the Bible (Socr., HE 2.46; 3.16; Sozom., HE 5.18; 6.25).
82 For details cf. a dissertation The influence of the Platonic dialogues on the literary 
form of the Dialogus cum Tryphone by Justin the Philosopher by Elizaveta Zueva, 
defended in 2011 in Moscow State University (in Russian, available on-line).
83 Even if Aristotle was widely proclaimed to be a founder of logic and thus of the 
scientific method, the revision of his concepts offered by Chrysippus appeared to 
be quite as widely employed and positively esteemed. For details cf. Barnes, J., 
Galen, Christians, Logic, in: Bonelli, M. (ed.), Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy II. Oxford 2012, 13; for Basils and Origens reverence for Peripatetic 
and Stoic logic cf. Sesboüé, B. (intr., trad. et notes), Basile de Césarée, Contre 
Eunome: suivi de Eunome Apologie, t. 2. Paris 1983, 195.
84 Cf.: “They say that we provide nothing by way of proof but require that those 
who come to us rely on trust alone. Against this slander the present treatise may 
be a not irrational reply” (Eus., DE 1.1.12f).
85 E.g., Gregory Nazianzen in his oration 23 (De pace) claimed that Christians should 
reason dogmatically (δογματικῶς) yet not illogically (ἀλλʹ οὐκ ἀντιλογικῶς)” 
(Or 23, PG 35.1164.46).
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Christians and pagans were educated at the same schools and naturally 
enough shared many epistemological principles as well as methodological 
problems and concerns. For instance, Christians willingly embraced the prin-
ciple of utility (sc. ὠφέλεια) in education, that is, the idea that studies of the 
literary classics were aimed at educating (sc. παιδεύειν) rather than entertain-
ing (sc. τέρπειν).86 In this fashion, Julian the Emperor proposed educational 
innovations which were aimed at strengthening the utility of education. In his 
Letter to a Priest we find a summary of Julian’s idea of a proper education 
of a pagan priest.87 
And that you understand what I mean by this, let no one who has been conse-
crated a priest read either Archilochus and Hipponax or anyone else who writes 
such poems as theirs. … and of philosophers only those who chose the gods as 
guides of their mental discipline, like Pythagoras and Plato and Aristotle and 
the school of Chrysippus and Zeno (Fragm. Ep 89b.300c–d). 
For the Christians this utility consisted principally in establishing a sufficient 
background for approaching Holy Scripture. Interestingly enough, sufficient 
background meant studying Hellenic literature. Basil of Caesarea coined a 
paradigmatic consideration of the matter:88 
But so long as our immaturity forbids our understanding their deep thought [sc. 
of the divine words], we exercise our spiritual perceptions upon profane writ-
ings, which are not altogether different, and in which we perceive the truth as it 
were in shadows and in mirrors89 (Homilia de legendis gentilium libris 2.27–30). 
The more power the Christians acquired the more persistently they strove 
for public recognition and rehabilitation of their doctrine, the shortest 
way to which lay in entering the institutionalized academic milieu of the 
philosophical schools. In the poem To his own verses (Εἰς τὰ ἔμμετρα), 
which forms a part of the Autobiographical poems (Carmina de se ipso), 
86 Galen, De semine 1.4 = 4.524. 
87 Cf. also: “But for us will be appropriate to read such narratives as have been 
composed about deeds that have actually been done; but we must avoid all fictions 
in the form of narrative such as were circulated among men in past, for instance 
tales whose theme is love, and generally speaking everything of that sort” (Jul., 
Fragm. Ep 89b.301b; transl. W.C. Wright, 1913, available on-line).
88 Julian apparently was vexed by this practicality of the Christian approach. Cf.: 
“But you yourselves know, it seems to me, the very different effect on the intel-
ligence of your writings as compared with ours; and that from studying yours 
no man could attain to excellence or even to ordinary goodness, whereas from 
studying ours every man would become better than before, even though he were 
altogether without natural fitness” (Gall 205.7–17; transl. W.C. Wright, 1913, 
available on-line).
89 Transl. B. Jackson, 1895, available on-line.
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Gregory Nazianzen expressed his intention to create a Christian alternative 
to the Hellenic literary tradition.
I wished to present my work to the young people (and especially those who enjoy 
literature – ὅσοι μάλιστα χαίρουσι λόγοις), as a kind of pleasant medicine, 
as inducement which might lead them to more useful things … I cannot admit 
the pagans to have greater literary talent than us. I’m speaking of those ornate 
words of theirs (τοῖς κεχρωσμένοις λόγοις), for in our eyes beauty lies in 
contemplation (τὸ κάλλος ἡμῖν ἐν θεωρίᾳ)90 (Carm 2.1332f).
Nevertheless, the efforts of Christian intellectuals to take part in the official 
pedagogical and philosophical agenda were not appreciated by the majority 
of Hellenic intellectuals. The reasons for this disapproval were sound. For 
instance, Origen ascribed the insights of Plato to the doctrine of the Hebrews 
(Or., Cels 4.39), while Eusebius proclaimed certain Greek philosophers to 
have been latent preachers of Christianity (Eus., PE). Some Hellenic authors 
(e.g., Celsus, Porphyry, Julian the Emperor) were furious about the intel-
lectual claims of the representatives of the new-born religion and expressed 
their indignation in treatises against Christians. 
Besides, the Greek and some of the Jewish intellectuals repeatedly mocked 
translation of the Jewish Bible.91 During the entire period of the so-called 
Second Sophistic92 attempts to purify the Hellenic language and cleanse it of 
90 Translation mine.
91 Isidore of Pelusium in one of his letters blames the sons of Hellenes for their con-
tempt for biblical language on the grounds of barbarism (Ep 1555.3–7); Theodoret 
of Cyrus said that some authors blamed the Apostles for their lack of education, 
which revealed itself in their poor style (Greac. affect. cur. prol. 1.4–6); and Je-
rome, who said that even Cicero had to use in his works some odd terms, because 
he translated from Greek and could only make some Latin imitations of the Greek 
terms: “The word ἀποκάλυψις, which means revelation, is a uniquely Scriptural 
coinage that none of the wordly sages among the Greeks employed” (ComGal 
1.1f, transl. A. Cain, 2010, 79).
92 The term second sophistic was introduced by Erwin Rohde (Rohde, E., Der Grie-
chische Roman und Seine Vorläufer. Leipzig 1876; Rohde, E., Die Asianische 
Rhetorik und die Zweite Sophistik, in: RhM 41 [1886], 170–190). Afterwards the 
term was employed by Georg Kaibel (Kaibel, G., Dionisios von Halikarnass und 
die Sophistik, in: Hermes 20/4 [1885], 497–513), Wilhelm Schmid (Schmid, W., 
Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern von Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf 
den zweiten Philostratus, Bde. 4. Stuttgart 1887–1896), Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von., Asianismus und Atticissmus, 
in: Hermes 35 [1900], 1–52) et al. Glen Bowersock challenged the notion that the 
second sophistic represented a social phenomenon (Bowersock, G., Greek Sophists 
in the Roman Empire. Oxford 1969). His Oxford colleagues approved and de-
veloped this approach (Gleason, M., Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation 
in Ancient Rome. Princeton 1995; Goldhill, S., Being Greek under Rome: The 
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barbarism, and to reconstruct Attic forms in writing practice, became an idée 
fixe of many rhetoricians and thinkers.93 In this context, Christian authors 
were forced to defend not only their faith but also the relatively poor language 
of the Holy Scripture. This linguistic task called for professionals in the sphere 
of belles lettres. Origen was one of them, and Basil and Gregory Nazianzen 
esteemed him so highly that they compiled the Philocalia of selected passages 
from Origen’s works, which represented a manual of Christian exegesis and 
textual criticism. This fact marked an important milestone in the methodo-
logical (sc. exegetic methodology featured in the recognition of the biblical 
canon), institutional (sc. a Christian school in Caesarea organized not as a 
typical catechetical school but per sample of the Alexandrian Museion – Eus., 
HE 6.8) evolution of the Christian environment. 
Chapter 2. Epistemological and methodological principles of 
Origen’s biblical studies
1.  Institutional framework of Alexandrian scholarship and Origen’s 
biblical studies
In the third century, when Origen made a considerable contribution to the 
investigation of the biblical manuscripts and establishment of a biblical can-
on, the methodology of textual criticism had, thanks to the achievements 
of Homeric scholarship, already been widely known and recognized. Five 
centuries before Origen, it took a lot of financial and human resources to 
found the Alexandrian Library, to collect manuscripts with Homeric poems, 
Second Sophistic, Cultural Conflict & the Development of the Roman Empire. 
Cambridge 2001; Connolly, J., Reclaiming the Theatrical in the Second Sophistic. 
Helios 2001). Some scholars distinguish between the first (second–third centuries 
AD) and the second (fourth century AD) periods of the second sophistic. As 
part of the discussion of the term a keen debate has taken place concerning the 
place of Christian authors in regard to the phenomenon (Swain, S., Hellenism 
and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World A.D. 50–250. 
Oxford 1996; Anderson, G., The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in 
the Roman Empire. London / New York 1993; Kennedy, G., The Art of Rhetoric 
in the Roman World 300 BC – 300 AD. Princeton 1963; Kustas, G.L., Studies in 
Byzantine Rhetoric. Thessalonike, 1973; Guignet, M., Saint Grégoire de Nazianze 
et la Rhétorique. Paris 1911; Ruether, R., Gregory of Nazianzus: Rhetor and 
Philosopher. Oxford 1969). A combination of the socio-cultural and linguistic 
approach to the Second Sophistic is suggested by: Whitmarsh, T., The Second 
Sophistic. Oxford 2005.
93 Apropos of employment of the classical genres and topoi by Christian authors cf. 
Dorival, G., Les formes et modèles littéraires, in: Pouderon, B. / Norelli, E. (eds.), 
Histoire de la littérature grecque chrétienne 1. Introduction. Paris 2008, 139–188.
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to create the methodology of textual criticism, to produce critical editions of 
the Iliad and the Odyssey and to stabilize the rules of Greek grammar. The 
efforts, however, paid off. After the acme of the Alexandrian Mouseion not 
only did the so-called wild manuscripts, containing weird paraphrases of 
Homeric poems, disappear, but in addition the groundwork was established 
for the Homeric vulgate (with all its pedagogical, literature and cultural values 
and implications). These pivotal achievements occasioned the formation of 
such cultural and intellectual pillars of Hellenism as the paideia and Hellenic 
language. 
As a matter of course, Origen in his biblical studies pursued scholarly 
principles which can be traced back to the complex history of Alexandrian 
philological scholarship. That is to say, the principles of Origen’s biblical stud-
ies resulted from the philological debates of the Hellenic and Hellenic-Jewish 
scribes and scholars affiliated with the Alexandrian tradition.94 Therefore, I 
now proceed to a brief survey of this tradition.
It is common knowledge that in response to Plato’s critique of the poets 
Aristotle came up with a justification of Homer and other Greek poets in his 
Poetica and Aporemata Homerica. These compositions became methodo-
logical pillars for Homeric scholarship (scholars of the Alexandrian school 
leaned towards the Peripatetic school of philosophy).95 However, there was a 
difference in Aristotle’s and Alexandrians’ approach to the philological stud-
ies. While Aristotle pursued justification of the poets, Alexandrian scholars, 
though never in full conformity with each other, balanced the vindication 
of Homer with criticism of the so-called wild manuscripts containing the 
weird paraphrases of Homeric poems. Their studies resulted in critical edi-
tions and running commentaries of Homeric poems.96 Therefore it would 
be fair to say that Homeric scholars formalized the methodology of textual 
criticism, whose binding purpose was to reconstruct the original text of 
literary composition. 
This research purpose sensu stricto could hardly match the scope of Jew-
ish Alexandrian exegetes of Bible, who were born and educated in Hellenic 
culture and had little or no knowledge of the Hebrew language. Therefore, 
94 A connection between Alexandrian scholarship and Origen’s biblical studies 
has been explored by recent research (cf. Perrone, L. [ed.], Origeniana Octava: 
Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition. Leuven 2003). 
95 The famous Peripatetics Demetrius of Phalerum and Theophrastus stood at the 
foundation of the Library in Alexandria (cf. MacLeod, 2005, 79–83). 
96 From what remained in the genuine or paraphrased version from Aristarhus 
(217–145 BC) editions and running commentaries of the Homeric poems we 
know that he athetized and obelized many verses but not as harshly as Zenodo-
tus (cf. Niehoff, M., Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria. 
Cambridge 2011, 9–16). 
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the research interest of Jewish exegetes dwelled in the studies of Septua-
gint. Yet, as Maren Niehoff showed in her monograph Jewish exegesis and 
Homeric scholarship in Alexandria, certain groups of Jewish Alexandrian 
exegetes applied the methodology of textual criticism of Homeric schol-
ars.97 The quarrelsome debates concerning applicability of textual criti-
cism to biblical studies divided Alexandrian Jewish exegetes into two main 
groups. The first associated with the ideas of the author of Letter of Aristeas 
(Aristeae epistula ad Philocratem, second century BC),98 Aristobulus the 
Peripatetic99 (181–124 BC), and Philo (10–50 AD), who tried to justify 
the contradictions of the Septuagint. The second comprised of Demetrius 
(160–131 BC), his anonymous colleagues and the argumentative opponents 
of Philo (whose works are mainly known from Eusebius’ paraphrase in 
the Praeparatio evangelica 9.29.16). These ridiculed the barbarisms of the 
biblical language, and didn’t hesitate to emend and reject them in a typical 
Aristarchian fashion.100 
Despite methodological disagreements, both parties of Alexandrian ex-
egetes in one way or another made use of the philological methods of their 
Hellenic colleagues. In a similar vein with Homeric scholarship, the biblical 
studies of Jewish exegetes resulted in various editions and translations of the 
biblical texts. Yet, it is important to underscore that since the more tradition-
ally oriented scholars could not allow emendation of the sacred texts, their 
primary pursuit was to justify and explain biblical contradictions. 
Origen confirmed that at his time there were: “large differences between 
the manuscripts (τῶν ἀντιγράφων διαφορά),” which according to his tes-
timony were created:
either by the negligence of some copyists (ἀπὸ ῥᾳθυμίας τινῶν γραφέων), 
or by the perverse boldness of others; they either neglect to check over what 
they have transcribed, or, in the process of checking, they make additions or 
deletions as they please (ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ ἑαυτοῖς δοκοῦντα ἐν τῇ διορθώσει <ἢ> 
προστιθέντων ἢ ἀφαιρούντων)101 (ComMatth 15.14).
97 Cf. Niehoff, 2011, 19–58.
98 The author of the letter argued for “the sanctity and natural meaning of the 
law [sc. the Jewish Scriptures]” (ArEp 117), that has been ascertained in the 
Septuagint and hence no alteration (μηδεμία διασκευή) was allowed in this 
translation (ArEp 310). 
99 Taking Aristotelian methodology as his point of departure Aristobulus elabo-
rated a philosophical and philological exegesis of the Hebrew Bible (cf. Collins, 
N.L., The Library in Alexandria and the Bible in Greek, Suppl. to Vetus Testa-
mentum 82. Leiden 2000, 186–190).
100 Cf. Niehoff, 2011, 38–58.
101 Transl. B. Metzger, cf. Metzger, B.M., Explicit References in the Works of Origen 
to Variant Readings in New Testament Manuscripts, in: Birdsall, J.N. / Thomson, 
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Notoriously, these large differences between the biblical manuscripts created a 
serious research problem of choosing between various readings. Yet, even this 
problem was not half as vexing as the puzzling oddities which sprung from 
the discrepancy between the Hebrew and Greek languages. Origen described 
this stylistic discrepancy in the Letter to Africanus, where he pointed to “the 
so-called etymological fancies (οἱονεὶ ἐτυμολογίαι αἵτινες), which in the 
Hebrew are perfectly suitable, but not in the Greek” (Epistula ad Africanum 
11.76.55).102 Origen affirmed that part of the biblical solecisms found in 
Septuagint sprang out of loose or even fallacious translations.103 
Presented with these research problems, Origen, an heir of both Hellenic 
and Jewish Alexandrian traditions, firstly tried to solve them by the means 
of philological (sc. grammatical) analysis. From the Commentary on John 
we learn that some of the Jewish and Early Christian scholars were likewise 
committed to meticulous grammatical studies and engaged in the textual criti-
cism of biblical manuscripts.104 They investigated style and grammar of the 
Greek translations of the Bible in order to detect pseudepigrapha and textual 
forgery in the biblical texts.105 
Similar to many of his predecessors and contemporaries, Origen was deeply 
engaged in the textual criticism and grammatical studies of the biblical texts. 
Yet, his methodology of the textual criticism and grammatical analysis had a 
different scope than the methodology of his Hellenic and Jewish predecessors. 
As a matter of course, Origen was obliged to distinguish his position from 
both traditions, and this obligation significantly complicated his research task. 
For instance, Origen reported that he studied the Jewish Scripture (i.e. using 
secondary sources and consulting Jewish scholars)106 in order to argue with 
R.W. [eds.], Biblical and Patristic Studies: In Memory of Robert Pierce Casey. 
New York 1963, 78–95, [78–79].
102 Here and later transl. F. Crombie, 1885, available on-line.
103 Cf.: “For in many other passages we can find traces of this kind of contriv-
ance (οἰκονομικῶς τινα) on the part of the translators, which I noticed when 
I was collating the various editions (συνεξετάζοντες πάσας τὰς ἐκδόσεις 
ἀλλήλαις)” (EpAf 77.25).
104 Cf.: “We are not unaware that ‘these things were done in Bethania’ occurs in 
nearly all the manuscripts. It seems likely too that, in addition, this was the 
earlier reading. And, to be sure, we have read Bethania in Heracleon” (ComJn 
6.40.204; transl R.E. Heine, 1989, 224).
105 In the Letter to Africanus Origen cites the argumentation of his addressee, who 
doubts the authenticity of the story of Susanna and suggests that it is a “mod-
ern composition and a forgery (σύγγραμμα νεωτερικὸν καὶ πεπλασμένον)” 
because it contains some fine phrases, “which not even Philistion the play-writer 
would have used” (EpAf 49.15).
106 Cf.: “And I make it my endeavour not to be ignorant of their various readings, 
lest in my controversies with the Jews I should quote to them what is not found 
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his Jewish opponents. In spite of this evidence, I think that his pursuits spread 
much further than those required to meet daily polemical needs. 
In order to resolve the disagreements among the Christian churches about 
various versions of the Bible, Origen attempted to formalise the canon of the 
Christian Bible which may appear to be quite a traditional pursuit.107 Yet, 
the way he proceeded towards this goal was truly challenging. Exceeding the 
philological technology of his Hellenic and Jewish predecessors Origen in 
his Hexapla project applied textual criticism to parallel bilingual texts;108 he 
insisted upon collecting various editions with various readings of the biblical 
texts and banned the practice of emendation of biblical texts as heretical.109 
Being so far engrossed in discovery of various readings in various 
manuscripts,110 Origen faced a challenging and unprecedented philological 
and linguistic investigation of bilingual and fairly complicated biblical texts. 
Besides, one should not forget that biblical texts possessed special authori-
tative status for different religious and cultural communities.111 Hence, it is 
in their copies, and that I may make some use of what is found there, even 
although it should not be in our Scriptures” (EpAf 60.15).
107 In disagreement with J.A. McGuckin’s thesis, presented at Origeniana Octava 
(McGuckin, J.A., Origen as Literary Critic in the Alexandrian Tradition, in: 
Perrone, L. [ed.], Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition. 
Leuven 2003, 121–135), that Origen trod in the steps of Alexandrian textual 
critiques by aiming at making textus criticus of Bible, I wish to rather recall 
and renovate B. Metzger’s conclusion that Origen never attempted to prepare 
a formal edition of the New Testament (cf. Metzger, 1963, 78). Yet, contrarily 
to Metzger’s criticism of Origen’s “remarkable indifference to what are now 
regarded as important aspects of textual criticism” (Metzger, 1963, 95), I wish 
to underpin that Origen was well versed in classical textual criticism as well as 
in the methods of Jewish Biblical studies.
108 Eusebius tells us about Hexapla in HE 5.28.16, 18.
109 Cf.: “…an apostolic saying not understood by the followers of Marcion, who 
therefore athetize the Gospels (ἀθετούντων τὰ εὐαγγέλια)” (ComJn 5.7.1f; 
transl. R. Heine, 2014, 165, modified).
110 A compelling testimony of Origen’s devotion to manuscript studies is given 
Eusebius, who in his Historia Ecclesiastica tells us that Origen found unknown 
manuscripts of Psalms in a jar in Jericho, which he embedded in his Hexapla 
(HE 6.16.3).
111 Cf.: “The following examples in the Gospels, however, may persuade us that 
matters related to names are incorrect in the Greek manuscripts in many places” 
(ComJn 6.208) (transl. R. Heine, 2014, 225); and also: “It is possible to see the 
same inaccuracy in many passages of the Law and prophets, as we have inves-
tigated them thoroughly after we learned from the Hebrews and compared our 
manuscripts with theirs, which are confirmed by the translations of Aquila and 
Theodotion and Symmachus which have not yet been corrupted” (ComJn 6.212; 
transl. R. Heine, 2014, 226). 
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fair to say that from a technical and methodological viewpoint, the Hexapla 
marked a unique scholarly achievement because Origen, to the best of his 
knowledge, tried to compare and detect the differences between the Hebrew 
and Greek languages preserved in the multiple manuscripts. He expounds the 
underlying purpose of his studies in his Letter to Africanus: 
What needs there to speak of Exodus, where there is such diversity (ἐπὶ πολὺ 
παρήλλακται) in what is said about the tabernacle and its court, and the ark, 
and the garments of the high priest and the priests, that sometimes the meaning 
even does not seem to be akin (ὡς μηδὲ τὴν διάνοιαν παραπλησίαν εἶναι 
δοκεῖν)? (EpAf 11.57.1).
Taking into account these facts, it appears that the purpose of Origen’s bibli-
cal studies was not to make the textus criticus of Bible,112 but rather to sketch 
the multi-dimensional and pervasive divine message spread through vari-
ous readings in the Greek and Hebrew manuscripts. In other words, Origen 
sought to assemble a comprehensive and inclusive picture of the biblical 
readings, while his direct opponents as well as Homeric scholars and Jewish 
exegetes aimed at the creation of an exclusive picture of Scripture. 
Unlike his opponents, Origen explicitly stated that he did not dare to 
fully reject the passages that he found in disagreement between the Hebrew 
and Greek manuscripts. Yet, seeking to mark the manuscript disagreements 
he applied the typical Aristarchian signs (asterisk and obelisk) to mark the 
textual differences:
For the lack of consistency in the manuscripts of the Old Testament, we have 
with God’s help found a cure, while we use the remaining manuscripts as a 
yardstick; what was dubious in the Septuagint on account of manuscripts lacking 
consistency, we judge this from the rest of the manuscripts, and retain whatever 
is in harmony. Moreover, such places that are not in the Hebrew (we did not dare 
to erase them completely) we mark some with an obelisk. Other places we mark 
with an asterisk to make clear that what we added is not found in the Septuagint, 
but is found in the Hebrew and some manuscripts [of the Septuagint]. Whoever 
wants to can accept these variants, but to whom such a thing is objectionable, 
he can accept or refuse as he wishes (ComMtth 15.14).
112 In disagreement with J.A. McGuckin’s thesis, presented at Origeniana Octava 
(McGuckin, 2003, 121–135), that Origen trod in the steps of Alexandrian tex-
tual critiques by aiming at making textus criticus of Bible, I wish to rather recall 
and renovate Metzgers conclusion that Origen never attempted to prepare a 
formal edition of the New Testament. Yet, contrarily to Metzger’s criticism of 
Origen’s “remarkable indifference to what are now regarded as important as-
pects of textual criticism” (Metzger, 1963, 95), I wish to underpin that Origen 
was well versed in classical textual criticism as well as in methods of Jewish 
biblical studies. 
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This passage shows that Origen insisted upon the studies of various readings 
not for the sake of reconstruction of the original text (as was the purpose of 
Homeric scholars and those Jewish scholars who followed their path) nor 
for the sake of preservation of the sacred text (as was the common pursuit 
of conservative Jewish exegetes) but for the sake of a deep and multifarious 
understanding of the biblical text and various individual levels of content. 
It naturally follows from this that such a comprehensive scholarly ap-
proach to biblical studies implies that an exegete can observe and compare 
various parallel readings of biblical passages. The Hexapla represented an 
unfolded version of such a helpful edition.113 This technical and methodo-
logical innovation could certainly not pass unnoticed by Hellenic scribes and 
scholars. There is no wonder that at least among Christian exegetes Origen 
acquired an outstanding reputation of an exegete par excellence. A compo-
sition of the Philocalia, a handbook of Christian biblical studies compiled 
from Origen’s works and secured by the authority of Basil of Caesarea and 
Gregory Nazianzen, I think, could be considered as trustworthy evidence 
of the positive reception of Origen’s exegetic methodology by later biblical 
scribes and scholars.
Origen’s comprehensive approach to biblical studies may appear somewhat 
in tension with his attempts to create a canon of the Christian Bible. Indeed, 
in various works Origen expresses his concern with such issues as: how many 
codices or rolls should a proper edition of the Bible comprise, what is the 
proper sequence of the biblical books, what should distinguish a proper Chris-
tian edition of the Bible from heretic editions. Eusebius gives a condensed 
version of Origen’s vision of the biblical canon in his Historia Ecclesiastica. 
Apropos of the Old Testament he refers to Origen’s commentary on the first 
Psalm, where he asserts that “the canonical books, as the Hebrews have 
handed them down, are twenty-two; corresponding with the number of their 
letters” (HE 6.25). In the introduction to the fifth volume of Commentaries 
on John Origen contends that despite the variety of readings, the prophets 
and apostles conceived of the Holy Scripture as one book (νενόηκε γραφὴν 
ὡς βίβλον μίαν; ComJn 6.6.7). To justify this idea Origen refers to Apostle 
John’s words from the book of Revelation 10:10 where he claims that “he 
ate one roll of the book” (μίαν κεφαλίδα; ComJn 5.6.25).
In such a way Origen argues for the inherent consistency of the biblical 
corpus which can and should be clearly displayed in the edition of Bible. 
At the same time, in a somewhat contradictory way, Origen asserts that a 
Christian exegete should not reject what seems to him an odd reading or an 
inconsistent passage of the Bible. He alleged that it is a habit of heretics to 
113 A description of Origen’s Hexapla is preserved in Jerome’s Commentary on 
Epistle to Titus 3.9 (PL 26, 734d–735a), and Eusebius’ HE 6.16.
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reject spurious readings, and that Christians should not fall for such an impi-
ous treatment of the holy texts (ComJn 5.7.1–2).
In order to see what Origen possibly meant by suggesting these contra-
dictory criteria, I now turn back to classical scholarship, where comparable 
ideas were first aired. In his seminal Aporemata Homerica, Aristotle intro-
duced the practice of multiple solutions of textual contradictions. The general 
structure of the Aristotelian study of Homeric questions consisted of the 
following elements: the contradictory fragment, the διὰ τί inquiry about this 
fragment, and a few possible solutions of the issue. In chapter 25 of the Poet-
ics Aristotle justifies the multiplicity of possible answers by pointing to the 
multivocity of being:
With regard to problems, and the various solutions of them, how many kinds 
there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like 
this. Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of like-
nesses, he must always represent one of three things — either things as they were 
or are (οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν); or things as they are said and seem to be (οἷά φασιν 
καὶ δοκεῖ); or things as they should be (οἷα εἶναι δεῖ)114 (Poet 1460b5–11).
In a quite similar way Origen in his De Principiis contends:
Scripture interweaves the imaginative with the historical, sometimes introduc-
ing what is utterly impossible (πῆ μὲν μηδὲ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι), sometimes 
what is possible but has never occurred (πῆ δὲ δυνατὸν μὲν γενέσθαι, οὐ μὴν 
γεγενημένον)115 (Princ 4.2.9 = Phil 1.16).
Aristotle applied different logical, grammatical, historical and stylistic argu-
ments in order to solve textual puzzles. If all these arguments fail to provide 
consistency in a given questionable fragment, Aristotle assumed that for some 
reason the author had applied dramatic effect in the text. Homeric scholars, 
Jewish exegetes and Origen also explained particularly troublesome frag-
ments by assuming deliberate authorial usage of dramatic effect.116 Porphyry 
informs us that Aristarchus elaborated the methodology of justification of 
textual contradictions by suggesting a comparison of parallel fragments.117 
114 Transl. W.H. Fyfe, 1932, available on-line. 
115 Here and later translation of the Philocalia fragments by G. Lewis, 1911, avail-
able on-line.
116 On the whole, Origen stood in line with Philo and Aristotle who supposed that 
the authoritative text (sc. of the Bible or of Homer) is free from any inconsistency 
and that each and every questionable fragment can be justified by a meticulous 
scholar (cf. Or., Phil. 9.30).
117 Although Aristarchus’ authorship of the famous dictum “αὐτὸς μὲν ἑαυτὸν 
πολλὰ Ὅμηρος ἐξηγεῖται” preserved by Porphyry is questionable (Porph., HQ 
1.1.12f.), the method of comparison of parallel readings most assuredly goes 
back to Aristarchus (in support of this idea cf.: Eustathios, ComIl 2.101.14f.).
46
Thus, for Aristarchus a seemingly nonsensical phrase (sc. τὸ ἀδύνατον) can 
be clarified, justified and understood through comparison with another con-
text or reading. Aristarchus used this technique in his running commentaries 
and also as the main instrument for the emendation of Homeric text, namely 
when he transferred some passages into different contexts, under the pretext 
that “this line is not properly placed here” (Schol. Il. 1.177a). 
Origen also compared parallel fragments, although he did not attempt 
in so doing to reconstruct as accurately as possible the original reading and 
produce a scholarly critical edition. Instead, his aim was the comprehensive 
compiling of various versions of the biblical texts, which would present the 
exegete with as full a variety of readings as possible. In such a way Origen 
contended that:
… the only way to begin to understand the Scriptures is (οὐκ ἄλλοθεν τὰς 
ἀφορμὰς τοῦ νοεῖσθαι λαμβανούσας) by means of other passages contain-
ing the explanation dispersed throughout them (ἢ παρ’ ἀλλήλων ἐχουσῶν ἐν 
αὐταῖς διεσπαρμένον τὸ ἐξηγητικόν)118 (Sel. in Ps. 12.1080.37 = Phil 2.3). 
Seen in the light of this logic, figurative or allegorical interpretation manifests 
itself as, so to speak, a multicontextual reading of the text. Niehoff argued 
that Aristobulus119 regarded figurative interpretation in a similar way. She 
also noted that this version of allegorical interpretation should be traced back 
to Aristotle and in no way be associated with the Stoics..
Yet Origen went even further and sought for parallel readings not only 
throughout Scripture but also in comparing biblical fragments with certain 
relevant passages of the most authoritative classical compositions. Thus, 
Origen significantly broadened the background of Scripture and allowed the 
reader of the holy texts to grasp the contextual framework of biblical con-
cepts and notions (cf. Or., Cels 6.10). Although he applied classical contexts 
only for the sake of interpretation and never equated their authority with 
the authority of biblical texts, nonetheless the amplitude of Origen’s horizon 
was a remarkable phenomenon which distinguished the Christian approach 
to textual criticism from the classical and Jewish approaches.120 
118 Transl. G. Lewis, 1911, available on-line.
119 Cf. Niehoff, 2011, 62f.
120 By presenting this way of understanding figurative interpretation I do not mean 
to deny that sometimes Origen went further than the literal meaning of various 
contexts could suggest. Nevertheless, I believe that even when Origen was busy 
suggesting some allegorical interpretation of the text, the way he did so can be 
legitimately traced back to the philological techniques of Aristotelian Homeric 
scholarship. To give one short example, in the Fragment from Commentary 
on John Origen assumes that the Jews called Christ a Samaritan because they 
agreed to do so in secret (κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον, ComJn fr. 77.14). This passage 
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Now by the way of outlining the bedrock principles of Origen’s biblical 
studies I would pinpoint certain passages from the Philocalia. 
1. Origen argued for collecting various editions preserving various readings 
of the biblical texts. Remarkably, the purpose of this activity was to go 
through all the existing readings, no matter how wild these manuscripts 
may seem at first blush. In such a way, Origen claimed: 
Nay, I suppose that every letter, no matter how strange, which is written in 
the oracles of God, does its work (ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ὅτι καὶ πᾶν θαυμάσιον 
γράμμα τὸ γεγραμμένον ἐν τοῖς λογίοις τοῦ θεοῦ ἐργάζεται) (ComJer fr. 
2.1 = Phil 10.1).
2. Origen forbade emendation of the solecistic phrases of Scripture. The en-
tire eighth chapter of the Philocalia, excerpted from the Commentary on 
Hosea, is devoted to this topic and correspondingly entitled: 
That we need not attempt to correct the solecistic phrases of Scripture. (Περὶ 
τοῦ μὴ δεῖν τὰ σολοικοειδῆ ῥητὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἐπιχειρεῖν διορθοῦσθαι) (Phil 
8.1n).
3. Origen also forbade the rejection of spurious fragments, arguing that 
to reject fragments of Scripture was a heretic custom. Here are Origen’s 
thoughts on this issue in his Commentary on Hezekiah: 
There are some who err in respect of the Gospel pasture and the apostolic water, 
so that they tread down certain portions of the Gospel field and feed on others 
as on good pasture, either rejecting the whole apostolic pasture, or approving 
some parts and rejecting others, let us feed on the whole of the Gospels and 
not tread down any part of them (ἁμαρτανόντων δέ τινων καὶ περὶ τὴν 
εὐαγγελικὴν νομὴν καὶ τὸ ἀποστολικὸν ὕδωρ, ὥστε τῶν εὐαγγελικῶν 
τινὰ μὲν πατεῖν τινὰ δὲ ὡς καλὴν νέμεσθαι νομὴν, καὶ τῶν ἀποστολικῶν 
ἢ πάντα ἀποκρίνειν, ἤ τινα μὲν ἐγκρίνειν τινὰ δὲ ἀποκρίνειν) (ComEzech 
fr. 13.665.5 = Phil 11.2).
4. Origen acknowledged that not all readings are of equal authenticity and 
that certain ones might indeed be fallacious. Yet, interestingly enough, this 
did not prevent him from stating together with Apostle Paul that this vari-
ety of readings is but natural and even reasonable because, as the Apostle 
asserted:
There must be also sects among you, that they which are approved may be 
made manifest among you (Δεῖ γὰρ καὶ αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι, ἵνα οἱ δόκιμοι 
φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν [1 Cor 11:19])” (Cels 3.13.2 = Phil 16.2).
suggests that Origen was familiar with Aristarchus’ κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον tech-
nique (Schol. Il. 21.17a).
48
5. In sum, these complementary principles elucidate Origen’s vision of bibli-
cal studies, whose purpose, as I emphasised earlier, consists in acquiring 
a comprehensive vision of biblical readings in both Hebrew and Greek 
traditions, which would allow an exegete to penetrate a multi-dimensional 
and universal divine message. Origen conceded that acquiring such a com-
prehensive vision required an ascetic way of life, which may or may not 
bring the scholar to a desirable result (for it is only a saint, after all, who 
is able to penetrate the divine message). In such a way, Origen asserted:
The saint is a sort of spiritual herbalist, who culls from the sacred Scriptures 
every jot and every common letter, discovers the value of what is written and its 
use, and finds that there is nothing superfluous in the Scriptures (οὕτως οἱονεὶ 
βοτανικός τις πνευματικός ἐστιν ὁ ἅγιος, ἀναλεγόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν 
γραμμάτων ἕκαστον ἰῶτα καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ τυχὸν στοιχεῖον, καὶ εὑρίσκων 
τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ γράμματος, καὶ εἰς ὅτι ἐστὶ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν 
παρέλκει τῶν γεγραμμένων) (ComJer fr. 2.2 = Phil 10.2).
These principles of biblical studies were set out in the Hexapla, which repre-
sented a ground-breaking methodological and technical innovation in Hel-
lenic philology. It is important to see the heavy methodological baggage 
which emerged together with the composition of Hexapla. What distinguishes 
Origen’s approach from the textual criticism of Hellenic and Jewish scholars 
is a pioneering and outstandingly high estimation of various receptions of 
the text. Whilst admitting that the Greek versions of Aquila, Symmachus had 
some forgeries deliberately inserted by the Jews,121 he neither emended nor 
rejected these versions from his collection. These versions were important 
for him because they threw light on the Jewish tradition of the reception of 
the Bible. 
In view of this evidence I cannot help seeing Origen’s approach to the text 
as surprisingly comparable to the contemporary research contending that 
the environmental (sociocultural and institutional) context of the literary 
composition is just as important for the formation of meaning122 as words 
121 For instance, Origen argued that Jews, in order to reject the story of Susanna 
and many other narratives and passages accepted in Christian tradition, “in-
troduced some phrases manifestly incorrect (λέξεις τινὰς τὰς μὴ πρεπούσας 
παρεμβεβληκότων τῇ γραφῇ)” (EpAf 11.65.25).
122 Contemporary cognitive linguistics studies reveal interesting observations con-
cerning the process of meaning formation. E.g., Evans and Green in their intro-
duction to cognitive linguistics focus on the relation of language and thought 
and conclude that semantic structure is conceptual and as such it is embodied 
(cf. Evans, V. / Green, M., Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Mahwah / 
New Jersey 2006, 44–50).
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and sentences, which constitute the textual tissue.123 I think that for Origen 
biblical text was not simply a collection of words arranged in sentences, 
divided in books with certain subheadings and paragraphes, scribed in co-
dices, and organized in the canon so that a correct sequence of the books 
is preserved. This is, of course, a rather rough depiction of the canon but 
even so, Origen knew that a commonly accepted version of the Bible would 
contribute to peace in the Church. Yet, he also knew that from the scholarly 
viewpoint this task was fairly complicated. Not only was it so because of the 
variety of the biblical manuscripts but also because these manuscripts were 
produced in certain environments and therefore their interpretation entailed 
studies of the transmission history of these endoseis. This tension between 
a routine Church need of the biblical canon and scholarly awareness of its 
“price,” eventually led Origen to a somewhat compromised solution. He 
balanced his efforts to establish the biblical canon with a thorough histori-
cal and philological study of the biblical texts that resulted in his extensive 
commentaries. Thus, is appears that Origen considered the canonised text 
of the Bible as a starting point and a rudder in his further and deeper studies 
and commentaries. 
In the Hellenic context and especially in the period of Late Antiquity, such 
a comprehensive scholarly approach to the text, and a pronounced interest 
in the transmission history of the text was not extraordinary. For instance, it 
is attested in the contemporary biblical scholarship that the New Testament 
manuscript culture was characterized by the so-called textual fluidity.124 It is 
in the same manner that, with a reference to Bernard Cerquiglini’s Éloge de 
la variante, Hugo Lundhaug, who studies the monastic manuscript culture 
in late antique Egypt,125 assumes that manuscript variants should not be 
123 Lundhaug persuasively argues for applying cognitive poetics in the studies of 
the early Christian literature (cf. Lundhaug, H., Cognitive Poetics and Ancient 
Texts, in: Ostreng, W. [ed.], Complexity. Interdisciplinary Communications 
2006/2007. Oslo 2008, 18–20). He asserts that ancient texts should not be ana-
lysed apart from the discourse context. In tune with the blending theory of Fau-
connier and Turner, he concludes that words, sentences and texts certainly guide 
the production of meaning, but they do not determine it (cf. Fauconnier, G. / 
Turner, M., The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Minds Hidden 
Complexities. New York 2002, 40).
124 Cf. the details about the history of the concept in: Lundhaug, H. / Lied, L.I., Studying 
Snapshots: On Manuscript Culture, Textual Fluidity, and New Philology, in: Lied, 
L.I. / Lundhaug, H. (eds.), Snapshots of Evolving Traditions: Jewish and Christian 
Manuscript Culture, Textual Fluidity, and New Philology. Berlin 2017, 1. 
125 An ERC financed research project “New Contexts for Old Texts: Unorthodox 
Texts and Monastic Manuscript Culture in Fourth- and Fifth-Century Egypt 
(NEWCONT)” guided by Professor Hugo Lundhaug (University of Oslo). 
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considered as deviation from the norm but as a natural product of the scribal 
culture, where textual variant represented the norm.126 
Another comparable context can be seen in the reception paradigm of 
the philosophical schools of Late Antiquity. As I have mentioned earlier, a 
routine business of the philosophical schools was to practice philosophy by 
reinterpreting the authoritative texts. Importantly, the purpose of these school 
oral exegetic-philosophical exercises was not to agree upon some commonly 
accepted reading but to contribute to a personal progress of the students. 
An impressive variety of interpretation and a keen interest in re-thinking the 
authoritative texts is preserved in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 
composed in the Peripatetic and Platonic schools in a period from the second 
and until seventh century AD. The written commentaries composed by the 
students of the schools captured the oral lectures in varied transcription and 
this variety was the norm of the Commentaria.
Now, if we combine these bits of evidence I think we can see how Origen’s 
principles of the biblical studies fit the context of Late Antiquity. Namely, 
in the circumstances of textual fluidity every honest scholar would see that 
making an accurate textus criticus of Bible is an even more daring enterprise 
than the Hexapla project. This status quo of the manuscript culture shaped 
the reading-writing paradigm of the philosophical schools, where a stronger 
didactic potential of questions over answers has been realised and a balance 
between the canonised authoritative texts and the research questions attached 
to them has been found. In these circumstances Origen could hardly consider 
variant readings as necessary negative phenomenon. Hence, he was deeply 
engrossed in studies of the transmission of the biblical texts. Although we 
have nothing but a few short fragments of the Hexapla,127 I think it is safe to 
assume that the Origenian methodology of biblical studies influenced at least 
some groups of the biblical scribes and scholars of the period that followed. 
Moreover, I venture to suggest that were this so, then the traces of it can be 
seen not only in the editions and commentaries of the biblical texts but also in 
the scribal τέχνη in general. In such a way, it is logical to assume that some of 
the authoritative texts composed or copied in the monastic communities, who 
supported Origenian philological principles, could preserve variant readings 
of the text or references to the contextual parallels.128 
126 Cf. Lundhaug, 2017, 2; Cerquiglini, B., In Praise of the Variant: A Critical His-
tory of Philology, transl. B. Wing. Baltimore 1999, 77f. 
127 Grafton, A. / Williams, M., Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: 
Origen, Eusebius, and the Library of Caesarea. London 2008, 28.
128 I am sincerely grateful to Professor Lundhaug’s illuminating suggestion given im-
promptu in the discussion of Origen’s principles of biblical studies and their pos-
sible impact on posterior exegetic and scribal tradition. He recalled the papyrus 
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In conclusion I would like to cite Gregory Nazianzen, who similarly to 
Origen believed that texts should not be investigated irrespective of their 
transmission. In his Oration 31 he asserts: 
…words do not belong more to the speaker of them than to him who 
called them forth (οὐ γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος μᾶλλον οἱ λόγοι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν 
συναναγκάζοντος)129 (Or 31.24). 
2. Origen’s exegetic methodology and Hellenic grammarians 
Origen’s experimental method of biblical studies was also primed to be in-
fluential from the linguistic point of view. As I have noted above Origen 
disapproved of rejecting those passages which he could not understand be-
cause of their strong dependency on the Hebrew original. In other words, 
Origen could not allow a one-standard model of language to control his 
biblical studies. In this he differed from the Hellenic grammarians who mainly 
considered the language of the poets as a paradigmatic example.130 In such a 
way Origen’s approach featured great flexibility, which he nevertheless com-
bined with a peculiar way of systematizing and ordering theological concepts. 
In this section I observe the lineaments of his method of systematisation which 
partially depended on the principles of ordering knowledge, discovered and 
established by the Hellenic grammarians (sc. the concepts of canon, gram-
matical analogy and order).
The growth of Homeric scholarship boosted grammatical studies and 
eventually resulted in the systematization of the rules of the Greek and Latin 
languages. A process of formalisation of the rules of Greek and Latin lan-
guages exemplified a significant epistemological paradigm. It is a commonly 
accepted prerequisite of systematization that there should be a somewhat 
reasonable arrangement of the elements constituting a system. One method 
of systematization comes with following certain operative regularities (sc. 
analogy); another with compiling a canon or paradigm, which practically 
amounts to a certain empirically attested data-storage framed by a less rigid, 
not apparent and maybe even dubious regularity. Analogy regulates con-
nections between the components,131 while canon can be understood as a 
roll (P.Köln Kopt. 1), which contains the two different versions of Pachomius 
Letter 10, preserved in the Coptic language and currently held in the Cologne 
University Library.
129 Transl. Ch.G. Browne / J.E. Swallow, 1894, available on-line.
130 Apollonius Dyscollus asserted that the language of poets, while significantly 
differing from ordinary speech yet represents a pre-eminent example of Hellenic 
language and therefore should be explored and explained (cf. Constr 2.77).
131 The methodological principle of analogy, which formed a ground of the Al-
exandrian grammatical and exegetical science, is captured in Varro’s account: 
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less restricted sequence, list, or table.132 In such a way, canon (sc. κανών) 
comprises different examples that occurred in habitual usage, and does not 
necessarily conform to analogical regularity. 
A discussion of these two principles between the grammatical Analogists 
and Anomalists, roughly speaking, revolved around the limits of rational the-
orizing on the basis of empirical data. Although neither rationalists nor em-
piricists denied the regularity of linguistic phenomena, they disagreed about 
the implications of this regularity: the rationalists believed that rules must 
determine the reality of language, while their opponents held the opposite 
position. In this way, Zenodotus, the first librarian of the Alexandrian Mou-
seion, in his first critical edition of Homeric poems based on a comparison 
of various manuscripts, expunged or obelized doubtful verses, transposed or 
altered lines, and introduced numerous conjectures. His successors appreci-
ated his critical methodology but often disagreed with his conjectures, so that 
a lot of verses expunged by Zenodotus were later accepted by Aristarchus. 
Subsequently, a tendency towards the reasonable harmonization of ratio and 
empeiria gave rise to a balanced scholarly approach held by grammarians 
and physicians.133
A case example is preserved in the works of the second century gram-
marian Apollonius, whose treatises on syntaxis and orthography became 
the standard manuals for many years after their publication. His work came 
after the achievements of the Stoic linguistics and of the Alexandrian and 
Pergamum schools of grammar.134 In Apollonius’ study of Greek language we 
find a balanced treatment of grammatical analogy and of the empirical facts 
of language. Thus, Apollonius designated two criteria of his study of Greek 
syntaxis: analogy (sc. ἀναλογία, ἀκολουθία) or correct construction (sc. 
καταλληλότης) and tradition (sc. παράδοσις, ἱστορία) or habitual usage. 
In his treatise De constructione he professed as follows:
… parts of speech will be established neither because of regularity of form (οὔτε 
παρὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῶν φωνῶν), nor because of irregularity (οὔτε μὴν παρὰ 
“Aristarchus, when he writes about the consistency of speech, bids us follow 
a certain likeness (similitudinem) of words in their declension, as far as usage 
permits (consuetudo)” (De Lingua Latina 9.1.1; transl. R.G. Kent, 1938, 441).
132 Cf. Lampe, G.W.H. (ed.), A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Oxford 1987; Liddell, H. / 
Scott, R. / Jones, H.S. (eds.), A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford 1983; (available 
on-line). 
133 For instance, Sextus tells us that Galen argued for a balanced use of rational 
speculations and empirical data (cf. Sextus, M 1.176, 1.60, 72).
134 Crates of Mallus was a founder of the Pergamum school, an adherent of the 
Stoic philosophy and a famous expert in allegorical interpretation. According to 
ancient evidence he sought to secure the support of Homer for Stoic doctrines 
(Eustathios, ComIl 11.32–40).
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τὸ ἀνακόλουθον τὰ τοῦ λόγου) but, as has been explained, on the basis of 
constant unique distinctive properties [of use or sense] (ἐκ τῆς παρεπομένης 
ἰδιότητος)135 (Constr 1.77). 
This research principle enabled Apollonius to expound and thereby “legal-
ize” some irregularities of Greek grammar, as, for instance, in the construc-
tion of a neuter plural with a singular verb. It follows from this approach 
to the language, that one of the tasks of the grammarian consists in recog-
nition and explanation of syntactical and orthographical irregularities (sc. 
ἀκατάλληλα) or solecisms (Constr 267.2), which can be explained and thus 
justified. Accordingly, Apollonius talked about “reason of irregularity” (sc. 
λόγος or αἰτία τοῦ ἀκατάλληλου136). Apollonius emphasized that it is im-
portant to study constructions which appear irregular, and to seek to explain 
their irregularity. 
The rationalistic approach to language, which is characterised by an expla-
nation of both regularities and irregularities in language, was built on the as-
sumption that at the background of all the puzzling and regular linguistic data 
lies the reasonable organization of the universe, which surfaces on different 
levels of being. For instance, Apollonius at the beginning of his De Construc-
tione postulated that there is a certain order (sc. τάξις), which is determined 
by nature (Constr 16.6–11) and can be detected in various phenomena. In a 
similar vein, he draws a parallel between the rational orderly organization of 
the universe (sc. λογικὴ ἀκολουθία), and its physical regularity (sc. φυσικὴ 
παρακολούθησις; Constr 1.52.5). 
In Stoic philosophy, this concept of the universal logicality and orderly 
structure of nature was mirrored in a theory of sequential provenance of 
the parts of speech.137 Apollonius professed that when language was first 
invented (Constr 4.10) the parts of speech took a certain order. He remarked 
that analogical orderly organization characterises the sequence of letters in 
the alphabet, the order of cases (nom., gen., dat., acc.), of tenses (present, 
past, future, etc.), and of genders (masc., fem., neut.). Eventually, this chain 
of thoughts leads to the assumption that all these orderly structures manifest 
logical patterns of the human intellect (Constr 1.12–29). Hereby, Apollonius 
asserted that grammatical analogy, which can be observed in word-forms, 
reveals not only regularity of the signifiers (sc. φωναί, words), but also the 
logicality of their significata (sc. νοητά, meanings; Constr 2.3–3.2, cf. ComJn 
135 Translation W. Householder, 1981, 50. 
136 Apollonius, Pron 38.22; transl. W. Householder, 1981, 91. 
137 The orderly organization of parts of speech goes back to the Stoic theory of 
pristine language, which was characterized by an accurate resemblance between 
intelligible and corporeal phenomena and was violated in the run of time (cf. 
Apollonius, Pron 38.22f.).
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2.161). Consequently, Apollonius contended that words can be analysed from 
the viewpoint of either their form or their meaning.138 A belief in correspond-
ence between the signifiers and significata was a feature of Stoic linguistic 
theory, which was adapted by grammarians.139 
Like the grammarians, Origen based his exegetical studies on a compromise 
between reasoning out both analogy and irregularities of the biblical language 
(for he clearly approached these notions as relative terms, which lose their 
meaning if not paired together140). Origen’s biblical studies comprised various 
techniques. By the means of grammatical analysis he studied the habitual us-
age of scriptural lexique (sc. συνήθεια, ἦθος; cf. ComJn 13.285, 290, 32.52; 
Sel. in Ps. 15.9) and argued for the logicality and consistency of the biblical 
text (sc. ἀναλογία, ἀκολουθία; cf. Philocalia 2.4.6; ComJn 2.102f.). 
Like Hellenic grammarians, Origen supported the idea of sequential prov-
enance of the parts of speech, of orderly structure of the universe and of 
the analogical connection between the physical (corporeal) and intelligible 
(incorporeal) phenomena (sc. καταλληλότης141). 
With regard to the sequential provenance of the parts of speech in the 
Commentaries on Genesis, Origen refers to Aquila Romanus (the third cent. 
AD Latin grammarian) who taught that subject has a certain priority to its 
derivation (sc. predicate) which characterises the subject.142 
Pondering the reasonable structure of the universe, Origen assert-
ed that this primordial structure enables the structuring of theological 
knowledge.143 For instance, in the Commentary on John he affirmed that the 
whole Bible is one body, whose parts form a harmonious unity in the Word 
138 Apollonius, Adv 119.1. 
139 It has become an accepted commonplace that it was the Stoics who introduced 
grammar as a “philosophy of language” and thereby procured a place for this 
discipline within philosophical studies (cf. Blank, 1994, 165).
140 Cf. Simplicius’ observation apropos the father-son relationships from his Com-
mentary on Categories (cf. ComCat 8.166.15–27).
141 Cf. Origen’s observation from his Homily on the Prayer: “Needful, therefore, 
is the bread which corresponds most closely to our rational nature and is akin 
to our very essence (ἄρτος ὁ τῇ φύσει τῇ λογικῇ καταλληλότατος καὶ τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ αὐτῇ συγγενὴς), which invests the soul at once with well-being and with 
strength, and, since the Word of God is immortal, imparts to its eater its own 
immortality” (Orat 27.9.20–4; transl. W.A. Curtis, 2001, available on-line).
142 Cf. Or., ComGen 12.88.20f.
143 In a recently issued monograph Róbert Somos scrutinizes the epistemology and 
strategy of argumentation of Origen. Somos touches upon different aspects of 
the logical discipline, focusing chiefly on rational syllogistic and linguistic ex-
egetic issues, and takes as his point of departure a comprehensive definition of 
logic as a rational discipline, which, due to the likeness of the created mind to 
divine intellect and the providential activity of God, guarantees the possibility 
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of God (ComJn 10.107). Origen contends that the whole world consists of 
the “elements of faith” (sc. στοιχεῖα τῆς πίστεως), through which, as long 
as they are arranged in a proper order, heavenly matters can be read (ComJn 
1.21). Origen draws a parallel between the sequence of the alphabet (sc. lin-
guistic level), and the sequence of the corporeal universe (sc. physical level), 
and also maintains the sequence of theological knowledge coined in the bibli-
cal canon144 (sc. exegetical and theological level, ComJn 1.106). 
The concept of universal law, which surfaces in different spheres of reality, 
links together and governs the whole universe, and this appeared in a fully-
fledged form in Stoic philosophy.145 Arius Didimus reported that according 
to the Stoics “the linkage and logical consequence of all things past, present 
and future, is an irrevocable and inescapable fate and knowledge and truth 
and law of all that is”.146 Cicero affirmed that “natural law is divine” and 
that “a reason which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power”.147 
In a similar vein with the complex and comprehensive theory of the Sto-
ics, the Hellenic grammarians retained flexibility in their explanation of 
disanalogous linguistic examples. A comparable approach characterized 
Origen’s vision for the diversity and richness of the biblical language. Not 
only did he proclaim the multivocity of the biblical lexis but he also attested 
to various interpretative levels embedded in the biblical text. Consequently, 
in his view biblical text represents a multi-level and multi-dimensional sys-
tem comprised of different meaningful “codes”, which can work differently 
not only due to their multiplicity but also depending on the circumstances, 
of attaining true knowledge about the universe and divinity (Somos, R., Logic 
and Argumentation in Origen. Münster 2015). 
144 In his monograph on logic and argumentation in Origen, Somos highlights the 
analogy which Origen makes between the logical elements of the universe and 
the principles of theology. Somos particularly focuses on the parallels between 
the scientific methodology of Aristotle and Origen’s exegetical principles declared 
in the Commentary on John (cf. Somos, 2015, 106).
145 Although the reasonable and orderly organization of the universe was pro-
claimed in Plato’s Timaeus, lately Antiochus of Ascalon (died 68 BC) and Posido-
nius (135–151 BC) harmonised the teachings of Platonism and Stoicism. George 
Karamanolis stated that Platonists believed “that in the Aristotelian or the Stoic 
writings they read nothing but Plato in a more dogmatic form”, since Zeno 
and Aristotle were both disciples of Plato, one directly, the other indirectly (cf. 
Karamanolis, G.E., Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. Oxford 
2006, 21). Another evidence of an intense dialogue between the philosophical 
schools is Simplicius’ commentary on the Handbook by the Stoic Epictetus (cf. 
Hadot, I. / Hadot, P., Apprendre à Philosopher dans l’Antiquité. L’Enseignement 
du “Manuel d’Épictète” et son Commentaire Néoplatonicien. Paris 2004, 35).
146 The witness of Arius is preserved in Eusebius’ PE 15.14.2. 
147 Cf. Cicero, De natura deorum 1.36. (transl. H. Rackham, 1933).
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environments, and eventually, on the embodied minds of exegetes, where 
these “codes” are “activated”.148
Interestingly enough, Origen arrived at this flexible approach to biblical 
studies when the governmental edicts and the spires of soldiers impelled a 
demand for an official church decision about the canon of the Christian Bible. 
As Lee McDonald persuasively showed in his research of the history of the 
Christian scriptural canon, the church community played an essential role 
in the identification of authoritative biblical texts. Practically, it was attested 
by liturgical and, so to speak, functional institutional employment of certain 
scriptures in the Christian worship, mission and literature.149
In conformity with McDonald’s argument, I wish to suggest that Origen’s 
biblical studies assume that the burden of responsibility for correct interpre-
tation of the Bible lies on the shoulders of the exegete (rather than church 
community), who must format the whole way of studying the biblical puz-
zles. Clearly, this emphasized responsibility of an individual did not infringe 
upon the authority of church, but simply underscored that biblical meanings 
represent a difficulty, a challenge, which awakens the mind of exegete and 
calls it to metanoia. 
Origen’s commitment to serious philological studies of the Bible can also be 
seen in his attempt to create a Christian school akin to the Alexandrian Mou-
seion. A general outline of Origen’s plan was presented by John McGuckin at 
Origeniana Octava, especially devoted to Origen and the Alexandrian Tradi-
tion.150 McGuckin argued that the educational standards of the Alexandrian 
Museion, which represented a fine example of an educational and research 
institution,151 impressed Origen to the extent that he ventured to organize a 
similar Christian institution. According to Eusebius’ account (HE 6.3.8–13) 
the church hierarchy at Alexandria disapproved of this “daring deed” of 
Origen, because his project of the school differed to a remarkable extent from 
the familiar image of a catechetical school and from the expectations of the 
148 Origen gives an interesting account concerning the interconnection between 
corporeal and intellectual aspects of the human being in the 20th homily on 
Jeremiah (HomJer 20.9.83f.), where he expounds the biblical saying that God 
examines hearts and kidneys (sc. νεφροί) of men (cf. Ps 15:7; 25:2; 72:21) in 
order to evaluate their righteousness.
149 Cf. McDonald, L.M., Identifying Scripture and Canon in the Early Church: The 
Criteria Question. Peabody 2002, 417–420.
150 Cf. McGuckin, J. A., Origen as Literary Critic in the Alexandrian Tradition, in: 
Perrone, L. (ed.), Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition. 
Leuven 2003, 121–135.
151 Cf. Guichard, L.A. / Alonso, J.L.G. / Paz de Hoz, M. (eds.), The Alexandrian Tra-
dition: Interactions Between Science, Religion, and Literature. Bern / New York 
2014.
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Alexandrian bishop, Demetrius (HE 6.8.4). Hence Origen decided to go to 
Caesarea, where he eventually received financial and administrative support 
for his school (HE 6.26).
As a matter of course, in formulation of curriculum for his school Origen 
took advantage of the curricula of contemporary philosophical schools. Pon-
dering differences between the curricula of philosophical schools and Origen’s 
educational program preserved in the Prologue of his Commentary on Song 
of Songs (§3) Róbert Somos concluded that Origen’s program cannot be fully 
identified with any of the philosophical curricula. Although the arrangement 
of disciplines in different philosophical curricula did not significantly change 
from one school to another,152 Origen, in his turn, took over the systematic 
and gradual approach to education and traced it back to Solomon. Thus, 
the classification of philosophical disciplines from the Prologue of the Com-
mentary on the Song of Songs (§3) goes as follows:
1) ethics (i.e. moral knowledge, which in Solomon’s writings is preserved in 
the Book of Proverbs); 
2) physics (i.e. knowledge about nature preserved in the Book of Ecclesiastes); 
3) epoptics (i.e. inspective knowledge preserved in the Song of Songs). 
Concerning logic, Origen specifically notes that it is an instrumental disci-
pline, which is yet indispensable for biblical studies. From the description of 
logic which Origen gives in the prologue to the Commentary on the Song 
of Songs (§3), it becomes clear that he regarded it first and foremost as a 
philological discipline: 
For this Logic is, as we say, rational, in that it deals with the meanings and 
proper significances and their opposites, the classes and kinds of words and 
expressions, and gives information as to the form of each and every saying; and 
this branch of learning certainly requires not so much to be separated from the 
others as to be mingled and interwoven with them153 (Cant prol. 3). 
This text shows that Origen recognised logic as an important component of 
his educational program and a useful analytical instrument.154 Pondering Peri-
patetic traces in Origen’s methodology, John McGuckin convincingly showed 
in his article that Origen’s exegesis was probably inspired by Aristotelian 
152 Thus, the Middle Platonic division, which was adopted by the Stoics, comprised 
logic, physics and ethics; while the Peripatetics distinguished between theoretical, 
practical and poetic sciences (cf. Somos, 2015, 20f.).
153 Transl. R.P. Lawson, 1957, 40.
154 Peculiarly he remarked that Solomon notably appreciated the significance of 
logical training and for this reason he entitled his book Proverbs because “the 
word pro-verb denotes that one thing is openly said, and another is inwardly 
meant” (Cant prol. 3).
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teleological theory, because whatever nuances of meaning Origen discovered 
in Scripture, their purpose was to throw light on the final cause, or divine 
design, of the fragment under consideration. Unsurprisingly, when guided by 
Aristotelian methodology, Origen’s writing style is sober and pithy, and his 
argument expressed in a dialogical manner.155
Robert Somos also recognizes elements of Aristotelian scientific method 
in Origen’s system. Namely, he asserts that the Aristotelian classification of 
knowledge into the “prior by nature” and the “prior in relation to us156” is 
echoed in Origen’s sorting of the scriptural names of Christ preserved in the 
Prologue to the Commentary on John. Thus, Origen distinguishes the names 
of Christ that represent his human nature, which is closer to us, and the 
names that characterize Christ’s divine nature.157 Somos argues that, similarly 
to Aristotle’s scientific project of philosophy, Origen sought to establish a 
scientific project of Christian doctrine.158 Nevertheless, Somos concludes his 
observation of various philosophical influences on Origen’s teaching by saying 
that Origen used mixed material from Platonic, Stoic and Aristotelian sources 
contained in the works of Platonic authors. I agree with this thesis to the 
extent that Origen was well versed in the teachings of various philosophical 
schools and that his own doctrine preserves the traces of Platonic, Peripatetic, 
and Stoic concepts, as well as the achievements of Hellenic grammarians and 
textual critiques and Jewish exegetes. 
In sum, Origen’s approach to ordering theological knowledge, which he 
built upon his biblical studies, has the following features. Similar to the gram-
marians, Origen retained a compromise between the regularities and irregu-
larities of the biblical language. This experience of work with complex and 
fluid linguistic structures patterned Origen’s view of structuring theological 
knowledge, which comprises various non transparent levels of meanings. 
155 McGuckin, 2003, 121–135.
156 In the Analytica Posteriora Aristotle asserts that one kind of knowledge is pri-
or by nature (sc. τῇ φύσει), which means that it is further away from sense-
perception and closer to reason; another kind of knowledge is closer to sense-
perception and prior in relation to us (sc. πρὸς ἡμᾶς) (APo 71b34).
157 Somos does not assert that Origen borrowed this principle directly from Aris-
totle, nor does he suggest any version of Origen’s source (but notes only that it 
was not of Middle-Platonic origin). 
158 Although Origen expressed, as did Aristotle, an intention to build a coherent 
system of theological knowledge (in the words of Origen, a kind of organic 
and connected whole [seriem quondam et corpus; Princ praef. 10]), his system 
ended up by being a probative one, since his exegetical exercises often represent 
a meticulous collection of alternative, relatively valid interpretations. The reason 
why Origen deliberately avoided formalizing and finalizing his theological edifice 
might be found in his exegetic principle of the polysemy of Scriptural language.
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The multiplicity of biblical meanings, which is accompanied by a variety of 
biblical readings and an obscure history of biblical texts, renders it impossible 
to decisively authorise one reading and one meaning of Scripture. Owing to 
the previous outlined status quo of the biblical studies, the idea of canon in 
Origen’s system appears to be fairly challenging. Yet, I suppose that this is 
the focal point of Origen’s biblical studies: he deliberately engaged in all the 
possible complexities because he identified both exegetic and ascetic practices. 
He maintained that the grammatical analysis of the biblical lexicon and gram-
mar of various connotations and parallel readings is important for biblical 
studies. According to Origen, a mere grammatical study of the Bible does not 
bring a scholar to the top of spiritual ascendance because a clear vision of 
the nuances of complex biblical knowledge is an ability that emerges from 
a constant mental and bodily search for decoding the genuinely appealing 
biblical enigmas. This plastic and challenging approach to the biblical canon 
which characterises Origen’s methodology of biblical studies distinguishes 
his approach from his Alexandrian (both Hellenic and Jewish) colleagues.
Chapter 3. Eunomian teaching in the context of philosophical 
and pedagogical debates
1. Philosophical background of Eunomian teaching
Turning to a pre-history of Eunomian teaching that played a significant role 
in the Christian epistemological discourse, I start with a brief survey of the 
previous theological discussions revolving around the Arian doctrine. 
The ontological questions raised by Arius were of long philosophical stand-
ing. For instance, the question about the generation of the Son and creation of 
the world invoked a debate about the created/uncreated cosmos. The genera-
tion of cosmos was discussed in the Timaeus, where the following dilemma 
was detected: either to see cosmos as “what always is and never becomes” (τί 
τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον; Tim 27d6), or to regard it as “what becomes 
and never is” (τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; Tim 28a1). It 
is stated in the Timaeus that the universe has come to be (sc. γέγονεν; Tim 
28b7), and that its cause is a Craftsman, who fashioned the universe after a 
model (Tim 28a6). 
The interpretation of the Middle Platonists159 underscored a particular 
angle of the issue: the divine will maintains the eternity of the created uni-
verse, hence, the eternity of the universe is superficial, while God is inherently 
unbegotten and eternal. A reflection of this Middle Platonic concept can be 
seen in Origen’s vision of God the Father as unbegotten (sc. ἀγέννητος), and 
159 Cf. Alcinous, Did 14, Philo, Opif 7–9.
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of God the Son as begotten (sc. γεννητός).160 Although Origen repeatedly 
affirmed that the Son was begotten, he insisted that he was eternally begot-
ten.161 This concept undeniably divorced his Christology from the teaching 
of Arius, who speaking about Christ declared that “there was when He was 
not” (sc. ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν; Theod., HE 1.3). 
Within the discussion about the relationship between the Father and the 
Son Origen introduced the term ὑπόστασις into Christian theology. Al-
though he used it with different meanings,162 and not as a theological terminus 
technicus, later on this term and Origen’s Christology in toto turned out to 
be helpful to the Cappadocian fathers in their polemics against Eunomius, 
Aëtius and their followers.163 
160 E.g., Origen constantly stressed that the Son was begotten by the Father and that 
he was assigned to create the world (Cels 6.17.31–44). Some Christian authors 
(Marcellus of Ancyra, Eustathius of Antioch in De engastrimytho contra Orige-
nem, Epiphanius of Salamis in Panarion) have regarded Origen as proto-Arian 
(for details of ancient and modern discussions of Origen’s role in the Arian con-
troversy cf. Hanson, R.P.C., The influence of Origen on the Arian controversy, 
in: Lothar, L. [ed.], Origeniana quarta. Innsbruck / Vienna 1987, 410–423). 
G. Stead in his contribution to Origeniana Septima showed that Arius was not 
influenced by Origen’s thought, while the Alexandrian bishops, who argued with 
Arius, were (cf. Stead, G.C., Philosophy in Origen and Arius, in: Bienert, W.A. / 
Kühneweg, U. [eds.], Origeniana Septima. Leuvens 1999, 101–108).
161 Cf. “the Father has not begotten the Son and then served him from his genera-
tion but always begets him (οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ἀπέλυσεν 
αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ αὐτόν)” (Or., 
HomJer 9.4.71–74).
162 Origen applied the term ὑπόστασις for the demarcation of the persons of the 
Father and the Son: “they are two realities regarding coming into existence (ὄντα 
δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα), but one in regard to unity of thought, and har-
mony, and identity of will (ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι 
τοῦ βουλήματος)” (Or., Cels 8.12.13; transl. mine). I would like to stress the 
relative function of Dativus Singularis τῇ ὑποστάσει, and feel uneasy with the 
translation “they are two, considered as persons or subsistences” by Fr. Crombie 
(1885). While in a fragment from the Commentary on John he used ὑπόστασις as 
a synonym for essence (οὐσία, ὑποκείμενον): “both being one, not only in essence 
but also in substance (ἓν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τυγχάνοντας 
ἀμφοτέρους), they are said to be Father and Son (λέγεσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν) 
in relation to certain differing aspects (κατά τινας ἐπινοίας διαφόρους), not in 
relation to [their] reality (οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν)” (ComJn 10.37.246). Cf. another 
fragment from the Commentary: “we believe in three hypostases of the Father and 
the Son and the Holy Ghost” (τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις πειθόμενοι τυγχάνειν, τὸν 
πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα)” (ComJn 2.10.75.1–2; transl. mine).
163 For details concerning the provenance of the term ὑπόστασις cf. chapter 4, 
secion 4.2.
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In the Eunomian teaching Christological questions were discussed in episte-
mological and methodological contexts rather than in an ontological context. 
In such a way, the discussion came to be concerned firstly with “how we know 
the divine being,” and secondly, with “what we know about it”. 
With a particular emphasis on the methodology of theological argumen-
tation, Eunomius argued against the substantial equality of the Father and 
the Son: 
There are two roads (δυεῖν ὁδῶν) marked out for the discovery of what we 
seek: one is that by which we examine the actual essences (τὰς οὐσίας αὐτὰς 
ἐπισκοπούμενοι) and with clear and unadulterated reasoning (τῷ περὶ αὐτῶν 
λόγῳ) about them make a judgement (κρίσιν) on each; the other is an inquiry 
by means of the actions (τῆς διὰ τῶν ἐνεργείων ἐξετάσεως), whereby we 
distinguish the essence on the basis of its products and completed works (ἐκ 
τῶν δημιουργημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων) – and neither of the ways 
mentioned is able to bring out any apparent similarity of the essence [in Father 
and Son] (τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὁμοιότητα)164 (A 20.5–10). 
The first of these roads constituted an examination of the divine names. In 
the seventh paragraph of his Apology, Eunomius introduced the term “un-
begotten” (sc. ἀγγένητος), and afterwards affirmed that the Father is an 
unbegotten essence (οὐσία ἀγέννητος; A 8.17), and consequently:
He could never undergo a generation which involved the sharing of his own 
distinctive nature (τῆς ἰδίας μεταδοῦναι) with the offspring of this genera-
tion (τῷ γεννωμένῳ φύσεως), and could never admit of any comparison or 
association (σύγκρισιν καὶ κοινωνίαν) with a thing begotten (τὸ γεννητόν) 
[viz. the Son]165 (A 9.1–3). 
Eunomius built his reasoning by means of syllogism. Like his master Aëtius, 
he was a renowned logician, and on that account they were both repeatedly 
castigated for their technical arguments by the adherents of Nicene Christolo-
gy.166 Nevertheless, Eunomius claimed that his teaching, unlike the conception 
of his opponents, was based not on “human invention” (sc. κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν 
ἀνθρωπίνην – A 8.1), but on “reality” (sc. κατ’ ἀλήθειαν – ibid.). Euno-
mius so persistently emphasised the advantages of his logical methodology 
164 Here and later transl. R.P. Vaggione, 1987, 59.
165 Transl. R.P. Vaggione, 1987, 43.
166 Epiphanius accused Aëtius’ Syntagmation of being a nest of logical vipers; he 
claimed that his work was a dialectical error (Pan 3.351), and nothing but a 
dialectical ostentation and a syllogistic waste of labour (Pan 3.361); Sozomenus 
stated that Eunomius was a technician of arguments, given to captiousness, 
rejoicing in syllogisms (HE 6.26); Socrates stated that Aëtius loved the matters 
set out technically by Aristotle (HE 2.35); Faustinus claimed that Aristotle was 
the bishop of the Arians (Trin 12 = PL, 13.60b).
62
that it would be fair to regard this methodological discourse as a backbone 
of his argumentation. 
Strictly speaking, what Eunomius seemingly meant to achieve in his dis-
course was to dissociate his teaching from a theological argument processed 
by means of “human invention,” which, as he professed in his Apologia 
Apologiae,167 not only perverts Scripture, but even defames God (NPNF 
280a39–41 = J 2.312.30–313.3). Instead of the “κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν ἀνθρωπίνην” 
mode of theological argumentation Eunomius suggested an accurate mode of 
reasoning and precise expression. Referring to Moses’ account about crea-
tion, Eunomius affirmed that God himself used words in creating (NPNF 
270b48–56 = J 284.30–285.3e), and that God gave human beings the use 
of things and their names, and that the names are older than those who use 
them (NPNF 277all–17 = J 303.1–6f). In this fashion, according to Eunomius, 
the greatness of the Creator is shown not only in the creation but also in the 
appropriate bestowal of names of the created things (NPNF 290b48–52 = 
J 344.8–13g), for he declared that the Creator made names conformable to 
natures (NPNF 291a36–40 = J 345.12–16). 
Regarding this evidence we have every reason to believe that it was not 
the term “unbegotten” per se which Basil and Eunomius quarrelled about, 
but the way (sc. method) in which this particular term (and other words) 
was generated in the human language. Consequently, the teaching of Aëtius 
and Eunomius occasioned an urgent need for a coherent and clear method-
ology of theological argumentation, or to put it plainly, for a step-by-step 
explanation of how to think the unthinkable God (sc. epistemology), how to 
speak and write the unspeakable and indescribable God (sc. linguistics and 
grammar), how to engage with the simultaneously immanent and transcend-
ent being of the divinity (sc. ontology) and how to treat the symbolical and 
obscure language of the Bible, preserved in various editions and translations 
(sc. exegesis). These problems naturally touched upon certain philosophical, 
scientific and institutional matters such as: epistemological principles of the 
Christian teaching, methodology of biblical studies, program and content of 
Christian education, genres and linguistic criteria of Christian literature, and 
form of Christian rituals (baptismal formula and prayers168).
167 A paraphrase of the Apologia Apologiae is preserved in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
Contra Eunomium. In his edition of Eunomius’ works Richard Vaggione gave 
parallel references to the critical edition of Gregory’s text by Jeager (1952) and 
to the English translation from NPNF. I reproduce Vaggione’s handy system of 
double references.
168 The Eunomians were reputed to change the baptismal formula in conformity to 
their doctrine. Athanasius of Alexandria reported that they baptized in the name 
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Small wonder that Gregory Nazianzen considered debate with Aëtius and 
Eunomius as predominantly methodological. For instance, in the third theo-
logical oration Gregory gives a detailed account of his vision of the heuristic 
potential of human language, particularly touching upon the scriptural names 
of Christ: 
Our position, of course, is that horses, man, oxen, and each item that comes 
under the same species have a single concept. Whatever shares in the concept (ὃ 
μὲν ἂν μετέχῃ τοῦ λόγου) is rightly called by that name (τοῦτο καὶ κυρίως 
λέγεσθαι), and whatever does not share in it is not properly called by the name. 
Thus in the same way there is a single being (καὶ θεοῦ μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι), na-
ture (φύσιν), and name of God (κλῆσιν), even though the titles are distinguished 
along with the distinct ideas about him (κἂν ἐπινοίαις τισὶ διαιρουμέναις 
συνδιαιρῆται καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα). Whatever is properly (κυρίως) called “God” 
is God and whatever he is in his nature (κατὰ φύσιν) is a true name for him 
(ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι) —granted that real truth is contained in facts (ἐν 
πράγμασίν), not in names (μὴ ἐν ὀνόμασιν). These people, though, act as if 
they were afraid of leaving any opposition to the truth untried. They acknowl-
edge the Son as “God,” when forced by reason and proof-texts (τῷ λόγῳ καὶ 
ταῖς μαρτυρίαις) to do so, but only in an equivocal sense (ὁμώνυμον), thus 
implying that he shares the name and the name alone (μόνης κοινωνοῦντα 
τῆς κλήσεως)169 (Or 29.13.17–23).
In this text we can easily identify a linguistic discussion of the correctness of 
names,170 or in terms of modern linguistics, between a signifier and a thing 
signified. This issue was crucial for Eunomian language theory, which formed 
a base of his theological conception. Eunomius’ doctrine revolved around the 
term “unbegotten,” which he defined as an essential characteristic of God the 
Father (A 15) and deduced his Christology from this thesis.171 
Eunomius’ interest in technical questions appears natural in the philosophi-
cal context of Late Antiquity.172 Thus, the issue of the correctness of names 
of Creator and Creature, Maker and Made or of the Unbegotten and Begotten 
(cf. Athan., Ar 2.42; Athan., Decr 31.3; cf. also Vaggione, 2000, 258f.).
169 Transl. L. Wickham / F. Williams, 1991, 250.
170 A conundrum concerning the correlation between a name (sc. ὄνομα) and a 
thing named (sc. πρᾶγμα) usually surfaced in the Hellenic philosophical agenda 
in the context of the exegesis of Plato’s Cratylus. For the details of the debate 
between the so-called naturalists and conventionalists cf. Frede, D. / Inwood, B. 
(eds.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. 
Cambridge 2005.
171 Details about the language theory of Eunomius and its correlation with his 
Christology are provided later in this chapter.
172 Cf. Vaggione, R.P., Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution. Oxford 
2000, 239–243.
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surfaced in a religious-philosophical discussion of the Neo-Platonic thinkers173 
and shortly afterwards involved Christian interlocutors (Origen, Eusebius of 
Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzen). Some of the chief participants of this dis-
cussion were personally acquainted (Eunomius, Julian the Emperor, Basil and 
Gregory) and for certain particular reasons were far from being indifferent 
to each other. Ergo, their polemic writings clearly manifest the socio-cultural 
and personal nuances of their relationships. 
2. Historical and social context of Eunomian teaching
2.1 Gregory vs. Julian: a pedagogical debate
The legalization of Christianity in 311 had a considerable impact on the cultur-
al and social life of the Roman Empire. A penchant for the social and academic 
recognition of Christian doctrine was encouraged by the most enlightened and 
refined Christian authors such as Origen and his distinguished students. In 
the fourth century this tendency expanded and grew in strength, so that Hel-
lenic intellectuals could no longer merely ignore the claims of their Christian 
colleagues. In such a way Christian and Hellenic thinkers came to discuss 
topical socio-cultural issues on an equal footing. One of these issues was the 
question of the correctness of names. In the context of the fourth century it 
was transformed and began to revolve around divine names. In other words, 
the issue introduced the dilemma: whether divine names signify the essence 
of gods and hence are granted with certain magical powers,174 or whether 
they are merely conventional utterances deprived of any supernatural power. 
In addition to its own particular context the discussion about divine names 
also surfaced in a religious-philosophical debate concerning the statues of 
gods. Like divine names, whose origin, heuristic and cognitive potential and 
ability to elevate a person spiritually were thoroughly discussed by philoso-
phers, the question of the purpose and role of statues of gods surfaced in the 
173 Cf.: “The present dialogue makes us understand the correctness of names, and 
one must, if one is going to be a dialectician, begin from this theoretical exami-
nation. […] Plato now wishes to present the first principles of real entities [τὰς 
ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων] and of the art of dialectic, inasmuch as he is presenting the 
names together with the things of which they are names” (Proclus, ComCra 6–8; 
transl. B. Duvick, 2007, 11).
174 Cf.: “if all these were the fraudulent devices of enchanters (γοήτων), how is it 
possible that things which are in the most eminent degree united (συνηνωμένα) 
with the Gods, which also conjoin (συνάπτοντα) us with them, and have pow-
ers all but equal to those of superior beings (τὰς ἴσας δυνάμεις ἔχοντα τοῖς 
κρείττοσι), should be fantastic devices (πλάσματα), though without them no 
sacred operation (ἱερατικὸν ἔργον) can be effected?” (Iambl., De mysteriis 
7.5.25–30; transl. T. Taylor, 1821, available on-line).
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social and philosophical context of the fourth century. Iamblichus, in his 
treatise On the Statues of the Gods, Porphyry in his work On the Statues 
(the title preserved in Stobaeus’ Anthology, the excerpts – in Eusebius’ PE), 
Eusebius in his Praeparatio Evangelica (where he argued with Porphyry) 
and Julian the Emperor in his Hymn to the Mother of God and Epistle 89 
discussed whether statues of gods are really helpful in spiritual ascendance. 
Within this context these authors quite naturally also pursued the question 
about the correctness of names debated in the Cratylus.175 
Interestingly enough all of these authors agreed that divine names signify 
divine essence. The only point they disagreed upon consisted in applying this 
principle to material objects like statues. Consequently, they held different 
opinions concerning the effect that statues can produce on ordinary people, 
and on initiated philosophers. Thus, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Julian stated 
that both divine names and statues of gods are powerful, while Eusebius be-
lieved that while divine names really have a certain supernatural power, this 
is not true for statues of gods. In this fashion, certain Hellenic philosophers176 
and Christian thinkers (e.g., Origen and Eusebius) tolerated the idea that 
divine names (when they are correctly spelled in certain ancient languages177) 
possess supernatural power.178 
Another significant context, which results from the discussion of the cor-
rectness of names, can be seen in the works of Julian the Emperor. Julian 
believed that the Hellenic language is inherently connected with the pagan 
175 Cf. Elm, S., Transformation of the Classical Heritage: Sons of Hellenism, Fathers 
of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome. 
Berkeley 2012, 245–270.
176 E.g., Iamblichus’ deliberation concerning divine names reads: “some of them 
are known to us, the explications of which we receive from the Gods (τὰς 
ἀναλύσεις παρὰ θεῶν)” and, hence “in those names which we can scientifi-
cally analyse, we possess a knowledge of the whole divine essence, power, and 
order (τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ τάξεως ἔχομεν), comprehended 
in the name (ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τὴν εἴδησιν)” (Myst 7.4).
177 Cf.: “These names, accordingly, when pronounced with that attendant train 
of circumstances which is appropriate to their nature, are possessed of great 
power; and other names, again, current in the Egyptian tongue, are efficacious 
against certain demons who can only do certain things; and other names in the 
Persian language have corresponding power over other spirits; and so on in 
every individual nation, for different purposes” (Or., Cels 24).
178 It has been convincingly demonstrated by Barnes that the language theory of 
Eusebius (PE 11.6.1.1–2.5), which he articulated within a discussion about 
statues of gods, provided a foundation for the language theory of Eunomius 
(cf. Barnes, M.R., The Background and Use of Eunomius’ Causal Language, in: 
Barnes, M.R. / Williams, D.H. [eds.], Arianism after Arius: Essays on the Devel-
opment of the Fourth-Century Trinitarian Conflicts. Edinburgh 1993, 217–236).
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religion.179 Consequently, he claimed that since the gods themselves “revealed 
all their learning to Homer, Hesiod, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Isocrates and Lysias” (Ep 61c.30f.), therefore Christians, who dishonour the 
gods, have no right to “expound the works of these authors in the Hellenic 
schools” (Ep 61c.423a–b). 
In June 362, Julian promulgated a rescript forbidding Christian teachers 
from working in Hellenic schools180 (preserved in Ep 61c). He required all 
public teachers who were paid by the state to be approved by the Emperor, 
in order to prevent Christians from teaching in Hellenic schools.
Yet, though I think this absurd, I do not say that they ought to change their opin-
ions and then instruct the young. But I give them this choice: either not to teach 
what they do not think admirable, or, if they wish to teach, let them first really 
persuade their pupils that neither Homer nor Hesiod nor any of these writers 
whom they expound and have declared to be guilty of impiety, folly and error 
in regard to the gods, is such as they declare. For since they make a livelihood 
and receive pay from the works of those writers, they thereby confess that they 
are most shamefully greedy of gain, and that, for the sake of a few drachmae, 
they would put up with anything (Jul., Ep 61c.423a–b).
Eusebius and Eunapius describe the grievous effect of the rescript, which 
caused the dismissal of many Christian teachers.181 The purpose of Julian’s 
law was not only to limit Christians’ access to classical education but to 
ghettoize them and to detach them from Hellenic culture. Gregory Nazianzen 
understandably burst with indignation and in his invectives against the Em-
peror (orations 4, 5) affirmed: 
… for though there are many and weighty reasons why that person deserves to 
be detested, yet in no case will he be shown to have acted more illegally than 
in this: and let everyone share in my indignation who takes a pleasure in words 
(Or 4.2–5);
‘Ours’, says he, ‘are the words and the speaking of Greek, whose right it is to 
worship the gods’; yours are the want of words, and clownishness, and nothing 
beyond the faith in your own doctrine182 (Or 4.102).
179 Cf.: “If speaking Greek (τὸ Ἑλληνίζειν) belongs to the religion (τῆς θρησκείας), 
pray show where it is the rule, and amongst what sort of priests, like particular 
sorts of sacrifices, and in honour of what kind of diction?” (Greg., Or 4.103; 
here and later translation of the invectives against Julian [orations 4, 5] by C.W. 
King, 1888, available on-line).
180 For the details about Emperor Julian’s Rescript on Christian Teachers cf. Sozom., 
HE 5.18; Socr., HE 3.16.1.
181 Cf. Eus., HE 6.3; Eunap., VS 10.1.3f.
182 Here and afterwards translation of the invectives by C.W. King, 1888, available 
on-line.
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Throughout Gregory’s invectives, his harsh resentment toward Julian is be-
yond doubt. He and Basil personally met the future Emperor in Athens dur-
ing the time of their studies.183 Gregory’s reaction is therefore not only of a 
professional but also of a personal nature.184 
These examples show how the philosophical issue of the correctness of 
names, which surfaced in various religious and socio-cultural contexts, came to 
seriously disturb social life in the Roman Empire of the fourth century. Moreo-
ver, Eunomius and Aëtius introduced this issue in the theological context.
2.2 The Cappadocian fathers vs. Eunomians: how the debate started 
In the year 361 the Apology of Eunomius was published. Two years later Basil 
finished composing his lengthy treatise Adversus Eunomium, which caused 
Eunomius to write his second Apology. 
Thinking through the arguments by which Eunomius supplied his de-
fence against Basil’s attack it appears plausible that he not only knew about 
the Emperor Julian’s especial reverence for the Hellenic language but even 
sought to benefit from it.185 In this fashion Eunomius asserted that while 
his own doctrine relies on the teaching of the saints (J 347.18–21 = NPNF 
292a11–15), Basil contradicts the teaching of apostles (J 315.31–316.3 = 
NPNF 281a41–5), agrees with Aristotle (J 346.4–11 = NPNF 291b22–31) 
and follows the teaching of Epicurus186 (J ibid. = NPNF 291b10–15). Euno-
mius framed these accusations in such a way that they painted Basil as an 
adherent of Hellenic philosophy (J 312.30–313.3 = NPNF 280a39–41). Of 
183 After the composition of the invectives, Gregory approved them with Basil and 
thereon concluded his psogos as follows: “These words Basil and Gregory send 
you, those opponents and counterworkers of your scheme, as you were wont to 
call them and persuade others to do the same – doing us honour by what you 
did threaten us with, and moving us all the more to piety – persons who being 
well known for their life, discourse, and mutual affection, and whom you were 
acquainted with ever since our common residence in Greece” (Or 5.39).
184 Furthermore, Gregory’s brother Caesarius, who was a court physician, was 
obliged for fear of persecution to leave Constantinople in 362 and return to 
Nazianz, where he provided his brother with information about the injustice 
and crimes of the Emperor (cf. Bernardi, J., [intr., texte critique, trad. et notes], 
Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 4–5. Contre Julien. SC 309. Paris 1983, 49).
185 At that time he resided in Constantinople along with his master Aëtius (Philost., 
HE 6.7, 7.6), who had previously had a close relationship with the future Em-
peror since in 348 Gallus appointed him a Christian tutor to young Julian. 
Though Aëtius failed to keep Julian faithful to Christianity, he managed to 
maintain good relations with him later on (Greg. Nys., CE 1.45–51).
186 In like manner, in the Apology Eunomius professed that his opponents were “led 
astray by the sophisms of the Greeks” (A 22, 27)
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course, it is an exaggeration to equate mere support of certain philosophical 
ideas with betrayal of religious doctrines, but this exaggeration was in line 
with the Emperor’s policy. I take these circumstances to highlight that the 
socio-political climate of the fourth century played no less important a role 
in theological debates than the religious discussions themselves. 
As for the philosophical background of Eunomius’ own texts, it should be 
noted that in comparison with Basil’s and Gregory’s compositions the apologies 
of Eunomius appear more plain and unsophisticated. Eunomius did not dwell 
on the heritage of the classical philosophers as much as his opponents did. Plain 
and logical as it was, the teaching of Eunomius and Aëtius proved very success-
ful (Soz., HE 6.26, 7.6). In the eyes of Gregory and Basil, the methodological 
message of Eunomian doctrine along with the positive public recognition of the 
teaching made it a more perilous evil than the social victimization of Christian-
ity launched by Julian. At the beginning of the first theological oration, which 
Gregory directed against the Eunomians, he exclaimed: 
I say this is so, the evil is intolerable and not to be borne, and our great mystery 
is in danger of being made a thing of little moment (Or 27.1). 
As a matter of fact, the Eunomians were reported to have changed the bap-
tismal formula and ritual and to have ordained priests from those whom 
they had previously re-baptised.187 Ergo, their activity aimed at establishing 
a new church hierarchy, and this understandably seemed highly dangerous, 
especially given the success that they had managed to achieve (Soz., HE 7.8).
As the years passed, the success of the Eunomians grew. In the year 379, 
Basil died and Gregory was invited by the pro-Nicene hierarchs to Con-
stantinople in order to “assist the congregation and help defend the world” 
(Greg., De Vita Sua 5.596). At that time, the Eunomians had already enjoyed 
huge governmental support for forty years and all the churches of the me-
tropolis were under their control.188 In 379, the political climate changed. 
The favour of Theodosius, the new Emperor, turned towards the supporters 
of the Nicene faith. Under the circumstances the politicians seeking to please 
their new Emperor encouraged the previously persecuted Nicene hierarchs 
to strengthen their voice. For this reason the pro-Nicene bishops required 
Gregory to come to the capital city and to stand with all his prominent rhe-
torical, polemical and philosophical skills in defence of the Nicene doctrine. 
In such a way, Gregory’s mission was planned and financially supported 
by the Nicene hierarchs and politicians. In plain words, Gregory agreed to 
187 Sozomenus stated that “Eunomius was the first who ventured to maintain that 
divine baptism ought to be performed by one immersion” (HE 6.26).
188 Cf. Greg., De Vita Sua 655–657 (PG 37, 1075). For the details concerning 
Gregory’s arrival to Constantinople cf. McGuckin, 2001, 238–240.
69
undertake a challenging mission for his task was to inform the still power-
ful pro-Eunomian intellectual and political elite that they had been hitherto 
mistaken in welcoming Eunomian teaching (some of them had even been 
rebaptized by the Eunomian hierarchs). Instead, he could offer them another 
doctrine, that of the hitherto despised and persecuted Nicene bishops, whom 
Eunomius and Aëtius continuously castigated for their unawareness and 
ignorance. 
Shortly after Gregory’s arrival he met his hostile and malevolent opponents 
(Ep 77.3). They ridiculed his speeches, mocked his Cappadocian dialect, 
abused him, and even made an attempt on his life.189 Gregory in turn persis-
tently continued performing his duty and preaching not merely against the 
Eunomians but more broadly and ambitiously, by professing the universal 
philosophical and scientific claims of the Nicene doctrine. 
As I have noted above, one of the keys of the success of the Eunomian party 
consisted in the tolerable simplicity of the theological argumentation chosen 
by Eunomius and Aëtius. Their teaching was constructed of syllogisms which 
appeared earnestly persuasive to everyone. Thus, the Eunomians popularized 
theological knowledge for the considerable benefit of their party. Gregory of 
Nyssa vividly depicted the situation, commenting that in the full bloom of 
Eunomian teaching all the streets and markets were full of people discussing 
the most intricate theological matters: 
When you ask about obols, in reply you hear philosophizing about the begotten 
and unbegotten; you request the price of bread, hear in return that the Father is 
greater and that the Son is under His control (ὁ Υἱὸς ὑποχείριος); you announce 
that the bath is ready, receive a firm reply that the Son is out of the non-existent 
(ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων)190 (De Deitate Filii et Spiritus Sancti. 46.557.23–27). 
Apparently, these circumstances made Gregory’s mission even more difficult 
for he could not disprove the persuasive Eunomian teaching simply by declar-
ing the incomprehensibility of God. He was obliged to suggest a fully-fledged 
theological system based on an equally persuasive argumentation. In other 
words, his task was not only in disproving Eunomian teaching but in creating 
a methodology of theological and exegetical argumentation. 
An obvious way of performing this task was to dwell on the achievements 
of predecessors. Among them were Basil and Origen with their logical and 
grammatical argumentative strategies, and the classical and Hellenic philoso-
phers and scholars with their epistemological theories. However, there was a 
difficulty attached to this strategy because the Eunomians already made use 
189 Cf. McGuckin, 2001, 256–258.
190 Translation mine.
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of the syllogistic technique and were publicly accused of this by their Nicene 
opponents (sc. they nicknamed Eunomians “the church of Aristotle”). 
Yet, Gregory pursued this path. He decided to discredit the logical skills of 
his opponents and to suggest an alternative theological methodology, which 
he grounded on a sophisticated mix of Peripatetic epistemology, ontology and 
anthropology, Stoic logic and linguistics, conceptions of Origen and Basil, 
and decorated with fitting Platonic topoi and biblical allusions. In the second 
part of this book I show how Gregory made use of these various components 
in his theological orations. Now it is time to analyse briefly the fundamental 
rhetorical polemical techniques applied by the Eunomians and Cappadocians 
in order not to be deceived by the finesse of their expressions.
2.3  Polemical rhetoric of the Cappadocians and Eunomians:  
an unjustified reasoning
While Gregory Nazianzen worked on his theological cycle, Gregory of Nyssa 
was composing his treatise Adversus Eunomium (in 12 books). For both 
Gregories and for Basil this debate was not only of a philosophical and 
theological but also of a personal character. It stands to reason that personal 
antagonism was reflected in the polemical compositions of the disputants, 
who did not hesitate to use rhetorical tricks in their argumentation, to slightly 
falsify the words of their opponents, and to manipulate public opinion. 
The Eunomians and Cappadocian fathers applied such classical rhetorical 
tricks as misrepresentation of the opponent’s ideas; charging the opponent 
with the misinterpretation of an authoritative text (either deliberate or caused 
by the opponent’s ignorance); personal abuse (incl. pointing to some defect 
of appearance, commonness, lack of education or low social standing).191
Misrepresentation. As I have already noted, the rational positivism of the 
Eunomians was widely ridiculed by their opponents. Thus, according to So-
crates, Eunomius professed that:192 
God knows no more of his own substance (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας) than we do; 
nor is this more known to him, and less to us: but whatever we know about 
the Divine substance, that precisely is known to God; and on the other hand, 
whatever he knows, the same also you will find without any difference in us 
(HE 6.7.35–38).
191 Cf. Gibson, C.A. (transl., introd., notes), Libanius’ Progymnasmata: Model 
Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Atlanta 2008, 196f.
192 Cf. Socr., HE 4.7.7, Thdt., Haer. 4.3. For a detailed analysis of this evidence cf. 
Vaggione, 2000, 253–256.
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Nevertheless, in the preserved works of Eunomius and Aëtius, direct claims 
of full comprehension of the divine essence are absent.193 In Eunomius’ own 
words, the substance of Christ is identical with what is signified by his name, 
that is to say:
…his essence was begotten (γεγεννῆσθαι) – not having been in existence prior 
to its own coming to be (οὐκ οὖσαν πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας συστάσεως) – and that 
it exists, having been begotten before all things (εἷναι δὲ γεννηθεῖσαν πρὸ 
πάντων γνώμῃ) by the will of its God and Father (A 12.12f.). 
From this statement I assume that in Eunomius’ concept the term “unbegot-
ten” constituted a substantial characteristic of God the Father rather than 
his essence per se.194 
Nonetheless, it stands to reason that with such a vague statement Eunomius 
came very close to the dictum attributed to him by his opponents (name-
ly, that Eunomius has fully comprehended the divine substance). Gregory 
Nazianzen repeatedly accused Eunomius of undue boldness and even made 
of this accusation a leitmotiv of his second thelogical oration (oratio 28). In 
this speech Gregory applied different sorts of arguments in order to arrive 
by various ways at the same conclusion about the incomprehensibility of the 
divine essence (Or 28 §§ 4, 6, 11, 17).
Now, to illustrate how Eunomius misrepresented the ideas of his oppo-
nents, I want to mention that Eunomius accused Basil of adopting the lan-
guage theories of Aristotle (J 1.346.4–11 = NPNF 291b22–31), Epicurus (J 
1.345.25–29 = NPNF 291b10–15) and Valentinus (J 1.356.20–24 = NPNF 
295a22–25). It would seem that these accusations cannot all be true simply 
because Aristotle and Epicurus held different views about the origin and 
nature of language.195 Yet Eunomius could easily gain from equating his op-
ponents’ ideas with philosophical concepts unpopular in Christian circles. 
Gregory Nazianzen responded to Eunomius’ accusation of Basil by saying 
193 Vaggione argued that since neither Aëtius nor Eunomius claimed to possess full 
knowledge even of earthly phenomena, they could never go as far as to profess 
to fully comprehend the divine essence (cf. Vaggione, 2000, 257).
194 My impression is that Eunomius’ understanding of unbegotten was similar to 
the Cappadocians’ idea of the hypostatic characteristic of the each of the divine 
persons, which I observe in detail later on (with respect to the exegesis of the 
famous phrase from the Heb 1:3: “χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ”). Thus, 
the principal difference between Cappadocian and Eunomian theology lay in the 
demarcation of essence and hypostasis: what Eunomius claimed as an essential 
characteristic of God, Cappadocians recognized as a hypostatic characteristic. 
195 Cf. Verlinsky, A., Epicurus and his predecessors on the origin of language, in: 
Frede, D. / Inwood, B. (eds.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language 
in the Hellenistic Age. Cambridge 2005, 56–101.
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that the Eunomians stand for “a view which is more absurd and anile than 
even the atoms of Epicurus” (Or 28.8). 
A typical rhetorical argument ad hominem appears in the works of Greg-
ory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa. Without any apparent hesitation they 
mocked the “servile” philosophy of the Eunomian teachers196 and pointed to 
the technical character of their intellectual craft (sc. τεχνύδριον197). McGu-
ckin persuasively demonstrates that these accusations represent examples of 
social critique because Eunomius and Aëtius were of low social origin and 
made their living by teaching, while all three Cappadocian fathers belonged 
to the landed gentry, received better education than Eunomius and Aëtius 
and used this fact in their polemics.198 
Concerning the accusation of misinterpreting authoritative text, plenty of 
evidence exists from both parties. Thus, the Cappadocians demonstrated their 
superiority in pointing to the philosophical incompetence of Eunomius. Grego-
ry of Nyssa accused Eunomius of misinterpreting Plato’s Cratylus (CE 2.1.404). 
Gregory Nazianzen censured Eunomius for misunderstanding the Aristotelian 
Organon.199 Basil charged him with applying Aristotelian wisdom (AE 1.9.10): 
The claims about possession (ἕξις) and deprivation (στέρησις) come from Ar-
istotle, as those who have read him can attest, in his book entitled Categories, 
where he says that privations are secondary to possessions (AE 1.9). 
By pointing to Aristotle’s concepts of possession and deprivation Basil implied 
that Eunomius perverted Aristotelian teaching because it followed from Eunomi-
us’ theory that deprivation (sc. unbegotten) is prior to possession (sc. begotten).
R. Mortley has argued that Eunomius offered an explanation of his vision 
of the possession-deprivation correlation in A 8.10–11 which matches with 
the interpretation of this concept preserved in Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic 
commentaries on the Metaphysics.200 
196 In such a way Gregory of Nyssa mocks Eunomius in his Contra Eunomium (CE 
1.4), and also Aëtius (CE 1.6). Gregory Nazianzen calls Eunomius the head of 
“a revolutionary factory for profanities” (Or 27.9).
197 Cf. Greg. Naz., Or 27.2.13.
198 Gregory of Nyssa stated that whereas in Eunomius’ wording, Basil is a plodding 
farmer, Eunomius is a singing master (CE 1.4). For details cf. McGuckin, 2001, 
282–284.
199 Cf. Basil, AE 1.5.43–45, Greg. Naz., Or 29.12, 15.
200 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias in his Commentary on Metaphysics used the clas-
sical example of blindness as privation of the inherent property of sight (cf. 
ComMet 327.20–27).
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Gregory Nazianzen in his third theological oration (Or 29) also claimed 
that the Eunomians violated the rules of logic.201 Daniélou offered a compara-
tive investigation of the Peripatetic, Neo-Platonic and Eunomian teachings. 
He has attested a strong influence of Neo-Platonic thought on Eunomius and 
Aëtius and concluded that no original Aristotelian ideas had been involved 
in the discourse of Eunomians.202 
Gregory of Nyssa discussed Eunomius’ teaching about the Creator, who 
fittingly bestowed names on things made (AA 1.324.1–5), against the back-
ground of Plato’s Cratylus.203 Gregory’s conclusion was that Eunomius had 
either read Plato’s dialogue himself, or had learnt its content from someone 
who had read it (CE 2.1.404). Daniélou argued that the Eunomian theory of 
language should be traced back to Neo-Platonic circles, with which he could 
possibly have been in touch via his master Aëtius.204 Meanwhile, Barnes con-
vincingly shows that it is more likely that the Eunomian theory of language 
emerged from Eusebius’ Præparatio Evangelica.205 
Chapter 4. Logical, linguistic and grammatical theories in the 
doctrines of Origen, Basil and Eunomius
1. The post-Nicene debate: a terminological introduction 
In this chapter I discuss especially significant notions involved in the debate 
surrounding the Eunomian cause, and trace their background in the relevant 
philosophical context. Namely, the terms under consideration are as fol-
lows: thing signified (sc. τὸ σημαινόμενον, λεκτόν), essence (sc. οὐσία), 
substance (sc. ὑποκείμενον), hypostasis (sc. ὑπόστασις), common quality 
(sc. κοινῶς ποιόν), individual quality (sc. ἰδίως ποιόν), characteristic (sc. 
χαρακτήρ), relation (sc. σχέσις), concept (sc. ἐπίνοια), name (sc. ὄνομα) 
and real entity or meaning (sc. πρᾶγμα). All these notions represent termini 
201 For the details concerning Gregory’s critique of the argumentation of Eunomians 
cf. later, part two, chapter 1.
202 Cf. Daniélou, J., Eunome l’arien et l’exégèse néo-platonicienne du Cratyle, in: 
REG 69 (1956), 412–432. I agree with Daniélou apropos of Eunomius’ rather 
surface knowledge of Aristotle’s logic but I am not positive about Daniélou’s 
affiliation of the doctrine of Eunomius to Neo-Platonic language theory (for the 
details concerning Eunomius’ language theory cf. later, chapter 4, section 2).
203 Cf.: “And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the 
dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given… and Cratylus is 
right in saying that names belong to things by nature” (Plat., Cra 390d). 
204 Daniélou, 1956, 428.
205 Cf. Barnes, M.R., The Background and Use of Eunomius’ Causal Language, in: 
Barnes, M.R. / Williams, D.H. (eds.), Arianism after Arius: Essays on the Devel-
opment of the Fourth-Century Trinitarian Conflicts. Edinburgh 1993, 217–236. 
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technici of Hellenic logic and grammar206, therefore it seems reasonable to 
start by surveying their specific technical definitions. I then show how Origen 
and Basil supported their theological argumentation by the adoption of this 
terminology. 
It is no wonder that Origen, Basil and Gregory, who due to their excellent 
education were deeply grounded in classical culture, applied logical and gram-
matical terminology in expounding exegetical and theological matters.207 The 
Eunomians likewise processed their theological arguing in a logical manner 
and brought up issues that strictly speaking were as much concerned with 
logic and grammar as with theology.
To illustrate the case, I offer a patent example from Eunomius’ first apol-
ogy. Though Eunomius says there that his purpose is to “examine the actual 
essences” of the Father and the Son (A 20.5), his argument in practice con-
cerned plain logical and linguistic matters, for he was examining the cor-
relation between the essence (οὐσία) and “the meaning of the word which 
designates it (τι παρʹ αὐτὴν τὸ σημαινόμενον)” (A 12.8) (that is to say, 
the meaning of the words: unbegotten, begotten, the Father and the Son). In 
such a way, a correct understanding of the technical term τὸ σημαινόμενον, 
which roughly means “what is signified,” became rather important in the 
context of the polemics around Eunomian doctrine. 
Now, turning to the history of the term τὸ σημαινόμενον the follow-
ing factor should be noted. If we understand τὸ σημαινόμενον simply as 
“meaning” or “thing signified,” for it indeed frequently surfaced with this 
connotation in the texts of philosophers and theologians, we are not given 
a clear vision of the ontological status of the notion. To put it plainly, the 
very notion “thing signified” demands the question: what is this thing that 
is signified? Is it the thing as a whole or is it the essence or the power of the 
thing?208 The answer to this question clarifies what exactly is signified by the 
thing signified. 
In such a way Eunomius questioned the arguments of the Nicene advocates. 
For instance, when Athanasius of Alexandria (De syn 46.3) argued against 
the Arians, he stated that the term ἀγέννητος has two different but equally 
valid meanings (sc. σημαινόμενα), first, signifying him who has no cause 
(τὸ μὴ ἔχον τὸν αἴτιον) and second signifying him who is neither crea-
tion (sc. ποίημα), nor generation (κτίσμα). This thesis naturally provoked 
206 The notion of λεκτόν is a specific term of Stoic logic (cf. Столяров, А.А., Стоя 
и стоицизм. Москва 1995, 70–78). The notions essence, substance, hypostasis, 
common and individual quality or characteristic and relation are attached to the 
Stoic and Aristotelian categorial systems. 
207 Cf. Norris, 1991, 3–5. 
208 These answers were proposed by Eunomius in A 18, 19.
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a set of logical and theological questions concerning the definition of τὸ 
σημαινόμενον, which Eunomius didn’t hesitate to ask. 
For instance, in the twelfth chapter of Liber Apologeticus, he criticized 
people who “stumble at the use of equivocal terms (ταῖς ὁμωνυμίαις 
προσπταίοντας)” and “understand the essence to be one thing (ἕτερον μὲν 
τὴν οὐσίαν νοοῦντες) and the meaning of the word which designates it, to 
be something else (ἕτερον δέ τι παρ’ αὐτὴν τὸ σημαινόμενον)”. This is an 
example of a typical Peripatetic critic of Stoic language theory. Ammonius 
Hermiae in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione affirmed that 
nouns and verbs directly correspond to the meaning of real objects and that 
one should not invent anything in between thoughts and real objects, as the 
Stoics do by inventing the notion of λεκτὸν209 (Int 17.25). 
The concern of the Eunomians about applying language theory to theo-
logical matters was not altogether artificial. After the Council of Nicaea 
the question about the correctness of divine names (viz. the correlation be-
tween the signifiers “unbegotten,” “the Father,” “the Son” and the reality 
signified by them: whether it was the divine essence (sc. οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, 
ὑποκείμενον – A 12), or authority (sc. ἐξουσία – A 21), or energy210 (sc. 
ἐνέργεια – A 24) still remained unclear. Besides, there was no agreement 
on the appropriate way of discussing these matters. Although the disputants 
processed their arguments by means of logic (Eunomius, Aëtius, and the Cap-
padocians), they at the same time accused each other of overuse of logical 
expertise.211 Pressured by the circumstances of the debate, the Cappadocian 
fathers were obliged to solve the question raised by the Eunomians and also 
to try to forestall the appearance of new methodological questions. To succeed 
in this task both Basil and Gregory Nazianzen decided to apply the analytical 
instruments of contemporary science, namely logical and grammatical analy-
sis, which they learned at the school desk and which had already proved to 
be useful in Origen’s exegetical technology. 
Now, to continue our discussion about the term τὸ σημαινόμενον we need 
to make a brief excursion into Stoic linguistics, where this notion appeared 
as a synonym of λεκτόν – one of the key concepts of Stoic philosophy. It 
209 The term τὸ λεκτὸν and its synonym τὸ σημαινόμενον are termini technici 
of Stoic teaching (for the details concerning the provenence of these terms cf. 
below, chapter 4, section 1.1).
210 Cf.: “Hence, if they think it not ridiculous to ascribe the same qualities equally 
to both of them—essence say, or action, authority or name (thereby doing away 
with the differences between the names and their objects – άνελόντες τάς τών 
ονομάτων καί πραγμάτων διαφοράς) —let them explicitly speak of two Un-
begottens” (A 21.1–4; transl. R. Vaggione, 1987, 61).
211 Cf. Eun., A 22; Bas., AE 1.9.8–11; Greg., Or 27.2.
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is important to look more deeply into philosophical terminology because 
many of the chief terms and concepts applied by the Cappadocians (often 
via Origen) go back to Stoic and Peripatetic linguistics and logic.212 In order 
to outline the background of the post-Nicene debates and to recognise the 
shifts and innovations that Christian authors applied to the adopted philo-
sophical terminology it is useful to start by surveying the relevant notions in 
their particular context. 
1.1 Stoic linguistics at the service of Christian thought
In Stoic logic the notion of λεκτόν (or τὸ σημαινόμενον) played a signifi-
cant role for it linked together the whole body of Stoic doctrine.213 One of 
the remarkable advantages of this notion is that it suggested a compromise 
between the spheres of physical reality and language (sc. πρᾶγμα and ὄνομα). 
Various philosophers at different times have provided various interpretations 
of the λεκτόν notion, which I am not going to discuss here.214 Instead I sur-
vey the major aspects of the notion in order to facilitate our understanding 
of Origen’s, Basil’s and Gregory’s vision of the correlation between sense- 
perception, language, and thought, which they tended to express in Stoic terms.
The difficulties which confront a researcher of the notion of λεκτόν lie in 
its multidimensional nature. Literally, λεκτόν means “something that can be 
said” or “sayable,” or, in terms of modern linguistics “something signified”.215 
That is to say, it is understood as “meaning” which is “generated by rational 
thinking”216 or, put differently, it is an impression which is thought through 
and verbalised.
212 Scholars have acknowledged that Origen and Basil rather leaned towards Chry-
sippus’ logic rather than to Aristotelian logic (cf. Sesboüé, B. [introd., trad. et 
notes], Basile De Césarée, Contre Eunome, SC 305. Paris 1983, 195–197; de 
Ghellinck, J., Patristique et Moyen Âge: Études d’Histoire Littéraire et Doctri-
nale III. Brussels 1961, 282–296).
213 Cf. Столяров, А.А., Стоя и стоицизм. Москва 1995, 70–78; Kidd, I.G. (ed.), 
Posidonius Rhodius, The Commentary, Testimonia and Fragments. Cambridge 
1989, 9f.
214 The discussion had begun already in the works of Aristotelian commentators. 
Thus, Ammonius argued that λεκτὸν is an intermediate between thought and 
thing (μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ComInterp 17.27); Sim-
plicius contended that it is a thought (ComCat 11.4); John Philoponus identified 
λεκτὸν with a sound (ComCat 243).
215 In Stoic linguistics “thing signified” (sc. τὸ σημαινόμενον), is opposed to 
“signifier” (sc. τὸ σημαῖνον) (cf. Sextus, M 8.11f.). Stoics also used a term 
“thing thought” (sc. νοούμενον πρᾶγμα), as a synonym of τὸ σημαινόμενον 
(cf. Sextus, M 8.80).
216 Cf. τὸ κατὰ τὴν λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον (Diog., 7.63).
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Understood as an abstract and immaterial meaning λεκτόν corresponds 
to inner speech (sc. ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), and is opposed to utterance (sc. ὁ 
προφορικός λόγος, Sextus, M 8.275–276). Inner speech comprises various 
connotations of the notion and nuances of meaning which cannot be simul-
taneously articulated in speech. In such a way, λεκτόν can be also considered 
as a sign that implies various meanings in addition to its chief denotation. 
Different meanings of λεκτόν get to be actualised in different contexts: 
As soon as we understand the sequence, we immediately derive from it the 
idea of sign’ (διόπερ ἀκολουθίας ἔννοιαν ἔχων εὐθὺς καὶ σημείου νόησιν 



















Plutarch (SVF 2.171) reported that, according to the Stoics, when we utter 
“don’t steal” we forbid one thing and order another thing and both these 
meanings are implied in the same utterance. In such a way, λεκτόν un-
derstood as incorporeal inner speech represents a comprehensive notion 
which, according to the Stoics, can be grasped by the sense-perception (sc. 
κατάληψις, SVF 2.70). 
Although λεκτόν has a close connection with the sense-perception (and 
consequently, with the sphere of τυγχάνον – material) it nevertheless has an 
immaterial status (albeit, its immateriality is different from that of Platonic 
ideas completely belonging to the transcendental sphere). For this reason the 
Stoics insisted upon distinguishing λεκτόν from idea or thought (sc. ἔννοια, 
ἰδέα).218 
217 Translation mine.
218 Cf. Frede, M., The Stoic Notion of a Lekton, in: Everson, S. (ed.), Companions 
to Ancient Thought 3: Language. Cambridge 1994, 109–129.
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Thus, λεκτά are neither thoughts nor impressions upon the organs of 
sense, although they depend on both. They do not depend on the rules of 
propositional logic, yet they belong to the sphere of human cognition. From 
the ontological point of view λεκτά are characterized by an independent 
ontological status, which is fixed in their special mode of existence conveyed 
by the verb “to subsist” (sc. ὑφιστάναι) as opposed to “to be” (sc. εἶναι). 
In other words, as immaterial items λεκτά cannot share the same mode of 
being as material objects.219 The λεκτά do not exist but subsist (Sextus, M 
1.15, 8.70). This is how Sextus described the matter: 
… some placed the true and false in the region of the sign signified, others in that 
of utterance, others in that of the motion of thought. And the Stoics stood for 
the first opinion, saying that three things were inseparably connected with one 
another: a thing signified, a signifier and an object (σημαινόμενον, σημαῖνον, 
τυγχάνον). Of these the signifier is the utterance (for example, the utterance 
‘Dion’); the sign signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by it, and which we 
apprehend as it subsists in our thought, and which foreigners do not understand 
even though they hear the utterance; and the object is the externally existing 
thing (for example, Dion himself). And of these, two are bodies, namely the 
utterance and the object, while one is incorporeal, namely the state of affairs 
signified and sayable, which is true or false. This is not the case universally, 
but some sayables are deficient and some self-sufficient. And belonging to the 
self-sufficient kind is the so-called proposition, which they delineate by saying 
‘a proposition is what is true or false’220 (M 8.11–12 = SVF 2.166).
Along these lines we see that the Stoics distinguished between the “thing 
signified” and its signifier (cf. Diog., 7.62f.). When λεκτόν is uttered it en-
ters the sphere of grammar. In this fashion, the Stoics thought that λεκτόν 
can be temporally actualized (sc. ὑπάρχει) in a proposition221 (sc. ἀξίωμα). 
Now, talking about the uttered λεκτόν it is important to specify that it can 
be uttered in various ways. 
A distinction which the Stoics drew between the thing signified and its 
signifier had an interesting analogy. The Stoics distinguished between the true 
(sc. τὸ ἀληθές) and truth (sc. ἡ ἀλήθεια). Although taken independently, as 
a pure meaning, λεκτόν is beyond true or false (M 8.74) because it is literally 
219 In Stoic philosophy, everything, including even gods, is material.
220 Transl. R. Bett, 2005, 92.
221 The Stoics identified three kinds of actualized or uttered λεκτόν: first, the in-
telligible and incorporeal complete λεκτόν (sc. αὐτοτελὲς λεκτόν) expressed 
in a complete sentence; second, λεκτόν was considered a corporeal qualitiy 
(ποιότης, πτώσις) if it was expressed by a substantive; third, the incomplete 
λεκτόν (sc. ἐλλιπὲς λεκτόν) expressed neither by substantive, nor in a complete 
sentence. Cf. Frede, M., The Origins of Traditional Grammar, in: Frede, M. 
(ed.), Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Minnesota 1987, 352–354.
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beyond “being” (sc. εἶναι), when λεκτόν is actualised in a proposition it 
become either true or false.222 Here is how Sextus explained the matter: 
We suggest it thus: truths are said to differ from the truth in three ways – in 
substance, in constitution, in power. In substance, because truths are incorporeal 
(they are statements and sayables) whereas the truth is corporeal (it is knowledge 
assertoric of all truths, and knowledge is the ruling part in a certain condition – 
just as a hand in a certain condition is a fist) … In constitution, since truths are 
simple (e.g. I am conversing), whereas the truth is constituted by a recognition 
of many truths. In power, because the truth is linked to knowledge, whereas 
truths are present only in virtuous men but truths are present in bad men as well 
(a bad man may say something true)223 (PH 8.81–83).
It is likely that these peculiar Stoic concepts of truth and truths and unut-
tered and uttered λεκτόν resonated in the argument of Origen and Basil. I 
will elaborate this hypothesis later in this chapter; for now I shall highlight 
only two examples in order to illustrate the matter. In a comparable vein 
with the Stoic understanding of inner speech Origen in his Commentary on 
John characterised the wisdom of God, which he identified with the second 
hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. He asserted that: 
…the wisdom of God (θεοῦ σοφία) is an incorporeal substance (ἀσώματον 
ὑπόστασιν) consisting of different ideas (ποικίλων θεωρημάτων 
περιεχόντων), and that ‘It is because of this creation [of wisdom] that the 
whole creation has also been able to subsist (πᾶσα κτίσις ὑφεστάναι), since 
it has a share in the divine wisdom according to which it has been created (Ps 
103:24) (ComJn 1.34.243). 
Remarkably enough in this fragment Origen uses the verb ὑφίστημι, which, 
as we remember, the Stoics applied to distinguish the quasi-being of the incor-
poreal λεκτὸν from the real being of the corporeal τύγχανον. Origen uses 
this verb in order to explain how the whole creation subsists in the divine 
wisdom and exists in material reality.
Basil also appears to dwell on the Stoic conception of truth and the truths, 
when in the Epistle 38 he contends: 
222 Susanne Bobzien expounded the matter as follows: “While true, the proposi-
tions have the ontological mode of subsistence, or are actualized (ὑπάρχει), 
whereas when false, they do not. Truth and actualization of a proposition alike 
are time-dependent: a proposition can subsist and be true at one time, then 
cease to do so, and then subsist and be true again later— still being the same 
proposition” (cf. Bobzien, S., Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. 
Oxford 1998, 64).
223 Transl. J. Annas / J. Barnes, 2000, 87.
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Yet receive what I say as at best a token and reflection of the truth (ὑπόδειγμα 
καὶ σκιὰν ἀληθείας); not as the actual truth itself (αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀλήθειαν)224 (Ep 38.5.1).
On the whole, by differentiating between the thing signified and the signifier 
the Stoics detected the relative truthfulness of human speech and eventually 
made considerable progress in exploring this phenomenon225. The achieve-
ments of the Stoic linguists along with the Hellenic philologists helped Origen, 
Basil and Gregory to explain the multiplicity and multivocity of the divine 
names. Thus, Gregory Nazianzen asserted that the multiple divine names 
manifest the single and integral divinity through the different characteristics 
of its nature. Here is how Gregory summarized the issue in his third theologi-
cal oration: 
there is one essence of God (μίαν οὐσίαν), and one nature (φύσιν), and one 
name (κλῆσιν)… although in accordance with a distinction in our thoughts 
(ἐπινοίαις τισὶ διαιρουμέναις) we use distinct names (ὀνόματα) and that 
whatever is properly (κυρίως) called by this name really is God; and whatever 
he is in his nature (ὃ δ’ ἂν ᾖ κατὰ φύσιν) is a true name for him — granted 
that real truth is contained in facts (ἐν πράγμασιν), not in names (μὴ ἐν 
ὀνόμασιν)226 (Or 29.13.15–20). 
This fragment demonstrates the close connection and mutual interdepend-
ence of epistemology and ontology. In other words, there is an inherent tie 
between the conception of being and the method of understanding the being. 
Consequently, my next excursus concerns the philosophical notions peculiar 
to categorial theory and touches upon cognitive theory.
1.2  The categorial theory and correlation between  
logic and linguistics 
In the Stoic system the notion of λεκτὸν is intrinsically connected with the 
categorial theory, which has much in common with the Peripatetic catego-
rial theory, though the Stoics themselves spared no effort to underscore the 
differences between theirs and Aristotelian logic.227 Since the chief notions of 
the categorial theory (essence, substance, hypostasis, common and individual 
quality or characteristic and relation) played a significant role in the teach-
224 Translation mine.
225 For the details concerning Hellenistic temporalized conception of truth cf. 
Bobzien, 1998, 19–21.
226 Transl. Ch.G. Browne / J.E. Swallow.
227 Cf. Gottschalk, H.B., The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators, in: Sorabji, R. 
(ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and Their Influence. 
Ithaca / New York 1990, 79f.
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ings of Origen, Eunomius, Basil and Gregory, it is important to include this 
theory in our survey. 
It is very characteristic that as opposed to the Peripatetic categories, which 
represent the genera of being, the Stoic categories represent the genera of 
what is explicable. This particular feature of the Stoic categorial theory, in 
my opinion, matches the underlying assumption of Christian dogma concen-
trated on the explicable side of divinity (sc. the hypostatic characteristics of 
the divinity).228 
The first category of the Stoic system is substrate (sc. ὑποκείμενον – 
SVF 2.314, 2.369). It is understood as an unqualified essence, or primordial 
substance (sc. ἄποιος οὐσία\ὕλη – SVF 1.86, 1.88); it corresponds to the 
Aristotelian pure potentiality (δυνάμει σῶμα). In grammar ὑποκείμενον 
correlates with the subject of proposition. 
The second category is “common quality” (sc. κοινὴ ποιότης  – SVF 
3.398). It denotes the independent (or self-dependent – κατ’ ἑαυτόν πως 
ἔχον) general characteristic. 
The third category is “individual quality” (sc. ἰδία ποιότης  – SVF 
2.400) scilicet the “independent individual characteristic” (sc. κατ’ οἰκεῖον 
χαρακτῆρα). 
The fourth category is relation (sc. σχέσις – SVF 2.369). It constitutes a 
dependent, “relative characteristic” (πρός τι πως ἔχον). 
The interrelationship of these categories can be easily demonstrated in the 
following example: It (1st) is a homo sapiens (2nd), named Paul (3rd), father 
to John (4th). 
According to Stoic logic, this proposition is true if there is something whose 
generic quality makes it a homo sapiens, whose individual quality makes it 
Paul229, who is indeed a father to John, i.e. the proposition is true, where 
the subject of the proposition does really exist and the circumstances of its 
existence satisfy the qualities and relations mentioned in the proposition. By 
contrast, if there is no Paul or he is not father to John, in other words, if the 
proposition does not correlate with reality, – it is a false proposition, yet it 
subsists in the mind. In summary, λεκτόν, when uttered, corresponds to a 
proposition (either complete or incomplete). To be true a λεκτόν-proposition 
228 Cf. Gregory in his second theological oration stated that: “Since the divine es-
sence is ineffable, we too will honour it by silence (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄρρητα ἦν, καὶ ἡμῖν 
σιωπῇ τιμάσθω)” (Or 28.20).
229 Diogenes Laertius informs us that the Stoics believed that proper names (sc. 
ὀνόματα) signify an individual quality, while common names (sc. προσηγορίαι) 
signify a common quality (Diog., 7.58). The Alexandrian grammarians shared 
this view (Apollonius, Constr 103.13, 142.1f., 155.3–5).
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(sc. προφορικὸς λόγος) must be complete, satisfy the grammatical rules and 

















































































Personal noun προσηγορία 
(Diog., 3.22)
Subject Predicates 
The Stoic complex understanding of λόγος, which comprised the conceptions 
of inner and outer speech (sc. λόγος προφορικός and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) 
accompanied by the categorial theory, provided a compromise solution of the 
issue of the correctness of names (sc. the dilemma of either the conventional 
κατὰ θέσιν or the natural κατὰ φύσιν provenance of words). Namely, 
the λεκτόν understood as an intermediary between the world of phenom-
ena and the world of thoughts, (and what is especially worth mentioning, 
a linguistic intermediary), indicated a via media. To put it differently and 
maybe more accurately, for the Stoics the announced dilemma simply was 
not valid because their vision of the cognitive process comprised natural 
(sense-perception) and conventional (analysis and classification of the per-
ceived data) components. The Stoics never ceased to underline the rational 
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character of human speech (language) vs. the babbling of children230 or cries 
of animals,231 nor did they cease to explore the connection of language with 
perception (sc. κατάληψις, SVF 2.70). This vision of the nature of language 
provided them with a solid alibi against the extremes of the conventional 
and natural theories of language origin. To that end, instead of solving the 
long-standing dilemma the Stoics approached it from a new angle and in so 
doing promoted a compromise solution. Without the λεκτόν notion this 
solution would not have been possible. 
The interdependence of Stoic linguistics, epistemology and ontology was 
based on the logical grammatical methodology constituted by the universal 
law of cause-and-effect and was recognized as equally valid for grammar, 
logic, physics and ethics.232 Ergo, in the Stoic doctrine, ontology agreed with 
linguistic and logic, and the last one was acknowledged as a full-fledged part 
of philosophy. 
One can easily guess the benefits that bridging linguistic and philosophi-
cal matters brought to Christian doctrine with its pronounced focus on the 
sacred text and all the associated linguistic matters (sc. the concept of the 
divine Logos and veneration of the Pentecost event). In the following sections 
I show how some of the Stoic concepts were applied by Origen, Basil and 
Gregory Nazianzen.
2.  Hellenic philosophers, Eunomius and Origen on the  
correctness of names 
Now that we are aware of the original philosophical definitions of those 
specific logical terms which sprang up in the debate around the Eunomian 
case, let us see how Christian authors took advantage of them.
As I noticed earlier, Aëtius and Eunomius built their doctrine on the simple 
assertion that God the Father is an unbegotten essence, while God the Son 
is a begotten essence. This means that in their view the terms “unbegotten” 
and “begotten” signified the essential qualities of the Father and the Son; and 
230 Varron argued that children being ignorant of grammar are incompetent in 
sensible speech (De lingua latina 6.56).
231 Sextus noticed that animals are also capable of articulation and feeling but this 
is not enough for the creation of discursive and complex (sc. μεταβατικὴ καὶ 
συνθετική) impressions (cf. M 8.275f.). An interesting comparable remark is 
preserved in Origen’s fragments of the Commentary on Luke: “You will find 
that in Proverbs is promised the divine perception (sc. αἴσθησιν θείαν) in con-
tradiction to that one which is not divine. In fact, perception cannot be divine, 
as also irrational animals – seeing, hearing, tasting and touching – take part in 
it…” (Or., ComLc fr. 186.40–46). (Translation mine).
232 Barnes, J., Logic and the imperial Stoa, Leiden 1997, 9f.
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since these qualities were different they assumed that they signified different 
essences. In terms of Hellenic linguistics this amounts to understanding the 
“thing signified” (sc. τὸ σημαινόμενον) as “thing signifying the essence 
of the thing”. Notoriously, this linguistic theory forming a foundation of 
theological doctrine was interwoven with the discussion of the correctness 
of the divine names which, as I noted earlier, had emerged in the Hellenic 
philosophical agenda. 
Although the issue of the correctness of names debated by the Hellenic 
philosophers and theologians has attracted considerable interest in contem-
porary scholarship, a certain nebulousness still surrounds the history of this 
debate. In particular, the specification of relevant terminology and charting 
the crossroads and specific nuances of the Christian theories involved in the 
dispute still lacks precision and accuracy. 
A seminal article of J. Daniélou233 devoted to the language theory of Eu-
nomius and to the debate about the correctness of names has been a lodestar 
in the investigation of the problem. Although the issue of the correctness of 
names goes back to Plato’s Cratylus, Daniélou convincingly demonstrates 
that there is no reason to become entangled in discussions of the fourth 
century BC when exploring debates of the third–fourth century AD. In late 
antiquity the view of the matter had considerably altered from that of the 
fourth century BC. 
Moreover, a long tradition of debating the issue and re-interpreting the 
relevant authoritative texts, which runs through the whole of classical and late 
antiquity, rendered it almost impossible to establish a standard classification 
of the disputant parties. To give a thematic example of the state of affairs: 
the attribution, preserved in works of Origen and Eunomius, of certain theo-
ries of the origin of language to Aristotle, Epicurus and the Stoics, is clearly 
misguiding.234 Whatever were the sources of the accounts of Origen and Eu-
nomius about the language theories of the ancient philosophers, it is evident 
that they were not particularly interested in details and nuances of the debate. 
With reference to H. Steinthal,235 Daniélou affirmed that in the third–fourth 
centuries AD we cannot find any theory of the origin of language whose 
233 Daniélou, 1956, 412–432.
234 Daniélou stated that the incorrect account of the Stoic, Epicurean and Aristote-
lian theories of language offered by Eunomius in the second apology suggests that 
he had “aucune connaissance de leurs doctrines sur le langage” (cf. Daniélou, 
1956, 414–416). Allen pointed out in his article that Origen gave a wry account 
of the Stoic theory of language (cf. Allen, J., The Stoics on the origin of Language 
and the Foundations of Etymology, in: Frede, D. / Inwood, B. [eds.], Language 
and Learning. Cambridge 2005, 36–56).
235 Cf. Steinthal, H., Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und 
Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik. Berlin 1890, 332f.
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derivation from Aristotelian, Epicurean or Stoic doctrine could be sufficiently 
proved. 
Analysing the matter within the context of late antiquity, Steinthal estab-
lished a classification of the three disputant parties: the first believing in the 
conventional or arbitrary origin of language (sc. θέσει), attributed to the 
Sceptics and sophists; the second supporting the mystical or supernatural 
origin of language (sc. φύσει), attributed to Heraclitus; and the third party 
holding a somewhat compromised opinion and associated with grammarians. 
Steinthal formed his classification on the basis of the testimony of Ammonius 
Hermiae, a Neo-Platonic author of the fifth century. In the second chapter 
of his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (§§ 34–45) Ammonius 
traces the history of the famous debate. He thoroughly examines views of 
various philosophical schools as well as various philosophers individually. 
He highlights not only philosophical and religious-philosophical aspects of 
the issue236 but more extensively dwells on the grammatical and linguistic 
nuances of the question.237 
In fact, Ammonius’ presentation of the debate is so detailed that I think 
Steinthal’s interpretation of his text does injustice to it. To say the least, I 
believe that it would be correct to develop his classification by mentioning the 
Aristotelian vision of the matter. In his work, Ammonius devotes a particular 
attention to the description of Aristotelian language theory. At the end of 
his overview of this issue he expounds five senses of “name” in Aristotle (§§ 
45–46). The Aristotelian diversified position may give us the sense of the 
complexity of the debate, which in my view should not be reduced to a de-
bate between two parties. I think it would be more accurate to say that strict 
conventionalism and naturalism marked the extremes of the dispute, while 
the really interesting discussion concerned the nuances of various compromise 
solutions.238 Later, I will come back to surveying the details of the debate and 
now continue with the research history of this question. 
236 For instance, paragraph 39 of Ammonius’ commentary, where he deliberates 
on the conundrum of the correctness of names, is entitled: “By imposition [sc. 
θέσει] is not contradicted by the efficacy of prayer”.
237 In such a way, the titles of the sections of Ammonius’ commentary, where he observes 
the naming problem, are self-explanatory: “Beasts sounds, none of which is a name”; 
“Indefinite name”; “Porphyry on the Stoic classification of predicates”; “Cases do 
not make an assertion when combined with just the copula” (ComInt 41–45).
238 Thus, Ammonius, for instance, tried to combine Aristotelian conventionalism 
with Platonic naturalism when he stated that Aristotle associated names with 
symbols because, as with a symbol, a name bears an artificial likeness to the 
nature of the thing named: “For signifying (sc. σημαῖνον) and signified (sc. 
σημαινόμενον) are said relative to one another, so that the things which signify 
by convention are reasonably <said to be> symbols of the things signified. … It is 
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Taking Steinthal’s classification as a point of departure Daniélou concen-
trated on the study of the two parties defined by Steinthal. Thus, Daniélou 
characterized the approach of grammarians as a congruence of the positions 
of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoa, which formed the “scientific” or “syncretic” 
(sc. θέσει + φύσει) theory of the origin of language. Daniélou claimed that 
the Cappadocians supported this “scientific” approach. However, he did not 
elaborate his hypothesis nor indicate any possible direct sources of the Cap-
padocians’ language theory. 
As for the so-called mystical or supernatural theory of the origin of lan-
guage239 Daniélou attributed it to Clemens of Alexandria (Strom 1.143.6), 
Origen and Eunomius.240 He maintained that they believed in the divine and 
revelatory character of the Hebrew language, and traced the roots of Origen’s 
and Eunomius’ concept to the doctrines of the Chaldean Oracles. According 
to Daniélou, Eunomius’ language theory emerged from the concepts of Origen 
and the Neo-Platonic theurgists, with whom he was related through his 
master Aëtius. The comparison of the Neo-Platonic and Eunomian concepts 
suggested by Daniélou does not seem sufficient to affiliate Eunomius’ language 
theory to the voces magicae concept, which sprang from the Chaldean Oracles 
and was subsequently elaborated by the Neo-Platonic theurgists. 
A clear presentation of the voces magicae concept is found in Iamblichus’ 
De Mysteriis (7.4f). Iamblichus tells us that the basis of the theurgic practice 
comprises a belief in the automatic power attached to the sounds upon which 
divine names are built. Dillon emphasized that according to Iamblichus only 
gods know the meanings of divine names for these meanings are unfathom-
able to humans and men should not even venture to provide these names with 
any rational interpretation.241 
In contrast to the logic of Iamblichus’ argument, Eunomius interpreted 
the term “unbegotten,” which in his view amounted to a true name of God, 
in an entirely rational way. Besides, Eunomius was never known to have 
attached any supernatural power either to the word ἀγέννητος or to any 
of its sounds. In fact Eunomius’ argument was a logical deduction from two 
no wonder that we want to call the name both a symbol and an artificial likeness 
(sc. ὁμοίωμα τεχνητὸν). For what is imposed unreflectively (sc. ἀσκόπως) is 
merely a symbol, while what is imposed according to reason resembles symbols 
in being able to be composed of now some and now other syllables, but in be-
ing appropriate to the nature of what is named it is a likeness, not a symbol” 
(ComInt 40.14–16; transl. D. Blank, 1996, 48f.).
239 John Dillon also talked about a theory of mystical or supernatural origin of names 
(cf. Dillon, J.M., The Magical Power of Names in Origen and Later Platonism, 
in: Hamson, R. / Crousel, H. [eds.], Origeniana tertia. Roma 1985, 203–216).
240 Cf. Daniélou, 1956, 422.
241 Cf. Dillon, 1996, 203–216.
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premises: the simplicity and ontological priority of the divine essence. Thus, 
in the 7th paragraph of the Liber Apologeticus Eunomius in a typical logical 
way argues for the ontological priority of the divine essence: 
In fact, just as the maker must be in existence before the thing he brings into 
being, and the thing made must be later than its maker, by the same token a 
thing cannot exist before or after itself, nor anything else at all before God… So, 
then, if it has now been demonstrated that God neither existed before himself 
nor anything else exist before him, but that he is before all things, then what 
follows from this is the Unbegotten, or rather, that he is unbegotten essence 
(οὐσία ἀγέννητος)242 (A 7).
Interestingly enough, immediately after this logical arguing Eunomius ex-
pounded his methodological principle by way of rejecting discursive thought: 
Expressions based on invention (κατʹ ἐπίνοια) have their existence in name 
(ὀνόμασι) and utterance (προφορᾷ) only, and by their nature are dissolved 
along with the sounds (φωναῖς) [which made them up]; but God, whether 
these sounds are silent, sounding, or have even come into existence, and before 
anything was created, both was and is unbegotten243 (A 8.4–7).
This example seems to confirm the idea that Eunomius did not consider the 
word “unbegotten” (with its syllables and sounds) as abnormally powerful, 
but instead professed the uniqueness of its meaning. He claimed: 
Indeed, if something else did exist before the Unbegotten, it is that which would 
properly have to be called ‘unbegotten’ and not the second244 (A 10.13f.). 
Thus it seems safe to conclude that it was the thing signified of ἀγέννητος 
and never the signifier itself that occupied the mind of Eunomius. More to the 
point, from Eunomius’ second apology (J 2.1.524–525) we learn that different 
divine names preserved in the Bible in fact mean the same, namely, that God is 
unbegotten. Eunomius even asserts that those who take the scriptural names of 
Christ to mean that he is an unbegotten essence, accord with his (sc. Eunomius’) 
teaching (τῷ ἡμετέρῳ συναγορεύσει λόγῳ).245 This affirmation renders it 
impossible to identify Eunomius’ teaching with the voces magicae concept.
242 Transl. Vaggione, 1987, 41.
243 Transl. Vaggione, 1987, 43.
244 Transl. Vaggione, 1987, 47.
245 Cf. in the second apology Eunomius affirmed that if there is a single divine life, 
every name applied to it must effectively signify the same divine essence (cf. J 
1.367.9–14 = NPNF 297b29–37, 298b38–40); and later on that this single 
divine life must have a single inner meaning, even if the names expressing it are 
different; real meanings are determined on the basis of the underlying objects, 
so that (if their names are different) either the reference is to a different object 
or there is no difference in meaning (cf. J 1.368.6–18 = NPNF 299a10–25).
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Like Daniélou, Dillon also saw reason in deriving Origen’s language theory 
from the voces magicae concept. According to the Neo-Platonists, the names 
of demons possess a certain power over their bearers because they have some 
substantial connection with them246. This approach implies that mastery over 
nature is acquired by the magical action of the theurgist. The nature and even 
daemons are obliged to obey theurgist because he knows certain magical 
formulae, hence, his appeal to the daemons is not strictly speaking a dialogue 
but an imperative monologue.
Origen indeed believed that automatic power is inherent in divine names. 
Vivid evidence for Origen’s thoughts on this matter is preserved in the Homi-
lies on Joshua:247 
That there are certain invisible forms within us, and indeed a multitude of them, 
is revealed to us by the psalm which says: Praise the Lord, my soul and let all 
the things within me praise his holy name [Ps 102:1]. So there are a multitude 
of powers within us which have been assigned to our souls and bodies, which, 
if they are whole, when the Holy Scripture is read, are benefitted and become 
stronger, even if ‘our mind is unfruitful,’ as it is written about ‘him who speaks 
with tongues’ [1 Cor 14:14], ‘My spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful’248 
(HomJosh 20.1).
Supportive of the supernatural power attached to divine names Origen con-
sidered their translation fatal for this power because, as he put it it must not 
be the “signification” of the name which gives it [the name] power but instead 
it must be “the qualities and characteristics of the sounds” (Cels 1.25). 
In spite of these beliefs, which, as Dillon demonstrated,249 come really close 
to the views held by the Neo-Platonists, Origen emphatically rejected the 
246 This substantial connection could not be perceived by any logical technique – it is 
ontological, inherent and irrational. Referring to Proclus’ Commentary on Craty-
lus, Dillon shows that names were understood as σύμβολα and συνθήματα, 
“which the gods have sown in the world, at all levels of existence. They are, 
in a way, meta-symbols, or the subjective correlatives of the symbols the gods 
have laid down. If one gets them right, one has the key to the understanding 
and manipulation of the world, and if one has the gods names right, one has 
achieved access to the gods” (cf. Dillon, 1996, 204).
247 Dillon gives this fragment in parallel with a fragment from the fourth Ennead 
in support of his hypothesis. The citation from Plotinus goes as follows: “the 
concord of like things and the mutual repulsion of unlike ones … it is by drawing 
on this unifying force in Nature that the magician achieves his effects. Nature 
itself, indeed, is the primal magician” (Enn 4.40.6f.).
248 Transl. J. Dillon, 1996, 214.
249 Dillon connects Origen’s remarks about translation with similar prohibitions, 
such as those found in Iamblichus (De mysteriis 7.5) and the Chaldean Oracles 
(cf. Dillon, 1996, 203).
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equation of pagan rituals with Christian prayer. He underscored the different 
mechanisms of pagan and Christian worship (cf. Cels 8.17–20). Whatever 
parallels might be seen between Origen’s conjectures on the divine origin of the 
Hebrew proto-language (sc. before the babble of languages, cf. Gen 11) and the 
concept of voces magicae, the practical application of divine names in prayer 
described by Origen is rather different from the Neo-Platonic reciting of spells. 
In such a way Origen emphasised that Christian prayer stands as far away 
from the magical spell as inane sounds do from meaningful words. Origen 
also asserted that the magical spell reveals its weakness in translation, which 
renders it powerless, while the Christian prayer remains powerful as long as 
one who says the prayer does it consciously:250 
… for the Lord of all languages (ὁ πάσης διαλέκτου κύριος) of the earth hears 
those who pray to Him in each different tongue, hearing, if I may so say, but one 
speech corresponding the meaning (ὡς μιᾶς φωνῆς τῆς κατὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα 
ἀκούων), expressing itself in different dialects (Cels 8.37.15). 
In the Homily on prayer Origen asserted that Christian prayer can be effica-
cious even when silent, because God listens rather to the heart of a praying 
man than to his voice (Orat 24). 
Besides, from Origen’s philological studies we learn that he had a sober 
scholarly approach to common biblical nouns and to divine names alike. In 
the Commentary on John Origen encouraged exegetes to investigate the con-
textual connotation (τοῦ σημαινομένου τὴν δύναμιν, ComJn 1.21.125) of 
a divine name (ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς), since this name is meant not only figuratively 
but literally (οὐ τροπικῶς ἀλλὰ κυρίως, ComJn 1.21.125). The usage of τὸ 
σημαινόμενον in these two fragments is in tune with the Stoic understand-
ing of the “thing signified,” which belongs to intellectual reality and implies 
different connotations. 
Origen’s leaning towards the Stoic linguistic was persuasively underscored 
by Shawn Keough, who showed that Origen applied the Stoic classification 
of words to common noun (sc. ὄνομα) and proper noun (sc. προσηγορία) 
and affirmed that “Origen’s understanding of divine names may perhaps be 
more usefully discussed against the background of Graeco-Roman linguistics, 
rather than magical papyri or Peircian semiotics”.251 
From the evidence presented above we must admit that the principles of 
Origen’s biblical studies appear to be somewhat at odds with his belief in the 
250 In this regard, it is important to note that Basil, whose inclination towards Stoic 
perception theory is clear, literally proclaimed the same idea in the Homily 18 
(PG 31, 504).
251 Cf. Keough, S.W.J., Divine Names in the Contra Celsum, in: Heidl, G. / Somos, R. 
(eds.), Origeniana nona. Origen and the Religious Practice of his Time. Leuven 
2009, 205–215.
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supernatural power attached to the sounds of the nomina barbara. There can 
be no doubt, however, particularly after Dillon’s convincing argument, that 
Origen was aware of the principle of working magic, scilicet of sympathy 
(sc. συμπάθεια). Indeed, Origen’s description of the technique of imitation 
(sc. μίμησις, Cels 6.63), by means of which he effectively bridged exegesis, 
theology and ascetics, makes one think of Plotinus’ vision of the imitatio dei252 
practice and bears a striking resemblance to the practices described by later 
Neo-Platonic authors (though this is obviously a theme for another story253). 
In sum, it is true that Origen, as did his philosophical colleagues, believed in 
imitatio dei as the foremost way to God.254 
Nevertheless, when going into the details of the imitatio dei practice, 
Origen tried to distance himself from his Hellenic colleagues, who elabo-
rated a comparable doctrine. He used a tolerably rare adjective σύμμορφος 
(sc. similar, LSJ), which, according to the TLG statistics, once appeared in 
the classical period, later came into use in the Epistles of Apostle Paul and 
eventually found its highest use in the texts of Clemens and Origen. It seems 
quite plausible that Origen deliberately chose to avoid the famous ὁμοίωσις 
(sc. resemblance; cf. ὁμοίωσις θεῷ – to become like God, in Plat. Thaet.; cf. 
LSJ), the term deeply rooted in the Platonic philosophical tradition, and to 
use Pauline vocabulary instead. 
252 Cf.: “In the strength of such considerations we lead up our own soul to the Di-
vine, so that it poses itself as an image of that Being (ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸ εἰκόνα θεμένην ἑαυτὴν εἶναι ἐκείνου), its life becoming an 
imprint and a likeness of the Highest (ἴνδαλμα καὶ ὁμοίωμα εἶναι ἐκείνου), 
its every act of thought making it over into the Divine and the Intellectual (ὅταν 
νοῇ, θεοειδῆ καὶ νοοειδῆ γίγνεσθαι)” (Plotin, Enn 5.3.8; transl. B.S. Page, 
1969, available on-line).
253 Proclus in his Commentary on Timaeus defined the following stages of the 
theurgic ascendance: 1. knowledge (sc. γνῶσις); 2. affinity (sc. οἰκείωσις, ac-
quired via “τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσις” or “τὰς ἰδιότητας τῶν θείων ὁμοίωσις”); 
3. contact (sc. συναφή, understood as touching the divine essence “καθ ἣν 
ἐφαπτόμεθα τῆς θείας οὐσίας”); 4. adhesion (sc. ἐμπέλασις understood as 
provider of greater communion and a more manifest participation in the light 
of God (τὴν κοινωνίαν ἡμῖν παρεχομένη καὶ τρανεστέραν τὴν μετουσίαν 
τοῦ τῶν θεῶν φωτός); 5. union (sc. ἕνωσις, understood as provider of unifica-
tion of our energy with divine energy (μίαν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῶν τε ποιοῦσα καὶ 
τῶν θεῶν)” (ComTim 1.211.20–25). For a detailed analysis of this fragment 
in the context of the Neo-Platonic and Christian concept of prayer cf. Petroff, 
V., Anagogic Rays of the Good: the Sun in the Platonism of Late Antiquity 
and the Corpus Areopagiticum, in: The History of Philosophy Yearbook 2009, 
Moscow 2010, 112–139.
254 Cf.: “Thus the Spirit of Christ dwells in those who bear, so to say, a resemblance 
(συμμόρφοις ἐφιζάνει) in form and feature to Himself” (Cels 8.18).
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In his debate with Celsus Origen stressed that, in contrast with the pagans 
who venerate divinities by altars and statues, Christians practise virtue in 
order to establish statues of God within themselves.255 This testimony, which 
sounds rather predictable in the text of a Christian author, peculiarly enough 
found support in the writings of Julian the Emperor. He explicitly stated that 
Christians, whom he thoroughly despised, showed remarkable success in 
their operative charity initiatives and other social work (education, mission, 
confession, etc.). For this reason he insisted upon cultivating similar social 
work within the pagan denomination.256
Thinking through the controversial evidence presented so far, I incline to 
regard Origen’s belief in the supernatural power of the nomina barbara in 
the light of his biblical studies. If we just take into account how persistently 
Origen urged his fellow exegetes to collect and explore all the readings they 
could find in various manuscripts with both Hebrew and Greek biblical texts, 
then we perhaps see the underlying logic of his thought. In his Letter to Afri-
canus Origen expounds this idea by saying that “Providence has ministered 
to the edification of all the Churches of Christ in the sacred Scriptures,” 
therefore, he continued, “In all these cases consider whether it would not be 
well to remember the words, ‘You shall not remove the ancient landmarks 
which your fathers have set’” (EpAf 11.57–60). 
In such a way Origen emphasised that everything that is found in various 
biblical manuscripts (either Hebrew or Greek) must be taken into account by 
a zealous student of scripture. I believe that with this argument in hand, the 
confusion about Origen’s “too pious” regard of the Hebrew names of God 
255 Cf.: “And everyone who imitates Him according to his ability, does by this 
very endeavour raise a statue according to the image of the Creator, for in 
the contemplation of God with a pure heart they become imitators of Him” 
(Cels 8.18).
256 The testimony of Julian goes as follows: “For when it came about that the poor 
were neglected and overlooked by the priests, then I think the impious Galile-
ans observed this fact and devoted themselves to philanthropy. And they have 
gained ascendancy in the worst of their deeds through the credit they win for 
such practices” (Jul., Ep 89b.463–476). Gregory Nazianzen also mentioned this 
episode in his invective against the Emperor: “He [Julian] also, having the same 
design, was intending to establish schools in every town, with pulpits and higher 
and lower rows of benches, for lectures and expositions of the heathen doctrines, 
both of such as give rules of morality and those that treat of abstruse subjects 
… He was purposing also to build inns and hospices for pilgrims, monasteries 
for men, convents for virgins, places for meditation, and to establish a system 
of charity for the relief of prisoners, and also that which is conducted by means 
of letters of recommendation by which we forward such as require it from one 
nation to another – things which he had especially admired in our institutions” 
(Greg., Or 4.111).
92
disappears. It is clear that he approached biblical texts as a highly complicated 
research enigma, which would take more than a lifetime to explore. He there-
fore maintained that even if he had not yet grasped some of the questions 
concerning the history of the biblical corpus, he could not simply abandon 
these questions. The correlation of the Hebrew and Greek versions of the Bi-
ble was one of the most perplexing research problems, which Origen explored 
more deeply than anyone else in his time. 
In sum, I think it is quite natural that Origen left a question mark over the 
enigma of the divine names, which he was not able to solve due to his poor 
knowledge of the Hebrew language. It is only fair that, unable to penetrate 
the underlying meaning of the Hebrew words, whose existence he neverthe-
less could guess from his own experience of Greek philological studies, he 
preferred to leave these sacred words without translation. I wish to conclude 
this chain of thoughts by noting in passing that, as most readers will know, 
in Greek the word δύναμις can signify both “power” and “meaning,” and 
therefore the mysterious supernatural power of the sounds of nomina bar-
bara, that Origen mentions in the Homilies on Joshua (20.1), can refer also 
to their enigmatic meaning.257
To sum up the arguments presented in this section I wish to highlight that 
neither Eunomius’ nor Origen’s theories of language can be traced back to 
the Chaldean Oracles or Greek Magical Papyri. There is no good reason to 
somehow associate or affiliate Eunomius’ theory with the teaching of Origen. 
As for Origen, however pious was his attitude to the antediluvian Hebrew 
language, he did not know its contemporary version and therefore his daily 
concern was about philological studies of the biblical manuscripts. The ex-
plorative approach to the Bible and logical and grammatical techniques 
of Origen’s biblical studies eventually provided the pattern for the routine 
methods of theological discourse pursued by the Cappadocian fathers. 
257 Having said that, I would like to distance my thought from the hypothesis of 
Naomi Janowitz, who in her investigation of Origen’s language theory con-
cluded that in his view names are non-referential and iconic (cf. Janowitz, N., 
Theories of Divine Names in Origen and Pseudo-Dionysius, in: HR 30/4 [1991], 
359–372). It is a plain fact that Origen usually applied the non-literal meaning 
of words in his interpretations but this does not mean that he supported the 
idea that divine names are strictly non-referential. I would suggest rather that 
Origen knew that these names have their reach meaning but this meaning was 
inaccessible for him because he didn’t know the language and, hence could not 
help treating these names as non-referential. 
93
3.  The language theories of Origen and Basil,  
and Stoic linguistics 
Having repeatedly emphasised that Origen and the Cappadocian fathers were 
deeply absorbed in logical and grammatical studies, I now elaborate this 
thesis. As I mentioned earlier J. Daniélou affiliated the language theory of the 
Cappadocian fathers with the teaching of the Hellenic grammarians (though 
he did not delve more deeply into this topic). He defined the Cappadocians’ 
approach to language as “scientific” or “syncretic”. 
It is true that Cappadocians were inclined towards a scientific solution of 
the issue and that their approach was syncretic, that is to say they stood for 
a compromise between the conventional (sc. θέσει, or νόμῳ) and natural (sc. 
φύσει) origin of the human language. Yet, I believe that a little bit of precision 
might be welcome in defining the language theory of Cappadocians. Thus, I 
venture to suggest another vague and broad, yet comparatively more precise 
term for labelling the Cappadocians’ theory of language. Namely, I would like 
to call it “cognitive” Meaning, in that it emerged out of a combination of the 
contemporary scientific and philosophical theories about sense-perception, 
imagination, logic, intellection, memory, and language. Although “cognitive 
language theory” sounds fairly modern, it appears to be quite a convenient 
umbrella term for the combination of the above-mentioned components. 
What I especially wish to underscore by this label is that the Cappadocian 
fathers took notice not only of specific linguistic but also of the psycologcal, 
socio-cultural and psychological aspect of language theory.258 Since there has 
been a long discussion about the influence of Stoic philosophy on the language 
theory of Basil and Origen, I start by surveying its focal points.
It was Henri Crouzel who first mentioned Origen’s familiarity with Stoic 
concepts.259 Louis Roberts took a particular interest in studying Origen’s 
relation with Stoic logic.260 He demonstrated that Origen’s method of treat-
ing arguments, particularly in polemics, was highly dependent on Stoic 
logic, where the truthfulness of propositions was of decisive importance. 
Roberts maintained that Origen carefully followed the principles of Stoic 
258 Cf. Basil by means of rhetorical questions described how the human mind per-
forms the naming process: “Does his intelligence receive an impression from 
objects, and, after having conceived them, make them known by particular signs 
appropriate to each of them, he proclaims? Has he consequently recourse to 
the organs of voice to convey his thoughts? Is he obliged to strike the air by the 
articulate movements of the voice, to unveil the thought hidden in his heart?” 
(Hom. 3.2).
259 Cf. Crouzel, H., Origène et la Philosophie. Paris 1962.
260 Cf. Roberts, L., Origen and Stoic Logic, in: Trans. and Proceed. of the Am. 
Philol. Assoc. 101 (1970), 433–444.
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logical studies.261 John Rist was sceptical of Origen’s high concern for Stoic 
logic, although he accepted and added evidence in support of Origen’s perfect 
awareness of Stoic philosophy.262 Ronald Heine studied how Origen used 
Stoic logic in the Commentary on John.263 He pinpointed that the exegetical 
techniques Origen applied in the Commentary on John reveal his familiarity 
with Stoic logic. He also provided historical and philological evidence for 
Origen’s high regard for Stoic logic. Heine asserted that according to Gregory 
Thaumaturgus, the Stoic dialectic formed a fundamental initial part of the 
curriculum of Origen’s school at Caesarea. 
It is evident from these studies that Origen was well versed in Stoic logic. 
A general course of Stoic and Peripatetic logic famously formed an integral 
part of Hellenic education, so it is no wonder that Origen applied this knowl-
edge for the benefit of his studies. Yet let us take a closer look at his works 
in order to see which of his adopted logical techniques subsequently turned 
out to play a significant role in the theological argumentation of Basil and 
Gregory Nazianzen. Predictably, the first notion I wish to scrutinize is the 
previously discussed λεκτὸν.
Although Origen only once referred to λεκτὰ in the Commentaries on 
Psalms (Fr. 80 1.20), he rather frequently (more than 100 times) used the 
term σημαινόμενον with a likely Stoic meaning. For instance in the Com-
mentary on John he advised a reader of Scripture to distinguish clearly be-
tween the “language (sc. φωνὴ), meanings (sc. σημαινόμενα), and things (sc. 
πράγματα), on which the meaning is based” (ComJn 2.5.47, cf. Phil 4.1). 
Marguerite Harl in her critical edition of the Philocalia noted that Origen 
in his language theory applied a Stoic differentiation between concepts, words 
and facts. With reference to the two fragments of the Philocalia and one 
from the Commentary on John, she affirmed that “les mots des incantations 
dans leur forme matérielle, les φωναί, renvoient naturellement au réel (sc. 
πράγματα)”. 
Although it might seem rather persuasive at first glance that Origen indeed 
embraced the Stoic λεκτὸν notion, we can’t accept the fact without inquir-
ing about the spirit of Origen’s attitude to Stoic language theory: whether he 
really and totally embraced it, or applied it with some reservations, or, more 
probably, used only words and implied a different meaning. To answer this 
261 To prove his argument Roberts refers to Cels 1.71 (cf. Roberts, 1970, 443).
262 Cf. Rist, J.M., The Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra Celsum, in: Blu-
menthal H. / Markus R.A. (eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought., 
London 1981, 64–78. 
263 Cf. Heine, R.E., Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology, in: Origen’s 
Commentary on the Gospel of John: JTS 44 (1993), 90–117.
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question we must define more precisely the meaning of the terms involved, 
i.e. φωνὴ and πράγμα, and to check their use in Origen’s opera. 
Marguerite Harl understood πρᾶγμα as a real object – equivalent to the 
Stoic τύγχανον.264 Louis Robers challenged this understanding. He noted 
that in Stoic language theory πρᾶγμα has a regular meaning of significate, so 
that this term was essentially used as a synonym for λεκτόν. Indeed, Sextus 
used265 τὸ πρᾶγμα σημαινόμενον and τὸ πρᾶγμα νοούμενον as identical 
termini technici, which signify an intelligible equivalent to a real object, or 
to put it differently, a mental grasp of reality. 
The term φωνὴ, we recall, is responsible for making Origen, in the eyes of 
some scholars, an adherent of the so-called mystical language theory, since he 
proclaimed that syllables (sc. φωναί) acquire a certain supernatural power.266 
In the first book of the Contra Celsum Origen expounds both terms (sc. φωνὴ 
and πράγμα) and also gives an account of the Stoic language theory. Thus, 
Origen affirmed that:
… according to the Stoics the names were bestowed by nature since the first 
sounds imitated the things signified which conform to the given names; 
… ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων 
φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ’ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα (Cels 1.24). 
It follows from this passage that both the sounds and the names depend upon 
the things signified. 
This translation of mine differs from the classical French and English 
translations in two respects. First, I accept Roberts’ offer to understand τὰ 
πράγματα in this fragment267 as “the things signified” instead of the slightly 
less precise “the things described” suggested by Chadwick, or “le modèle des 
choses mêmes” offered by Borret. 
Second, I suggest that the participle clause “which conform to the given 
names” (καθ’ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα) does not refer to the “first sounds” (τῶν 
πρώτων φωνῶν), as Chadwick and Borret argue,268 but to “the things 
264 Harl made a table with the terms, which in the texts of Philo, Clemens, Origen 
and Sextus corresponded to Stoic distinction between the language, meanings 
and things. In this table Harl did not show that Sextus and Origen used πρᾶγμα 
to denote the thing named (sc. significatum) (cf. Harl, M. [ed.], Origène, Philo-
calie, 1–20 sur les Écritures, SC 302. Paris 1983, 278). 
265 Cf., e.g., Sextus, M 8.12.
266 We have the evidence that Origen maintained that Scriptural names are stronger 
than any charm (cf. Phil 12.1.15).
267 Though I do not share Roberts’ idea that Origen regularly used πράγμα in this 
meaning (cf. Roberts, 1970, 436–443).
268 In Chadwick’s translation we read: “the first articulate sounds being imitations 
of the things described and becoming their names”; in Borret’s translation: “les 
96
signified” (τὰ πράγματα). There are two arguments on which I rest my point. 
First, there is a literal parallel to this phrase in the Commentary on John, 
where the affiliation of the names to the things signified (τὰ πράγματα, καθ’ 
ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα) is beyond doubt. The passage goes as follows: 
For if we consider the meanings (Ἐκλαβόντες γὰρ τὰ πράγματα) which con-
form to the given names (καθ’ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται) (ComJn 1.9.52.5). 
In this passage the phrase τὰ πράγματα, καθ’ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα appears as 
coherent as a coined formula. 
Second, if we affiliate the names (sc. τὰ ὀνόματα) to the first sounds (sc. 
τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν) it would follow from this that Origen believed that 
the principles of Stoic etymology are based on the following provenance of 
language (as follows from the logic of Chadwick’s translation):
1) “the things signified” from which 2) “the first sounds” from which 3) “the 
names”;
1) τὰ πράγματα from which 2) αἱ πρῶται φωναί from which 3) τὰ 
ὀνόματα.
This vision of the provenance of human language and accordingly of etymo-
logical theory was supported by J. Dillon who affirmed that Origen accepted 
the Platonic-Stoic etymological theory, which “provided an excellent theoreti-
cal basis for a theory of magical power of names269”. The Stoics accepted the 
basic principle of etymology set out in the Cratylus, namely that etymology 
is built on the indicating of a distinctive characteristic (i.e. functional char-
acteristic) of a thing. For instance, it is stated in the Cratylus that Apollo’s 
name is “admirably appropriate to the power (sc. δύναμις) of the god” be-
cause it “aptly indicates [his] four functions (sc. δυνάμεις): music, prophecy, 
archery, medicine” (Cra 404e–405a). The Stoics would likely approve such 
an interpretation: similar examples of Stoic etymologies pursued the same 
principle (SVF 2.156–163). 
Nevertheless, I think there is a big difference between thinking that Stoic 
etymologies derived from the meanings of names (sc. from the functional 
characteristics of things, which are coined in their names) and thinking that 
the Stoics derived their etymologies from the first sounds, which in some 
mysterious way imitated phenomena. I think that the problem with the di-
rect connection of first sounds to words lies in the assumption that these first 
premières voix s’étant formées sur le modèle des choses mêmes et les représent-
ant par leur son, d’où ensuite les noms entiers ont été tirés” (cf. Origen, Contra 
Celsum, transl. H. Chadwick, Cambridge 1953, 23; Borret, M., Origène Contra 
Celse, t. 1, SC 132 Paris 1967, 135).
269 Cf. Dillon, 1996, 206.
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sounds are independent philological facts like nomina barbara. That is to say, 
nobody knows where these sounds came from but there is no choice but to ac-
cept them without explanation, like magical spells. In fact, the Stoics preferred 
to work with semantics rather than with phonetics.270 They believed that the 
process of intellection comprises the following stages: 1) sense-perception; 
2) imagination; 3) memory; 4) intelligible conception (sc. ἔννοια).271 Aëtius, 
the demographer of the second century, provided the following account of 
the naming process: 
When man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding part of his soul like 
a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his 
conceptions (ἔννοιαι). The first method of inscription is through the senses. 
For by perceiving something, e.g., white, they have a memory of it when it has 
departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have occurred, then we 
say we have experience (ἐμπειρία). Some conceptions arise naturally in the 
aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and at-
tention272 (Aët., 4.11.1–4 = SVF 2.83).
This seems to confirm that the Stoics took no great interest in phonetics. In 
fact, they defined sound as “a kick of the air” that affects human sensors.273 
This rational explanation leaves no place for some mysterious and unfathom-
able first sounds. 
Now, with regard to the evidence presented above, it appears difficult to 
accept that Origen could consider Stoic etymological theory as a basis for 
magical practice and much less that he could himself be engaged in such 
business. In the homily On prayer Origen clearly formulated the definition 
of name (sc. ὄνομα), which perfectly matches the Stoic language theory and 
correlates with the categorial system: 
A name (ὄνομα) is a summary designation descriptive of the peculiar charac-
ter (προσηγορία τῆς ἰδίας ποιότητος) of the thing named. … It is the pecu-
liar in these characteristics, the unique combination (τὸ τοίνυν τούτων τῶν 
270 Cf. Dawson, D., Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexan-
dria. Berkeley 1991, 27f.
271 Cf. Diogenes’ account of the Stoic approach to perception: “The Stoics like to 
start with the theory of appearance and perception (φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως), 
since the criterion by which the truth of things is recognized is in the genus ap-
pearance, and since the theory of assent, and that of apprehension and thinking, 
which precede the rest, cannot be put together without appearance. For appear-
ance leads the way, and then the articulating thinking (διάνοια) which is present 
brings out in words what the effect is on it of the appearance” (Diog., 7.49). 
272 Transl. D. Dawson, 1991, 28.
273 Cf. SVF 139–141 = Scholia Arati 5.1; Diog., 7.55; Aul. Gell., NoctAtt 5.15.
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ποιοτήτων ἴδιον) – for there is not another being identical with Paul – that is 
indicated by means of the appellation Paul (Orat 24). 
A very similar vision of the provenance of words and conceptions is found 
in Basil’s Adversus Eunomium, where he maintained that: 
the names (αἱ προσηγορίαι) don’t signify the substances (οὐχὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν 
εἰσι σημαντικαὶ) but the qualities (τῶν ἰδιοτήτων), which characterise each 
individually (αἳ τὸν καθ’ ἕνα χαρακτηρίζουσιν) … when we hear Paul, we 
think of the combination of characteristics (ἰδιωμάτων συνδρομὴν) that is 
attached to this particular name (φωνή)274 (AE 2.4 = PG 29.577.30). 
In view of the above presented evidence it seems safe to assume that Origen 
and Basil took advantage of contemporary linguistic theories, particularly 
those which emerged from Stoic theories. 
Eunomius contested the language theory of Basil. In his second apology 
he affirmed that “Basil has divided our God” (σύνθετον ἡμῖν τὸν θεὸν 
ἀπεργάζεται), when he characterized him through a “combination of char-
acteristics” (συνδρομὴ ἰδιωμάτων) (J 2.307.23). As one may reasonably 
assume the debate between Basil and Eunomius was as much theological 
as methodological. However severe was Basil’s criticism of Eunomian syl-
logisms, he himself never pretended to hide his own logical preferences and 
explicitly urged it in his Ep 38: 
to apply (μετατιθεὶς) to the divine dogmas (ἐπί τῶν θείων δογμάτων) the 
same standard of difference which you recognize in the case both of essence 
(τῆς οὐσίας) and of hypostasis (τῆς ὑποστάσεως) in human affairs, and you 
will not go wrong (Ep 38.3.30). 
The arguments we have observed hitherto demonstrate that Origen and Basil 
took advantage of their competence in logic in pursuing their theological 
and exegetical studies. It is likely that Origen was interested in logic due to 
his exegetical practice, whereas Basil was thus predisposed by reason of his 
polemics with reputed logicians (Eunomius and Aëtius) and his personal 
interest in physical studies.275 In the following section I show how the logical 
and linguistic trend of Origen’s and Basil’s studies shaped their theological 
theories.
274 Transl. M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 135.
275 Cf.: “May He who has given us intelligence to recognize (καταμανθάνειν) 
in the smallest objects of creation the great wisdom of the Contriver make us 
find in great bodies a still higher idea of their Creator. However, compared 
with their Author, the sun and moon are but a fly and an ant” (Bas., Hexaem. 
6.11.57–60; transl. B. Jackson, 1895, available on-line). Remarkably, the verb 
καταμανθάνω that Basil uses in this passage was commonly used in the context 
of scientific studies (sc. to observe well, examine closely, cf. LSJ). 
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4.  Methodology of the theological discourse  
of Origen and Basil
4.1 Conceptual theology and the notion of epinoia 
Eunomius unmistakably detected the logical trend in Basil’s argumentation 
and censured him for conceptual (sc. κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν) theological arguing 
(A 8.1). Basil, in his turn, insisted upon the κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν theology and, 
as I show hereafter, Origen’s influence played a considerable role in Basil’s 
methodological choice. 
Meanwhile, the role of the ἐπίνοια concept in Origen’s own doctrine has 
been variously regarded by scholars. To give a shortcut of the research his-
tory, Henri Crouzel considered it one of the key notions in Origen’s doctrine, 
while Marguerite Harl proclaimed “the famous ἐπίνοιαι” to be “superficial, 
naturally verbal, and much less important than the doctrine of the two natures 
of Christ276”. In recent studies,277 however, different aspects of the ἐπίνοια 
concept have attracted the interest of scholars. In my opinion this concept is 
one of the backbones of Origen’s doctrine. Before I elaborate this thesis and 
show the connection between Origen’s and Basil’s visions of ἐπίνοια, it is 
necessary to sketch the philosophical background of this concept. 
In Stoic philosophy ἐπίνοια has a meaning synonymous with ἒννοια, 
which is one of the key termini technici of Stoic logic.278 Augustine tells us that 
this term (ἒννοια) supports the whole plan and connection of Stoic learning 
and teaching. He expounds the notion as follows: 
276 Cf. Crouzel, H., Le Contenu Spirituel des Dénominations du Christ selon le 
Livre I du Commentaire sur Jean d’Origène, in: Crouzel, H. / Quacquarelli, A. 
(eds.), Origeniana secunda. Roma 1980, 131–150; Harl, M., Le Déchiffrement 
du Sens. Études sur l’Herméneutique Chrétienne d’Origène à Grégoire de Nysse. 
Paris 1993.
277 Cf. Torjesen, K.J., Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in Origen’s 
Exegesis. Berlin 1986; Wolinski, J., Le recours aux epinoiai du Christ dans le 
Commentaire sur Jean d’Origène, in: Dorival, G. / Le Boulluec, A., et al. (eds.), 
Origeniana sexta. Leuven 1995, 465–492.
278 Cf.: “Of true appearances, some are apprehensive and some are not. Non-ap-
prehensive ones are those that strike people when they are suffering an effect. 
… An apprehensive one is the one that is from a real thing and is stamped and 
impressed in accordance with just that real thing, and is of such a kind as could 
not come about from a thing that was not real. For since they trust this appear-
ance (φαντασίαν) to be capable of perfectly grasping the underlying things 
(ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένω), and to be skillfully stamped with all 
the peculiarities (ἰδιώματα) attaching to them, they say that it has each of these 
as an attribute (συμβεβηκός)” (Sextus, M 8.247–249; transl. R. Bett, 2005, 50).
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from the senses the mind conceives the notions (ἒννοιαι) of those things which 
they [sc. the Stoics] explicate by definition279 (Civ 8.7). 
In a similar vein, Basil in his treatise Adversus Eunomium characterized 
ἐπίνοια as “conception,” which springs out of analysis of sensual informa-
tion. Namely, in his own wording: 
After an initial concept has arisen for us from sense perception, the more sub-
tle and precise reflection on what we have conceived is called conceptualiza-
tion280 (μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγινόμενον νόημα τὴν 
λεπτοτέραν καὶ ἀκριβεστέραν τοῦ νοηθέντος ἐπενθύμησιν ἐπίνοιαν 
ὀνομάζεσθαι) (AE 1.6 = PG 29, 524.19–22).
This fragment shows that formation of the conception depends, on the one 
hand, on sensual information, and on the other hand, on human intellective 
capacity, which comprises imagination, memory and conceptualization.281 
While perception is processed by the sense organs, conceptualisation is pat-
terned by logical and linguistic structures. This interdependence of logic and 
grammar is reflected in Origen’s definition of a name (sc. ὄνομα). In his 
homily On prayer he affirmed that:
A name (ὄνομα) is a summary designation descriptive of the peculiar charac-
ter (προσηγορία τῆς ἰδίας ποιότητος) of the thing named. … It is the pecu-
liar in these characteristics, the unique combination (τὸ τοίνυν τούτων τῶν 
ποιοτήτων ἴδιον) – for there is not another being identical with Paul – that is 
indicated by means of the appellation Paul (Orat 24). 
This way of mapping the process of conceptualisation282 resonated in Origen’s 
Christology. In his Commentary on Jeremiah he expounds the nature of 
Christ as follows. He contends that although the nature of Christ “con-
stitutes a single subject (τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἕν ἐστιν), yet conceptually 
(ταῖς δὲ ἐπινοίαις) it is designated by many names (τὰ πολλὰ ὀνόματα), 
which signify different aspects [of the nature] (ἐπὶ διαφόρων)283” (HomJer 
8.2.10–11). 
279 Translation mine.
280 Transl. M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 98.
281 By conceptualization I mean orderly, analytical and complex thinking, which 
operates many concepts at the same time. Cf.: “Generally speaking, all things 
recognized through sense-perception and which seem simple in substrate but 
which admit of a complex account upon further consideration are said to be 
considered through conceptualization” (Bas., AE 1.6 = PG 29.524.35–37; transl. 
M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 98).
282 Cf. Bas., AE 29.577.30.
283 Translation mine.
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Of course Origen was not the first who built his Christology by means of 
interpreting the scriptural names of Christ but he was the one who patented 
this method as equally valid for exegetical, theological and even ascetical 
practice. Thereby Origen created a methodological track for the following 
generations of exegetes and theologians. 
By methodological track I mean that generally speaking Origen’s exegetic 
and theological practice, as far as he informed us about it, included three 
components, which I label exegetical, theological and ascetical. This is of 
course, a very simplistic classification and by making it I only mean to high-
light the distinction between the exegetical “excavation” of the material and 
the theological “processing” of this data. In other words, I wish to empha-
sise that Origen worked from the textual data and not from the theological 
doctrines (after all, not many of them were hitherto fully elaborated). His 
theological concepts emerged out of his biblical studies, while his biblical 
studies included grammatical, logical, poetical, historic, philosophical and 
even scientific scrutiny of the text preserved in various readings and in two 
languages. By stating this I do not wish to divorce theological and exegeti-
cal analysis. On the contrary, I think it is important to see that, just as the 
philological studies of the Homeric scholars were framed first and foremost 
by textual material, likewise Origen’s biblical studies were framed by rel-
evant textual and historical data, out of which he deduced his arguments and 
concepts. In order to arrange these concepts in a coherent system he used 
contemporary philosophical patterns (e.g., categorial and language theories). 
Needless to say, all this intellectual work relied upon sincere personal devo-
tion to the Christian faith, therefore, the third component, which I labelled 
ascetic practice, in fact, precedes, accompanies and fulfils both the exegetical 
and the theological work. 
Although the hitherto described components of Origen’s exegetic and theo-
logical work are very broadly defined, I nonetheless have tried to illustrate 
them in order not so much to divide them as to locate their focal points.
Exegetical inquiry 
In the Commentary on Romans Origen urged exegetes to pursue the accurate 
philological study of the biblical texts and strive to grasp all possible con-
notations of various readings. Thus, he proclaimed:
A reader must therefore in every place carefully consider first the literal mean-
ing of the word ‘law,’ (τί σημαίνεται ἐκ τῆς νόμος φωνῆς) then its particular 
meaning (τί χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐννοεῖν)284 (ComRom 36a.2–4). 
284 Translation mine. 
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Origen himself showed an example of this philological study and in the Com-
mentary on John he concluded his analysis of various readings of the word 
“god” by deducing four different meanings of this word (“four orders in 
relation to the noun “god,” [τέσσαρα τάγματα κατὰ τὸ ‘θεὸς’ ὄνομα]: 
“the god,” and “god,” then “gods” in two senses [ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεός, εἶτα 
θεοὶ διχῶς]”; ComJn 2.32).
Theological analysis
In the Commentary on John (2.28.126) Origen formulated his Christological 
concepts on the basis of the scriptural names of Christ and with the help of 
categorial theory. 
There has been a keen discussion among scholars as to whether or not 
Origen tolerated the idea of the substantial unity of the Father and the Son.285 
Origen indeed argued for a distinction between the Father and the Son286 (e.g., 
in ComJn 1.112). Yet, at the same time he insisted on the eternal co-existence 
of the two divine persons. This inconsistency of Origen’s thought can be easily 
explained by the complexity of the Father-Son relationship, which was later 
expounded by the Cappadocian fathers in the language of paradoxes and 
metaphoras. I believe that Cappadocians took advantage of Origen’s concept 
of the three divine hypostases287 in formulating their Trinitarian doctrine and 
also adopted Origen’s way of describing the Father-Son relationship by means 
of the term “relation” (sc. σχέσις). 
Origen expounded the principle of the Father-Son relationship in his 
Fragments of the Commentary on John, where he gave his interpretation 
of a famous phrase from the Proverbs (8:22: “The Lord possessed me [the 
Wisdom of God] at the beginning of His way, before His works of old”), 
which the Arians usually refer to in order to prove subordination of the 
Son to the Father.288 Origen explained this phrase by involving a category 
of relation (sc. σχέσις). He argued that, although initially Wisdom had no 
other relation but to God, later, due to the divine intention to create, Wis-
dom assumed a creative relation (sc. σχέσιν δημιουργικὴν). Consequently, 
he continues:
285 For an account of the debate cf. Stead, G.C., Homousios, in: RAC 16 (1994), 
364–433 (90).
286 Cf. Jacobsen, A-C., Christ – the Teacher of Salvation. A Study of Origen’s Chris-
tology and Soteriology. Münster 2015, 125–130.
287 In the Commentary on John, Origen plainly affirmed that “we believe in three 
hypostases of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost (τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις 
πειθόμενοι τυγχάνειν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα)” 
(ComJn 2.10.75.1–2; transl. mine).
288 Cf.: “God made all things in Wisdom” (Ps 103:24).
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the same existence (ἡ αὐτὴ ὕπαρξις) bears the name of Wisdom by essence 
(κατ’ οὐσίαν), for it dwells with God (ᾠκείωται τῷ θεῷ), and the name of 
Creative logos (ὁ δημιουργικὸς λόγος) for the sake of creation (πρὸς τὰ 
δημιουργήματα)289 (Fragm. ComJn fr. 1.60–69). 
In this interpretation Origen declares that the Wisdom of God shares the 
same existence with the Father and that the creation of the universe has not 
substantially changed this existence for it is only the relation of the second 
hypostasis that has been altered for the sake of creation. Hence, it becomes 
clear that the distinction which Origen detected between the Father and the 
Son is of a relative nature.290
Origen maintained that various names of the Son signify various aspects 
of his relation to the creation. In the Commentary on John, after listing 
the scriptural names of Christ Origen states that there is “a system of ideas 
(συστήματος θεωρημάτων) in him insofar as he is wisdom”, and among 
these ideas there are some things that “the Saviour has not for himself (οὐχ 
αὑτῷ), but for others (ἑτέροις)”, and besides, that he has “some things for 
himself and for others” (ComJn 2.28.125–126). Ergo the interpretation of the 
scriptural names of Christ, according to Origen, at once provides knowledge 
about his divine and human natures. 
Ascetic component 
A process of personal perfection played a crucial role in Origen’s exegetical 
and theological studies.291 Remarkably, he claimed that the investigation of 
the scriptural names of Christ not only deepens theological understanding 
but also favours personal salvation. He professed that the investigation of 
the biblical enigmas accelerates the personal advancement of the exegete: 
And if we should thus collect the remaining aspects of Christ (τὰς λοιπὰς 
ἐπινοίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ), we will discover without difficulty from what has been 
said how he who does not believe in Christ will die in his sins. For because he 
289 Translation mine.
290 It is remarkable that in Stoic philosophy this kind of distinction exists in thought 
only (κατ ἐπίνοιαν) and has no real (sc. material) existence (sc. ὕπαρξις) (Sex-
tus, M 8.453f.).
291 Cf.: “human wisdom is an exercise for the soul, but that divine wisdom is 
the end, being also termed the strong meat of the soul by him who has said 
that strong meat belongs to them that are perfect (τελείων δέ ἐστιν ἡ στερεὰ 
τροφή), to those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both 
good and evil” (Cels. 6.13). Cf. Usacheva, A., The Exegetical Requirements in 
Origen’s Late Works: Mystical and Intellectual Aspects of Perfection According 
to Origen and his Followers, in: Jacobsen, A-Ch. (ed.), Origeniana Undecima. 
Leuven 2016, 871–885. 
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is in opposition to the things that Christ is in his aspect (ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τῇ 
ἐπινοίᾳ, ὧν ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός), he dies in the sins themselves292 (ComJn 19.158).
In order to better understand this passage it is important to recall that tradi-
tionally the image of God in man was associated with Christ, who, as stated 
in the Epistle to Hebrews 1:3, is “the Impress of the hypostasis of his Father 
(χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ)”. 
In this fragment the word χαρακτὴρ is applied as a synonym for oth-
er meaningful biblical terms: effulgence (sc. ἀπαύγασμα), impress (sc. 
χαρακτήρ), image (sc. εἰκών) and stamp (sc. σφραγίς). This thesis from 
the Epistle to Hebrews and the idea of “Christ – the image of God” associated 
with the idea of “man – the image of God” were broadly used in patristic 
literature.293 
Yet the prerequisites for this association had already been elaborated in 
pre-Christian times. Philo, for instance, used different meanings of the word 
χαρακτήρ in his philosophy, one of which goes back to Stoic perception 
theory. Namely, Philo asserted that the idea of λόγος – the image of God – 
unfolds itself in the following analogy:294 “man was created after the image 
of God, thus the soul of man has received its divine impress (ὁ ἐπιγινόµενος 
χαρακτήρ), namely, in its implanted ability to know God” (Gen 1:26f.). 
Origen appeared to share this concept of Philo. In a similar vein Origen states 
in his Contra Celsum that: 
when a man becomes perfect … and learning the precept – ‘Be followers of 
God’, receives into his virtuous soul the traits of God’s image (μανθάνων τὸ 
‘Μιμηταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεσθε’ ἀναλαμβάνει εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐνάρετον ψυχὴν 
τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τοῦ θεοῦ) (Cels 6.63).
As a matter of course, the idea that the names of God signifying the charac-
teristics of divinity can be grasped by the human mind, promotes the study of 
these names for the sake of spiritual ascendance. This is how Origen expounds 
this idea in the Homily on prayer: 
Since therefore, though we all have some notion of God, conceiving of him in 
various ways, but not all of what he is (ὅ ἐστι), for few and, be it said, fewer 
than few are they who comprehend his complete holiness – we are with good 
292 Transl. R.E. Heine, 1993, 203.
293 For instance, Gregory Nazianzen applied it in his third theological oration (Or 
29.17); Origen in Contra Celsum stated: “So entirely are they (The Father and 
the Son) one, that he who has seen the Son, who is the brightness of Gods glory, 
and the express image of His person (χαρακτῆρα τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ θεοῦ), 
has seen in Him who is the image of God (ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι εἰκόνι τοῦ θεοῦ), God 
Himself (τὸν θεόν)” (Cels 8.12).
294 Cf. an article on the term τέλειος from ThWNT.
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reason taught to attain a holy conception of him (ἔννοιαν περὶ θεοῦ) in order 
that we may see his holiness as creator, provider, judge, elector, abandoner, ac-
ceptor, rejecter, rewarder and punisher of each according to his desert (Orat 24).
This passage shows how Origen associated the scriptural names of God with 
his characteristics available for human comprehension and with the human 
concepts about God. This chain of associations tied up by the ἐπίνοια con-
cept clearly illustrates how important this notion was for Origen’s theology. 
Now, let us explore how this concept was reflected in the doctrine of Basil 
of Caesarea. 
Like Origen, Basil used grammatical and logical termini technici in his 
Christology. In the Adversus Eunomium, pondering the idea of divine simplic-
ity, he remarked that “the indicative tropes of his characteristics (οἱ δεικτικοὶ 
τῆς ἰδιότητος αὐτοῦ τρόποι)” do not infringe the idea of simplicity (AE 
2.29.640.25). The term δεικτικὸς τρόπος is terminus technicus in logic and 
grammar, particularly typical for Peripatetic and Stoic philosophy.295 Basil 
applied this term in order to underscore that the individual characteristics 
of Christ manifest his divine incomprehensible nature. Like Origen, Basil 
noted that Christ himself had indicated to men his characteristics (sc. the 
scriptural names), which Christians can grasp through contemplation,296 and 
emphasised that it is by virtue of the study of the names of Christ that a man 
can approach divinity:
If there were nothing to characterize the substance (τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν χαρακτηρίζον) 
there would be no way for us to penetrate it. Since divinity is one (μιᾶς οὔσης 
θεότητος), it would be impossible to specify the concept of the Father or the 
Son, unless our thought does not articulate any additional characteristic (τῶν 
ἰδιωμάτων)297 (AE 2.29.640.15).
In the context of investigating the scriptural names of Christ Basil approved 
of philological techniques. In a similar vein as Origen, Basil used the catego-
rial theory for classifying the names of Christ. Remarkably his ambiguous 
logical-theological reasoning sometimes appears so technical that, unaware of 
the implied subject of Basil’s discourse, a reader can easily take his theologi-
cal reasoning for a logical one and vice versa. For instance, in the Adversus 
Eunomium we read: 
295 Cf. Alexander Aphr., ComAPr 323.4.
296 Cf.: ”When our Lord Jesus Christ spoke about himself to make known both 
the Divinitys love of humanity and the grace that comes to humanity from the 
economy, he did so by means of certain distinguishing marks considered in con-
nection with him (ἰδιώμασί τισι τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρουμένοις ἀπεσήμαινε 
ταύτην): he called himself door, way, bread, vine, shepherd, and light…” (AE 
1.29.524; transl. M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 99).
297 Transl. M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 180.
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Who does not know that some names are expressed absolutely in respect of 
themselves (καθ’ ἑαυτὰ προφερόμενα), signifying the things which are their 
referents (τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς πραγμάτων ἐστὶ σημαντικὰ), but other 
names are said relative to others (τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερα λεγόμενα), expressing only 
the relation to other names relative to which they are said (τὴν σχέσιν μόνην 
ἐμφαίνει τὴν πρὸς ἃ λέγεται)?298 (AE 2.29.588.35–40).
A strong logical trend of reasoning is a feature of Basil’s teaching. On the 
evidence we have thus far examined, it seems plausible that Basil took advan-
tage of Origen’s methodological principles. In the following section I show 
how the method of theological argumentation described above shaped Basil’s 
polemics with Eunomius and echoed in his Trinitarian concept.299
4.2 The categorial theory in the Trinitarian doctrine
One of the key questions which Eunomius and Aëtius asked about the term 
ὁμοούσιος revolved around the contradiction between the simplicity of the 
divine essence and the distinction between the divine persons.300 Accord-
ing to Eunomian logic, God the Father was unbegotten essence (sc. ουσία 
άγέννητος – A 7.10), that is to say he was not begotten essence301, and hence 
298 Transl. M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 142.
299 The issue of provenance of the hypostasis doctrine has been recently debated. 
Thus, Volker Drecoll has argued that Basil’s occasional usage of the term hy-
postasis in the Epistle 9 and in the Adversus Eunomium does not reflect his 
deep engagement with the elaboration of the hypostasis doctrine. According to 
Drecoll, Basil came to specifically deliberate on this issue in around 370 when 
circumstances forced him to engage with the Homousian party (cf. Drecoll, 
V.H., Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea. Sein Weg 
vom Homöusianer zum Neunizäner. FKDG 66. Göttingen 1996, 101, 337f.). 
Christoph Markschies and Reinhard Hübner challenged Drecoll’s view and ar-
gued that Basil’s deliberation on the hypostasis concept can be detected in his 
works written before 370 (cf. Markschies, C., Gibt es eine einheitliche “kappa-
dozische Trinitätstheologie”? Vorläufige Erwägungen zu Einheit und Differenzen 
neunizänischer Theologie, in: Härle W. / Preul R. [eds.], Trinität, MThJ 10. 
Marburg 1998, 51–94, [56–58]; Hübner, R.M., Zur Genese der Trinitarischen 
Formel bei Basilius von Caesarea, in: Weitlauf, M. / Neuner, P. [eds.], Für euch 
Bischof – mit euch Christ. FS F. Kardinal Wetter. St. Ottilien 1998, 123–156, 
[152–154]). I am inclined to side with Markschies and Hübner and to suggest 
that Basil’s reflection on the hypostatic relationship, and employment of the 
terms hypostasis and epinoia, echoes the conceptions of Origen. 
300 Cf.: “It is in accordance, therefore, both with innate knowledge and the teaching 
of the fathers that we have made our confession that God is one…” (A 7.1–2; 
transl. R.P. Vaggione, 1987, 41).
301 Cf.: “He was not first begotten and then deprived of that quality so as to become 
unbegotten!” (A 8.10f.; transl. R.P. Vaggione, 1987, 43).
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the begotten Son has a different essence than the Father302. A solution to this 
tricky issue proposed by Basil and elaborated by Gregory Nazianzen (as we 
will observe in the following chapters) articulated the relative nature of the 
differentiation between the divine persons (sc. the Son and the Father are rela-
tive names, which don’t signify different substances but only certain relations 
within the same substance). This solution, as Basil and Gregory emphasised, 
did not damage the idea of simplicity of the divine essence, nor prevent the 
divine persons from sharing the same divine essence.303 
Basil’s vision of the Father-Son relationship might be traced back to Origen, 
who introduced the term hypostasis into Christian theology (cf. PGL) and to 
the Stoics, who instituted the notion in a philosophical context (cf. ThWNT). 
Remarkably, the term hypostasis emerged in Stoic philosophy from the medi-
cal and scientific lexicon. Posidonius, who had a philosophical and scientific 
education and achieved impressive results in astronomy, devoted special at-
tention to this term. He defined hypostasis as an actualized being, which 
comes into existence to manifest an eternal essence and its peculiar attributes 
in the real phenomena (here the physical background of the notion is pro-
nounced). An account of Posidonius’ concept is preserved in Arius Didymus’ 
Epitome:304 
302 Cf.: “We assert, therefore, that this essence was begotten – not having been in 
existence prior to its own coming to be – and that it exists, having been begotten 
before all things by the will of its God and Father” (A 12.10–12; transl. R.P. 
Vaggione, 1987, 49).
303 Cf. Basil in Adversus Eunomium stated: “So when anyone hears something 
begotten, he is not brought in his mind to a certain substance (οὐκ ἐπί τινα 
οὐσίαν), but rather he understands that it is connected with another (ἑτέρῳ 
ἐστὶ συναπτόμενον). … So, how is it not the peak of insanity to decree that 
that which does not introduce a notion of any subsistence, but only signifies the 
relation to another (τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν), is the substance (οὐσίαν)?” (AE 
2.9 = 29.588.40–45; transl. M. Delcogliano / A. Radde-Gallwitz, 2011, 142). 
Similarly Gregory Nazianzen in the third theological oration contended: “Father 
is not a name either of an essence or of an action (οὔτε οὐσίας ὄνομα ὁ πατήρ, 
οὔτε ἐνεργείας). But it is the name of the Relation in which the Father stands 
to the Son, and the Son to the Father (σχέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν 
υἱὸν ὁ πατήρ, ἢ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα)” (Or 29.16; transl. Ch.G. Browne 
/ J.E. Swallow).
304 Cf. Origen’s description of the Stoic first category preserved in the De oratione: 
“On their [i.e. the Stoics] view essence (ἡ οὐσία) is inherently unqualified and 
inarticulate (ἄποιός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος) as such. It is even indeterminate in 
magnitude (οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἀποτεταγμένον ἔχουσα), but it is involved in all 
quality (πάσῃ δὲ ἔγκειται ποιότητι) as a kind of ready ground for it (ἕτοιμόν 
τι χωρίον)” (Orat 27.8).
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Posidonius said that the substance of the whole, i.e. matter (τὴν τῶν ὅλων 
οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην) was without quality and without shape, in so far as in no way 
has it a form detached of its own (οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα), 
nor quality by itself either (οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ’ αὑτήν), but always is in some 
form and quality. For he said that substance differs from matter (διαφέρειν δὲ 
τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης), being the same in reality, in thought only (οὖσαν κατὰ 
τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον) (Arius Did., Epit. fr. 20 = Posidonius, fr. 92305). 
This distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις created a problem, which 
concerned the status of ὑπόστασις. If hypostasis is to be understood as the 
essence, which is actualised in its attributes (which are different from the es-
sence), the question arises about the status or basis of the hypostatic being. 
In other words, if hypostasis is neither essence nor attributes but something 
in between (sc. the essence actualised in the attributes), what can be said 
about its being? Does the hypostasis properly exist or subsist or is it a mere 
illusion? The Stoics solved this problem by identifying the attributes with the 
functional characteristics of the essence. A detailed and clear explanation of 
the matter is preserved in Origen’s Homily on prayer: 
By qualities (ποιότητας) they mean distinctively like the actualities and the 
activities (τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς ποιήσεις) in which movements and relations 
of the essence have come to be (τὰς κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις συμβέβηκεν), and 
they say that the essence as such has no part in these inherently (οὐδέ τούτων 
μετέχειν φασὶ τὴν οὐσίαν) though it is always incidentally inseparable from 
some of them (αὐτῶν ἀχώριστον εἶναι) and equally receptive of all the agent’s 
actualizations (ἐπιδεκτὴν πασῶν τῶν τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐνεργειῶν) however 
it may act and transform (ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνο ποιῇ καὶ μεταβάλλῃ). And they 
say that it is throughout transformable and throughout divisible (δι’ ὅλων τε 
μεταβλητὴν καὶ δι’ ὅλων διαιρετὴν), and that any essence can coalesce with 
any other (πᾶσαν οὐσίαν πάσῃ συγχεῖσθαι δύνασθαι), all being a unity 
notwithstanding (ἡνωμένην μέντοι) (Orat 27.8).
Such a peculiar and complex Stoic vision of the essence which exists behind 
real objects and actualizes itself in them, quite understandably seemed weird 
to the Peripatetics, who normally detected existence exclusively in real things 
(cf. Alex. Aphr., ComTop 4.5). One must admit that the Peripatetic criticism 
of the Stoic concept appears quite rational. A tolerably satisfactory explana-
tion of the Stoic vision of the relationship between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία 
might be found, however, in the sphere of logic and grammar. A grammatical 
equivalent to οὐσία is ὑποκείμενον – a subject of proposition (or a thing 
signified), while ὑπόστασις is regarded as actualisation of the subject in a 
predicate (or a signifier). 




οὐσία (essence) = ὑποκείμενον (subject 
of proposition)




= predicate of the subject = signifier
A very helpful account of this tricky matter is preserved in Dexippus’ fourth-
century Commentary on Categories. I have summarized his testimony in the 
following table.
TABLE III:
1st meaning of the subject (πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον): qualityless matter (ἡ ἄποιος 
ὕλη) = a subject of proposition = potential body (δυνάμει σῶμα)
e.g., it (τί)
2nd meaning of the subject: qualified subject (ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιόν) = 
actualization (ὑπόστασις) of the subject in the attributes which are predicated 
of the subject (relative terms πρός τι λέγεσθαι)
e.g., the bronze
these attributes are either general or particular (κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως)
e.g., the bronze of statue (general), or the bronze of the statue of Socrates 
(particular)
In Dexippus’ own words the fragment runs as follows: 
… (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) ‘subject’ has two senses, both with the Stoics and with 
the older philosophers (the Peripatetic and the Old Academy), one being the so-
called primary subject (πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον), i.e. qualityless matter (ἡ ἄποιος 
ὕλη), which Aristotle calls ‘potential body’ (δυνάμει σῶμα), and the second 
type of subject is the qualified subject (ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιόν).306
Apropos of the second type of subject Dexippus says that this qualified sub-
ject represents the actualization (ὑπόστασις) of the subject in the attributes 
(ἐπίνοιαι) which are predicated of the subject, and which are themselves 
relative terms (πρός τι λέγεσθαι). Then he continues by saying that:
… these attributes are either general or particular (κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως); for both 
the bronze and Socrates are subjects (ὑποκείμενον) to those things that come 
to be in them (ἐγγινομένοις) or are predicated of them (κατηγορουμένοις). 
For ‘subject’ is regarded as being a relative term (κατὰ πρός τι λέγεσθαι) 
(for it is the subject of something – τινὶ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον), either without 
306 Transl. J. Dillon, 1990, 50f.
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qualification, of those things that come to be in it and are predicated of it, or 
in a particular sense. Unqualifiedly, the subject for all accidents (ὑποκείμενον 
πᾶσι τοῖς γινομένοις) and predicates (κατηγορουμένοις) is prime matter (ἡ 
πρώτη ὕλη), while for particular accidents and predicates the subject is (τισὶ δὲ 
ὑποκείμενον γιγνομένοις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατηγορουμένοις), e.g. the bronze 
or Socrates (ComCat 23.25–24.4).
This fragment demonstrates that from the linguistic perspective, the differ-
ence between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις looks less problematic than from a pure 
ontological viewpoint. This vision of essence, which finds its actualization 
in the attributes of real things, happened to fit a complex Christian vision of 
the divine essence. 
This is how Basil adopted this concept to his anti-Eunomian Christology. 
In the Epistle 38, he stated: 
That which is spoken of in the specific sense (τὸ ἰδίως λεγόμενον) is signified by 
the word ‘hypostasis’ (τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως δηλοῦσθαι ῥήματι). For, because 
of the indefiniteness of the term, he who says ‘man’ has introduced through our 
hearing some vague idea, so that, although the nature is manifested by the name 
(τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος δηλωθῆναι), that which subsists in the na-
ture (τὸ δὲ ὑφεστὸς) and is specifically designated by the name is not indicated 
(δηλούμενον ἰδίως ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρᾶγμα μὴ σημανθῆναι)… It is not 
the indefinite notion of essence (οὐχ ἡ ἀόριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια) which 
creates no definite image because of the generality of its significance (ἐκ τῆς 
κοινότητος τοῦ σημαινομένου στάσιν), but the hypostasis, which is evident 
through the specific qualities307 (Ep 38.3.1).
Once again we see that for Basil a purely logical or, should I say, grammatical 
reasoning is appropriate to theological matters. I assume that it was not at all 
the idea of prime matter that seemed worth adopting for Christian doctrine 
but the mechanism of correlation between categories and its equal eligibility 
in ontology, logic and grammar. 
In table number four I demonstrate how the logical and grammatical no-
tions adopted by the Christian authors correlated with each other and with 
the theological notions: 
TABLE IV:











307 Transl. B. Jackson, 1895, available on-line.
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This table shows that the relation between the two notions of one discipline 
is analogous to the relation between the two notions of another discipline, 
etc. Thus, prime matter has the same relation to matter in ontology as the 
subject (sc. ὑποκείμενον) has to the predicate (sc. ὑπόστασις) in grammar, 
as essence has to hypostasis in theology, as common quality has to individual 
quality in logic, as the thing signified (sc. σημαινόμενον or λεκτόν) to the 
signifier (sc. σημεῖον) in linguistics. The very idea of compounding the logical 
and theological notions which I use in this formula belongs to Basil, who in 
his Epistle 214 plainly affirmed:
οὐσία has the same relation to ὑπόστασις (τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν 
ὑπόστασιν) as the common has to the particular (ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν 
πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον)308 (Ep 214.4.1–15).
It seems plausible that the Cappadocians applied Stoic cognitive theory to 
their theological argument so that it resulted in stating that the incomprehen-
sibility of the essence of the Trinity is its substantial characteristic; whereas all 
the other characteristics like begotten and unbegotten and so forth are relative 
names. That is to say that everything that is predicated of the essence reveals 
not the essential but the functional characteristic of the subject, or to put it 
plainly, the functional characteristic does not denote what the Trinity is in 
its essence but merely explicates how it functions for the sake of humanity. 
Conclusion
I think that a principal methodological challenge introduced into theology 
by the Cappadocians was that they tried to explore and explain topical 
theological matters in the terms of contemporary science and philosophy 
instead of merely teaching ex cathedra some unexplainable divine doctrines. 
They took advantage of the logical, linguistic, cognitive and philosophical 
discourses and applied the relevant notions and terms to the interpreta-
tion of the biblical narrative and formulation of the theological doctrines. 
I believe that this daring explorative approach to the Bible and theology 
balanced by a modest recognition of the limitation of the human ratio in 
discovery of the divine enigmas was inspired by Origen and his method of 
biblical studies. 
Another important common feature of the theological method of the Cap-
padocians and Origen is that they emphasised the significance of the indi-
vidual effort reflected in the life of the Christian community. Admittedly, 
although they encouraged Christians to investigate Scripture and the physi-
cal world in order to discover the beauty of creation, they set rather high 
308 Transl. B. Jackson, 1895, available on-line.
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intellectual and ascetical requirements for the researcher. Thus, one may say 
that it was an elitist theology that they promoted. Be this so, their theology 
was also paradoxical therefore exceptions and contradictions were inherent 
in this system. 
Such an explorative, dialogical and collective approach to theological 
contemplation was not, however, an invention of either Origen or the Cap-
padocians. As it is broadly known, one of the most popular contemporary 
approaches to the provenance of John’s Gospel is the Johannine commu-
nity hypothesis. Roughly the hypothesis states that the fourth gospel was 
composed during a period of time in the second half of the first century by 
several authors belonging to the Johannine community, and hence, that the 
remarkable theology of the fourth gospel to a considerable extent reflects 
the intellectual atmosphere of this community.309 This is of course only a hy-
pothesis but it accurately highlights the social climate of the Early Christian 
community where the teaching was not only preached but also explicated 
and intensively developed. 
As I have shown earlier in this chapter, it was also peculiar to the philo-
sophical schools of Late Antiquity to practise philosophy by way of re-
interpreting authoritative texts. Importantly, the purpose of these oral 
exegetic-philosophical exercises was not to arrive at a fixed and commonly 
accepted reading but to contribute to the personal progress of the students. 
An impressive variety of interpretation and a keen and persistent interest 
in continuous exploration of the same authoritative texts is preserved in 
the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca composed in the Peripatetic and 
Neo-Platonic schools in a period from the second and until the seventh 
century AD. 
Origen’s explorative interest in biblical studies also required a scholarly 
community for the realisation of his Hexapla project. A post at the school in 
Caesarea and the generous support of someone by the name of Ambrosius 
provided Origen with the necessary means for his studies. Cappadocians did 
not literally establish a school but all their work can be characterised as a long 
collective theological research project. They discussed theological issues with 
each other and with their colleagues, Hellenic philosophers, and opponents, 
and they vastly benefitted from this discussion. They explored the same ques-
tions from various perspectives and expressed their multivocal and sometimes 
paradoxical ideas in different literary styles and genres. 
This explorative courage and amplitude of intellectual horizon are the 
distinctive hallmarks of the theological style of Origen and the Cappadocians 
309 Cf. Cirafesi, W.V., The Johannine Community Hypothesis (1968–Present): Past 
and Present Approaches and a New Way Forward, in: Cur. Biblic. Res. 12/2 
(2014), 173–193.
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and make it sometimes really difficult to claim decisively that they inherited 
this or that idea from a particular author. Although in this chapter I have 
traced back to Origen the concepts of hypostasis, epinoia and the idea of the 
relative relationship between the Father and the Son, lately developed by the 
Cappadocian fathers, I wish to underline that at the same time similar ideas 
were discussed in the philosophical and scientific milieus. Thus, I would like 
to conclude this chapter by sketching the institutional and methodological 
points of transmission of the theological ideas relevant for the third–fourth 
centuries. 
Taking into account Origen’s engagement with classical culture (philo-
sophical schools, textual criticism, grammatical studies) it is no wonder that 
he creatively used and transformed classical heritage. To give a concrete ex-
ample, I believe that within the context of Late Antiquity Origen happened 
to play a remarkably important role for the following reasons. 
First, he adapted Jewish and Hellenic philological and scribal technology to 
the needs of Christian church, such as formation, preservation, copying and 
studying of the canon of Scripture. Consequently, Origen’s heritage became 
particularly popular within monastic circles, where the lion’s share of biblical 
scribal work was done.310 
Second, Origen set an example of how basic grammatical and logical 
knowledge can be successfully applied to the needs of Christian dogma. As 
soon as the basics of grammar and logics were well known to broad audience, 
the use of these school arguments could easily prove successful in Christian 
preaching and theological polemics. Indeed, as I have demonstrated in this 
chapter, Basil of Caesarea broadly applied simple logical and grammatical 
analogies to explain difficult theological doctrines. 
Third, Origen’s deep knowledge of the contemporary philosophy and in-
stitutional educational achievements primed his controversial and loud fame: 
he simply turned out to be an unparalleled figure of his time and therefore in 
later times his achievements echoed in various ways. The Cappadocian fathers 
found a lot of insights in Origen’s teaching and methodological approach to 
theological argumentation. 
A particularly significant strand clearly discernible in Origen’s thought and 
in the discourse of the Cappadocian fathers is their anthropological turn. That 
is to say, they regarded theology not so much as divine and sacred knowl-
edge given by God as a daring attempt of humans to challenge and stretch 
310 Cf. Rubenson, S., The Influence of Origen on Fourth-Century Monasticism: 
Some Further Remarks, in: Dorival, G. / Le Boulluec, A. et al. (eds.), Origeniana 
sexta. Leuven 1995, 591–598; Lundhaug, H., Origenism in Fifth-Century Upper 
Egypt: Shenoute of Atripe and the Nag Hammadi Codices, in: StPatr 64 (2013), 
217–228.
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themselves towards the inexplicable and unknowable. Hence, it is through 
the prism of anthropology, of the embodied human being, that Origen and 
the Cappadocian fathers looked at theological doctrines. In the second part 
of this book I will examine the cognitive theory of Gregory Nazianzen and 
try to read his theology in the light of his epistemological and anthropologi-
cal concepts.
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Part Two: Epistemology and Human 
Intellection in the Theological Orations  
of Gregory Nazianzen
Introduction to Part two
As I have already mentioned in the introduction to this monograph, the scope 
of my analysis lies in investigating Gregory’s method and the methodology 
of theological discourse and epistemology which supports it. That is to say, 
I explore firstly the argumentative strategies, genres, and topoi Gregory 
applied in his theological circle; secondly the philosophical background of 
his reasoning and thirdly, how contemporary historical and philosophical 
circumstances and discussions shaped Gregory’s epistemological theory and 
theology. 
With regard to these research questions the material in the second part is 
structured in the following way. The first chapter is devoted to the justifica-
tion of the methodological scope of my inquiry. I delineate the historical rea-
sons and textual evidence which proves that the methodology of theological 
argumentation was considered important by Gregory. Then I describe the re-
search methodology which I myself have used to examine Gregory’s orations 
in order to track his epistemological theory and to unearth its philosophi-
cal background. Afterwards I present a philological analysis of the genres, 
stylistic features, and coherent structure of the five-speech circle, which also 
correlates with my interpretative approach to the theological circle. In the 
second chapter, I focus on philosophical and methodological matters. Here 
I begin by investigating the concept of essential predication in the context of 
Eunomian teaching. The general scope of this part consists in highlighting the 
basic concepts of Peripatetic epistemology which, in my view, established the 
parameters for Gregory’s epistemological and methodological reflections. In 
the third chapter I consider how the physiological and anthropological aspects 
of Peripatetic epistemology and cognitive theory found an echo in Gregory’s 
natural, exegetic and dogmatic theology. 
Chapter 1. The methodological framework  
of the theological orations
Introduction
In the previous chapters I have observed the historical circumstances of the 
Eunomian debate and outlined the main trends in the relevant philosophi-
cal discussions of that time, which touched upon epistemological, logical 
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and grammatical issues. I have also briefly sketched the vulnerable situation 
of Constantinople in the year 379, when Gregory Nazianzen arrived at the 
capital city at the request of the Pro-Nicene party, which was in a consider-
able minority and urgently needed support from a skillful rhetorician and 
theologian who was capable of persuasive and witty argument in favour of 
the Nicene cause even in the face of death threats from his opponents. Now it 
is time to proceed to the analysis of the theological orations, which Gregory 
composed and delivered before his fastidious metropolitan audience at a 
home-church which he named Anastasia, comfortably situated in one of the 
most prestigious areas of Constantinople311. Having summarized the material 
to be considered in this first chapter I now provide some further explanations 
as to the methodological scope of my research.
First, I begin my methodological questioning of the theological orations 
guided by a strong impression that the clue to their interpretation lies in the 
process of theological argumentation which they contain, rather than in the 
multitude of arguments that have evolved out of them. Second, this peculiar 
process-oriented reading of the orations which I offer is not only rooted in 
my own experience of thinking through them but is also firmly supported by 
historical, philosophical and textual evidence from the contemporary epoch. 
In other words, the intellectual and social climate of the fourth century 
strongly suggests that the Christian church experienced an urgent need to 
officially leave the intellectual ghetto of its restricted Judeo-Christian back-
ground and to address the fundamental methodological and epistemological 
issues with which Hellenic philosophy had been grappling and had thus far 
made considerable progress in science. The scope of this cultural quest was 
much larger than the accidental aims of a purely theological discourse and we 
have ample evidence that Gregory appreciated its amplitude. I suggest that it 
was precisely this ambitious pedagogical pursuit that played a decisive role 
in his consent to the request of the Pro-Nicene bishops.312 As he confessed in 
his autobiographic poem, he had a hard time thinking about their offer, which 
he accepted somewhat reluctantly and only because it seemed to him that no 
one else was sufficiently accomplished for this mission.313 In this chapter I 
run through Gregory’s explicit remarks about the methodology of theological 
311 Cf. McGuckin, 2001, 241–242.
312 In his autobiographic poem Gregory asserts that he came to Constantinople not 
on his own initiative but was “summoned by powerful men to defend the word” 
(De Vita Sua 607f. = PG 37, 1071). 
313 A captivating account of Gregory’s Constantinople campaign can be found in 
a substantial intellectual biography of Nazianzen written by John McGuckin 
(McGuckin, 2001, 233–240).
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discourse and the stylistic characteristics of the theological orations signifying 
their didactic drift. 
1.  Method in the theological orations: historical evidence  
and modern scholarship
Now turning back to the question I raised for this prolegomenon: What evi-
dence is there to justify my claim that methodological and epistemological 
issues model the texture and structure of the theological orations? Various as 
it is, this evidence can be arranged into three groups: polemical, philosophi-
cal and philological. By polemical evidence I mean that from the texts of the 
Eunomians and their contemporaries (e.g., the church historians) we know 
that the leaders of the Eunomian teaching insisted upon the methodological 
advantages of their mode of theorizing about God and that they apparently 
succeeded in acquiring a reputation as strong logicians. This fact obviously 
suggests that the Nicene cause lacked a certain persuasiveness, which in ad-
dition to the historical and political circumstances fed the increasing success 
of the Eunomian teaching. 
I hope that the historical and philosophical overview of the Eunomian de-
bate sketched in the first part of the book may provide a sufficient illustration 
of the issues which were brought up by Eunomius, Aëtius, and their follow-
ers, and occasioned severe dogmatic and methodological debate. It should 
also be clear from the first part of the book that as the Christian church grew 
in power and began to enjoy a benevolent attitude from the government, 
demand for a formulation of a clear pedagogical paradigm emerged in the 
Christian agenda. Should the domain of Christian teaching be limited by the 
framework of religious ritual or should it maintain the whole cultural and 
intellectual life of the society? 
Although these broad pedagogical issues may seem to be less pressing than 
the polemics with heresies, Gregory repeatedly insisted that for him they were 
of big importance.314 Having spent 10 years in the schools of Caesarea, Alex-
andria and Athens, where he had received an exceptionally good education, 
one not every aristocrat could boast of,315 he reasonably enough felt respon-
sible for answering the pedagogical challenges of his epoch. For these reasons 
he engaged in a fundamental epistemological and methodological discourse 
314 In the poem To his own verses (Εἰς τὰ ἔμμετρα), which forms a part of the 
Autobiographical poems, Gregory explicates his didactic motivation towards 
literary activity (cf. Carmina de se ipso 2.1332f.).
315 Byzantine authors noticed and praised Gregory’s encyclopedic knowledge of 
classical culture and usually set his orations as examples not only of rhetorical 
finesse but of theological contemplation deeply rooted in classical philosophy 
and literature. (Cf. Bady, 2016, 285–307).
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about the proper preparation, organisation and conduct of theological con-
templation.316 This combination of the methodological (how to approach and 
think through the incomprehensible divine knowledge, how to explicate it), 
epistemological (how to justify Christian faith and the correct interpretation 
of the Bible), and pedagogical (how to teach Christian doctrine and transmit 
the Bible) issues outlined a framework of Gregory’s theological orations.317 
Some scholars have previously also admitted a methodological aspect in 
Gregory’s discussion with Eunomians. Thus, Gallay and Bernardi have noted 
that the methodological concern of Nazianzen is particularly clear in orations 
27 and 28.318 Norris has noted that in Gregory’s mind the debate with the 
Eunomians emerged from a “basic disagreement about methodology, about 
paideia,” albeit he affirmed that Gregory’s orations were not concerned with 
the question of a theological method.319 Yet, it was not a purpose of Norris’ 
commentary on the theological orations to assemble an integral epistemo-
logical theory of Gregory and to discern his methodological and pedagogical 
concepts (albeit he encouraged this research inquiry320). 
I believe that it is important to approach Gregory’s text bearing in mind 
that his own educational patterns were formed in the Hellenic philosophical 
and rhetorical schools at a time when he was not yet even baptised. Therefore 
I suggest that before reading the theological orations we should recall the 
reading-writing paradigm321 of the philosophical schools of Late Antiquity. 
As I have shown in the first part of the book, the reading-writing paradigm 
of the philosophical schools was characterised by the creative transmission 
of the authoritative text and a rather liberal approach to authorship. 
In the fourth century, Themistius, a commentator on Aristotle, who him-
self was a Peripatetic philosopher (active career from the late 340s to 384) 
and a Constantinople politician, vividly exemplified this reception paradigm. 
316 In such a way he declares in his first theological oration that he is going to 
explicate, who, when, before whom and to what an extent can and ought to 
philosophize about God (Or 27.3).
317 Henceforth I denote this cluster of issues of Gregory’s agenda as methodological 
framework of the theological orations.
318 Cf. Gallay, P., Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 27–31: Discours Théologique, SC 
250. Paris 1978, 8–10, 84; Bernardi, J., La Prédication des Pères Cappadociens: 
Le Prédicateur et son Auditoire. Montpellier 1968, 184f.
319 Cf. Norris, 1991, 36.
320 Cf. Norris, 1991, 17.
321 By the reading-writing paradigm I mean the way of engaging with the authorita-
tive text (reading, copying, interpreting, explicating) that was practised in the 
philosophical schools of Late Antiquity. I also call this paradigm the reception 
paradigm – for the sake of brevity. 
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Despite his eloquent admiration of Plato, which had been noticed by his 
contemporaries,322 Themistius remained faithful to Peripatetic teaching.323 
Accordingly, Gregory Nazianzen who received an excellent education hav-
ing spent 10 years in the schools of Caesarea, Alexandria and Athens,324 natu-
rally adopted the reception paradigm of the philosophical schools. Although 
Gregory’s debt to the classical tradition has been recognized by scholars,325 
yet it has not sufficiently affected the interpretation of Gregory’s philosophical 
impact, especially as regards his epistemological and anthropological con-
cepts. Thus, Norris resumed his observation of the methodological allegiance 
to Hellenic philosophical concepts by saying:
…in many ways Nazianzen’s dependence upon Aristotle’s views of dialectic and 
rhetoric and a partial acceptance of an Epicurean theory of language allowed 
him to limit the Platonic dominance in Christian theology that Eunomianism 
embodied and rescue many important insights from Origen.326 
Having shown particular attention to Gregory’s rhetorical breeding, Nor-
ris did not examine Gregory’s anthropology and ontology and drew the 
conclusion that there are no grounds to see Gregory as something “more 
than philosophical rhetorician” and his teaching otherwise than philo-
sophical rhetoric (ibid.). Norris persuasively demonstrated that concept of 
philosophical rhetoric in Gregory’s works stemmed from Plato’s Phaedrus 
(259e–274b).327 
Despite this, I see no good reason for the appraisal of Gregory’s legacy as 
within the classical debate between rhetoric and philosophy announced in the 
dialogues of Plato328. I think that neither literary genre chosen by the author 
nor his literary style but rather the reception history of his texts should be 
322 Gregory was personally acquainted with Themistius, held him in high regard, 
and in one of his letters to Themistius Gregory called himself his admirer (τοὺς 
σοὺς ἐπαινέτας) and also noted Themistius’ reverence to Plato (cf. Greg., 
Ep 24). 
323 Cf. Blumenthal, H.J., Themistius: the Last Peripatetic Commentator on Aristo-
tle? in: Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and 
Their Influence. Ithaca / New York 1990, 113f.
324 Cf. Norris, 1991, 3.
325 Cf. Demoen, K., Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study 
in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics. Turnhout 1996, 29. 
326 Cf. Norris, 1991, 38.
327 Cf. Norris, 1991, 18f.
328 E.g., a famous 2nd cent. AD teacher of rhetoric, Hermogenes of Tarsus, in his 
treatise On types of style distinguished between meaningful political speech and 
stylish panegyrical speech. Notably, he classified Plato’s prose as panegyrical 
standard and thereby was the first to use Platonic loci communi for stylistic 
purposes (Hermogenes, Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου 2.10.230–245).
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decisive in the scholarly appraisal of the legacy of the ancient author. It seems 
to me that sometimes readers, perhaps too readily, take ancient authors at 
their word when they depict an austere conceptual battle between Christian 
and pagan philosophy, which might have taken place on a polemical level 
but not so much on a substantial one. That is to say, Christian and pagan 
authors frequently appear to have more in common than they are ready to 
acknowledge. To give a single example, Christopher Beeley in his influential 
monograph on Nazianzen’s theology notes that: 
…for all his knowledge of Greek philosophy, Gregory is concerned above all 
with setting the pagan and Christian philosophies in contrast with one another.329
If this were true, we could expect to find no impact of philosophical and sci-
entific conceptions on Gregory’s thought. As far as I’m concerned, Gregory 
never engaged in combat against pagan philosophy. He did say that it should 
not be overestimated because its intellectual potential is limited and that it 
yields to Christian teaching, but he nonetheless exhorted Christian students 
to seek a good education.330 It was his openly stated belief that the human 
mind constitutes the image of God through which it is possible for men to 
acquire both perfection and likeness to God (Or 28.17). I wish to underscore 
this point not as a mere truism but as an operative motif, which propelled 
Gregory’s educational and epistemological initiative. 
There are, it is true, passages in Gregory’s opera in which he ironically ridi-
cules certain concepts of Greek philosophers, but similar kinds of squabbles 
are easily found between representatives of different philosophical schools. 
Hence, I do not think we have grounds enough to somehow categorically 
distinguish Christian thinkers from their pagan colleagues. They shared the 
same agenda, the same education and (I believe it fair to say when it comes 
to science), in many cases the same intellectual pursuits.331 Therefore I find 
329 Cf. Beeley, C.A., Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of. 
God: In Your Light We Shall See Light. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. 
Oxford / New York 2008, 91.
330 Thus Gregory described his education as follows: “so from secular education we 
have received principles of enquiry and speculation, while we have rejected their 
idolatry, terror and pit of destruction… We must not then devalue education, 
because some are pleased to do so, but rather suppose such to be boorish and 
uneducated, desiring all to be as they themselves are, in order to hide themselves 
in the crowd and escape the detection of their want of culture” (Or 43.11).
331 For instance, Gregory Nazianzen tells us that his brother Caesarius was a 
court physician. He particularly emphasized that it was due to Caesarius’ pro-
found knowledge of philosophy that he received this post and specific honours 
from the Senate of Constantinople (cf. Or 7.8). Gregory of Nyssa tells us that 
Aëtius worked as an assistant of a physician and quite succeeded in this job 
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it disadvantageous to apply to Gregory the label “philosophical rhetorician” 
suggested by Norris. I think that this approach has precluded Gregory’s epis-
temology and anthropology from intensive special studies. So far these areas 
have not been especially deeply investigated.
To illustrate my idea, I refer once again to a reflection of Christopher Bee-
ley, who suggested that Gregory’s drift away from the philosophical path was 
due to his preference for the practical discipline of “conducting one’s life in 
light of one’s highest values”.332 I do not see how this argument could stand 
if Gregory’s own life and the typical customs of the Hellenic philosophical 
schools were taken into account. As far as we know, Gregory’s explicit ideal 
of practical discipline consisted in theological contemplation, which basically 
meant biblical studies and prayer. In his eventful and burdensome life he was 
once blessed with a three-year stay (375–378 AD) at St Thekla’s convent in 
Seleukia, which he recalled afterwards as the most pleasant time of his life, 
and which was completely devoted to his beloved studies.333 
A compelling example of a life devoted to active and practical studies of 
various aspects of being can be also found in the Peripatetic tradition.334 
Thus, Aristotle explicitly asserts in the Nicomachean Ethics that intellectual 
perfection (sc. σοφία) can only be achieved when theory meets practice.335 In 
the Metaphysics Aristotle tells us that “philosophy … differs from sophistic 
in its decision about how to live”336 (Met 1004b23–25). 
In view of this evidence, I believe it is not correct to lay down a watershed 
between Christian and Hellenic thinkers with regard to their inclination 
(cf. CE 1.36–45). In his eulogy of Basil Gregory Nazianzen told us that Basil was 
well versed in medicine and was able to take care of the bodies of his flock as 
well as of their souls (Or 43.23). For the details cf. Marasco, G., The Curriculum 
of Studies in the Roman Empire and the Cultural Role of Physicians, in: Horst-
manshoff, M. (ed.), Hippocrates and Medical Education. Leiden 2010, 209–212. 
332 Cf. Beeley, 2008, 73.
333 Cf. Greg., De Vita Sua 547–549 = PG 37.1067. Cf. also: McGuckin, 2001, 
229–231.
334 Notoriously, the Platonists valued theoretical life more than practical (cf. Alci-
nous, Did 152.30–154), therefore the Peripatetics’ active interest in the studies of 
embodied living beings suited some of the Christian authors similarly interested 
in the investigation of enigmas of the divine creation (cf. Bas., Hexaem 8).
335 Aristotle provides us with a pretty mechanistic account of how it is impossible 
to succeed in any kind of studies while enjoying a moral holiday. He affirms 
that “that what is wished for in the true and unqualified sense is the good, but 
that what appears good to each person is wished for by him” (NE 1113a23f.). It 
follows from this that when apparent good does not match the true good, than a 
person is deceived due to his own lack of moral virtue (NE 1114b21–25). Here 
and afterwards transl. H. Rackham, 1934, available on-line.
336 Here and afterwards transl. W.D. Ross, 1924, available on-line.
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to either a practical or philosophical way of life. A reasonable balance be-
tween practice and theory was a commonplace of Hellenic philosophy. Yet, 
naturally enough, there were men of praxis as well as men of letters in both 
groups and as for the men of letters, although some of them valued beautiful 
and metaphorical language and maybe even the fiction genres (cf. Platonic 
dialogues), this, of course, does not diminish the depth of their philosophical 
deliberation. 
Thus, I do not think that Gregory’s way of life somehow precludes his writ-
ings from being a deep and solid piece of eloquent philosophical contempla-
tion. Besides, it comes as no surprise that Gregory regarded the philosophical 
insights of his predecessors as his own intellectual heritage, which he could 
utilize at his sole discretion. As a result, his texts are marked by a creative 
interplay of classical and biblical tags: he shifts and transforms terms and 
meanings, introduces neologisms and demonstrates his mastery over classical 
and Christian literature.
2.  A reception paradigm of the theological orations
One of the direct consequences of the liberal approach to the authoritative 
text is that Gregory does not confess his leaning to any philosophical teach-
ing, even if analysis of his concept proves his considerable and substantial 
dependence on a particular philosophical doctrine. In such a way, on the 
surface of his theological orations Gregory appears to support Platonic loci 
communi and uses many of the well-known Platonic metaphors and stylistic 
patterns.337 These characteristics have prompted the scholars to assume a 
dominant Platonic trend of Gregory’s thought.338 Although the concept of a 
337 In the first theological oration Gregory creates an atmosphere of a lively dialogue 
with his opponents, whose incompetence he mocks with easy recognizable 
Platonic irony. Almost every paragraph of the 27 speech has parallels or al-
lusions to the Corpus Platonicum. For example, Gregory calls his opponents 
sophists and acrobats who specialize in uncommon and paradoxical speeches 
(Greg., Or 27.1, cf. Plat., Sym 190a). He compares his opponents with “those 
who in the theatres perform wrestling matches in public, but not that kind of 
wrestling in which the victory is won according to the rules of the sport, but a 
kind to deceive the eyes of those who are ignorant in such matters, and to catch 
applause” (Greg., Or 27.2, cf. Plat., Soph 231d, 234a). 
338 To give a single example, Claudio Moreschini in his comprehensive volume on 
patristic philosophy devoted a section to the Platonic theology of Gregory Nazi-
anzen, where he did not mention any traces of Peripatetic concepts in Gregory’s 
texts. Cf. Moreschini, C., Storia della Filosofia Patristica. Brescia 2004, ch. 7; cf. 
also: Moreschini, C., II Platonismo Cristiano di Gregorio Nazianzeno, in: Ann. 
Sc. Norm. Super. 3/4 (1974), 1347–1392. Moreschini, C., Filosofia e Letteratura 
in Gregorio di Nazianzo. Milano 1997, 22–69.
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Platonic influence on Gregory is by all means compelling, I suggest that it is 
not univocal and that Gregory employed various philosophical and literary 
patterns for different purposes; and that unless we at least try to differentiate 
between these purposes, we might misinterpret Gregory’s texts.
Another group of scholars have recognised a dependence on Aristotelian 
rhetoric and mode of argumentation in Nazianzen’s teaching.339 For instance, 
Norris devoted a considerable part of his study to the examination of Grego-
ry’s connection with Aristotelian rhetoric and logic and assumed:
The Theologian’s dependence upon Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship 
between logical syllogisms and rhetorical enthymemes seldom if ever appears as 
clearly in earlier Christian literature.340 
Yet, Norris did not go further than an examination of Gregory’s leaning 
towards Aristotelian rhetoric thus having completely missed his ontologi-
cal, epistemological and anthropological dependence upon the Peripatetic 
doctrine.
I think that in the theological orations we can see a balanced and meth-
odological dealing with various philosophical texts. That is to say, that Greg-
ory apparently distinguished between different ways of employment of the 
classical heritage. Plato was a universally acknowledged master of excellent 
philosophical prose; hence Gregory made use of many Platonic loci communi, 
metaphors and stylistic patterns. Aristotle in his comprehensive and multivo-
cal epistemology renounced the Platonic binary of the material and ideal and 
offered instead a hylomorphic undivided union of matter and form in all the 
living (sc. natural or ensouled) beings.341 
For Gregory this hylomorphic narrative turned out to be particularly im-
portant because Gregory affirmed that the degradation of the body caused by 
the fall of man had been redeemed by Christ, who himself from the moment 
of incarnation and forever onwards preserves his human body.342 Thus, there 
is grave tension between the Platonic approach to the human body and hence 
to the bodily aspect of the cognitive process (i.e. the sense-perception, imagi-
nation and conceptualisation) and Gregory’s Christology, namely a concept 
of the perfect humanity of Christ. Christopher Beeley admits the fact that 
Gregory’s view of the human body is complicated and should not be conceived 
339 Cf. Peters, F.E., Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam. 
New York 1968, 18–22; Norris, 1991, 17–37. 
340 Cf. Norris, 1991, 37.
341 About Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism cf. later, chapter 3, section 1.
342 Cf.: “For there is One God, and One Mediator between God and Man, the 
Man Christ Jesus. For He still pleads even now as Man for my salvation; for 
He continues to wear the Body which He assumed (μετὰ τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν)” 
(Or 30.14).
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singularly in Platonic terms.343 Nevertheless, he does not detect the Aristote-
lian teaching at the background of Gregory’s approach.
Similarly to Origen, in the materiality of the universe Gregory sees a 
beautiful work of the divine Wisdom (sc. of the second hypostasis of the 
Trinity), that he identifies with the “knowledge of the divine and human mat-
ters” (ἐπιστήμη θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, Or 30.20.13).344 
Moreover, Gregory underscores a substantial and not only metaphorical or 
theoretical connection to the Son of God and his creation. He argues that 
“he [the Son=the Wisdom of God] exists inherently in the living beings (διὰ 
τὸ ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς οὖσι, Or 30.20.10)”. In a similar way, Origen in the 
Commentary on John also contends that the Son is identified with the Wis-
dom of God because of his bond with reason (εὐλόγως τυγχάνων, ComJn 
1.34.243). What is even more interesting, Origen emphasises that this identi-
fication of the Son with the Wisdom of God ought to be understood as some-
thing more substantial and solid than a simple analogy because, as he says: 
For he [the Son] does not have his wisdom merely in the mental images of the 
hypostasis of God and Father of the universe in a way analogous to the images 
in human thoughts345 (ComJn 1.34.243). 
This argumentation implies that because of this substantial connection be-
tween the second hypostasis and the whole creation the process of theologi-
cal study should not be a merely theoretical discipline. In terms of Hellenic 
philosophy, the divine knowledge (sc. ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων 
πραγμάτων) that Gregory is talking about is different from the Platonic ideas 
because these ideas are completely deprived of the material world. Instead, in 
his approach to knowledge Gregory comes closer to the Aristotelian multivo-
cal and practical vision of knowledge as an alliance between the cognising 
subject and the object of cognition (cf. DA 430b20). Thus, Gregory argues 
that it is through knowing Christ that the whole creation is saved. 
This emphasis on knowing Christ Gregory took up from the Epistles of 
Paul. Gregory very often cites Paul and especially the passages from the 
343 Cf. Beeley, 2008, 80.
344 Fragments from the Commentary on John (in catenis) preserve an elaborate 
deliberation about the Son as the Wisdom of God and the beginning and the 
principle of the creation (Fragmenta in evangelium Joannis (in catenis) fr. 1.50–
70). Moreover, in tune with Origen’s interpretation of the scriptural names of 
Christ given in the first book of the Commentary on John Gregory provides a 
comparable explication of the scriptural names of Christ at the end of the fourth 
theological oration. Although the list of the divine names of Origen’s account is 
remarkably longer and more elaborate, all the 22 names that Gregory expounds 
coincide with Origen’s interpretation. 
345 Transl. R.E. Heine, 1989, 83.
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Epistle to Romans, 8:11 and 1 Corinthians, 12:15.346 In his interpretation of 
one of Paul’s key epistemological passages from the 1 Cor 13:12, – “then shall 
I know, even as also I am known” (ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην), 
Gregory underlines the importance of personal engagement with God, of 
active and bodily recognition of ourselves in God. He underscores that this 
knowledge is not of a purely theoretical discovery kind because broadly 
speaking there is not much left to discover about God but rather about an 
empirical recognition of the human being in God.347 That is to say that since 
human beings cannot fully comprehend God; whenever they try they stum-
ble across their own cognitive limitation. Nevertheless, Gregory argues that 
this limitation is not bad and should not discourage anyone. In claiming this 
he again joins Paul in marvelling at the “the depth of the riches both of the 
wisdom and knowledge of God” (Rom 11:33) and in switching his focus to 
the study of the wonders of the material universe and particularly of the hu-
man mind (Or 28.21).
The epistemological strand of Gregory’s theology comprises ideas from the 
Pauline Corpus, the concepts of Origen and Aristotelian epistemology. Nei-
ther the Aristotelian leaning of Gregory’s epistemology, nor indeed Gregory’s 
epistemological teaching itself has ever attracted special scholarly interest. I 
believe that the scholars have mostly overlooked Gregory’s epistemology and 
cognitive theory because they are shrouded in his fine rhetoric and sophis-
ticated stylistic play in various philosophical and biblical allusions. Hence, 
Gregory’s teaching is mainly considered as an example of beautiful rhetoric 
rather than of deep philosophical deliberation. I want to challenge this ap-
proach and to show that Gregory inherited the reception paradigm of the 
philosophical schools and practised a creative and liberal interpretation of 
the authoritative text. That is to say, Gregory employed various philosophical 
and literary patterns for different purposes. He married Peripatetic anthro-
pology and epistemology to Christian teaching and wrapped the result in 
multivocal philosophical and biblical allusions. An example of this creative 
reception of the authoritative text can be seen in a beautiful passage from 
the second theological oration, which is as rich as it is puzzling and therefore 
346 Cf. index of Norris’ edition (1991).
347 Cf.: “So that if anyone has known God, or has had the testimony of Scripture 
to his knowledge of God, we are to understand such an one to have possessed 
a degree of knowledge which gave him the appearance of being more fully 
enlightened than another who did not enjoy the same degree of illumination; 
and this relative superiority is spoken of as if it were absolute knowledge, not 
because it is really such, but by comparison with the power of that other” (Or 
28.17; transl. C.G. Browne / J.E. Swallow, improved).
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suitable for a methodological demonstration. For the sake of the argument I 
cite the passage at length: 
Therefore this darkness of the body (ὁ σωματικὸς γνόφος, cf. Ex 10:22348) has 
been placed between us and God, like the cloud of old between the Egyptians 
and the Hebrews; (cf. Ex 14:20) and this is perhaps what is meant by “He made 
darkness His secret place,” (cf. Ps 18:12 [LXX 17:12]) namely our dullness, 
through which few can see even a little. But as to this point, let those discuss 
it (φιλοσοφείτωσαν349) whose business it is; and let them ascend as far as 
possible in the examination (διασκέψεως350). To us who are, as Jeremiah says, 
“prisoners of the earth,” (τοῖς δεσμίοις τῆς γῆς, cf. Lam 3:34351) and covered 
with the denseness of carnal nature (σαρκίον περιβεβλημένοις352) …as it is 
impossible for the eye to draw near to visible objects apart from the intervening 
air and light (τοῖς ὁρατοῖς πλησιάσαι τὴν ὄψιν δίχα τοῦ ἐν μέσῳ φωτὸς καὶ 
ἀέρος353) (Or 28.12).
What we see here is a sophisticated play on tags from, on the one hand, Plato 
and Aristotle, and on the other, the Bible. It is noteworthy that Gregory clearly 
seeks to outline a common grounding for the biblical and philosophical reflec-
tions and for the sake of reconciliation he uses direct citations from the Bible 
and, I believe, quite discernible Platonic and Aristotelian flags. Regarding this 
sophisticated play with classical allusions it is important to classify the tags 
with respect to their plausible role in the context. 
Apropos of this passage I suggest that Platonic allusions are of a decorative 
character, while the Aristotelian tags reveal Gregory’s philosophical position. 
In such a way, pondering the famous topic of the “bonds of flesh” (sc. σάρξ), 
Gregory supplements his complaint about the “denseness of carnal nature” 
(sc. σαρκίον περιβεβλημένοις) by: 
348 Cf. in Ex 10:22 γνόφος means “darkness,” in Arist., De mundo 319b12 – 
“storm-clouds”.
349 Gregory always uses derivatives of the verb φιλοσοφέω when he refers to 
the Hellenic philosophers. Cf. Or 27.10.15, 27.3.1, 27.6.12; Or 28.17.3; Or 
29.2.19, and elsewhere in Corpus Gregorii.
350 Note that διασκέψεως – term. tech. for the scientific examination (cf. LSJ) 
along with a verb φιλοσοφέω allows one to consider the lexicon of the passage 
as multivocal and simultaneously implying biblical, Platonic and Aristotelian 
allusions.
351 Cf. a passage from the Timaeus (73a–b), where Plato discusses the carnal natures 
(σαρκῶν φύσεως, 73a) and affirms that “the bonds of life (τοῦ βίου δεσμοί) 
by which the Soul is bound to the body were fastened, and implanted the roots 
of the mortal kind” (73b).
352 Cf. Plat., Tim 73a.
353 Cf. Arist., DA 418b2.
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1) allusion to the Bible (Ex 10:22), when he speaks of “the darkness of the 
body” (ὁ σωματικὸς γνόφος,), 
2) direct reference to Jeremiah (Lam 3:34), when he mentions “prisoners of 
the earth” (τοῖς δεσμίοις τῆς γῆς) covered with the denseness of carnal 
nature (σαρκίον περιβεβλημένοις). 
It worth noting that Gregory also provides what we may call a naturalistic 
grounding for his thought: 
…it is simply impossible (ἀμήχανον) for those who are in the body (τοῖς ἐν 
σώμασι) to be conversant with objects of pure thought (τῶν νοουμένων) apart 
altogether from bodily objects (Or 28.12). 
I deem it obvious that what Gregory is referring to here are not Platonic 
“light-bearing eyes” (φωσφόρα ὄμματα, Plat., Tim 45bc) attacking sensible 
objects whenever “surrounded by midday light” with the result that “like 
becomes conjoint with like” (ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον συμπαγὲς γενόμενον, 
ibid.). Neither could it be a later interpretation of Platonic theory found in 
Plotinus who agreed with Plato’s account of the process of sight and dismissed 
Aristotelian theory: “the vision sees not through some medium but by and 
through itself alone (οὐ δι’ ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὑτῆς, Plotinus Enn 5.3.8)”. 
According to Aristotle a medium between the object of perception and 
the organ of sense is indispensable in the process of perception (Arist., DA 
416b33), which he regarded as a kind of mechanistic process, where the joint 
activity of the sensible object and the cognizing subject is realized with the 
help of a medium.354 One must note that it is quite problematic to admit to 
objectivity in the Platonic scheme because the perceptual process fully hangs 
on the cognizing subject, while in the Aristotelian scheme the contact and 
cooperation of the subject and object of perception gives more floor for reli-
ability. I believe that this is exactly what Gregory underscores by asserting 
that “as it is impossible for the eye to draw near to visible objects apart from 
the intervening air and light” (Or 28.12).
354 The Interpretation of Aristotle’s vision of the interaction between form and 
matter in sense-perception is highly debatable in the contemporary scholar-
ship. Mainly, it concerns the question about materiality of the soul (cf., e.g., 
Nussbaum, M.C. / Rorty, A.O. [eds.], Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, with an 
Additional Essay by M.F. Burnyeat. Oxford / New York 1995, 12f.). Although 
it would be preposterous to suppose that Gregory found any interest in debating 
the nuanced philosophical issues, I yet suppose that his vision of sense-perception 
leaned towards Aristotelian teaching because he also emphasised that contact 
and mutual exchange between the cognizing subject and the object of cognition 
is indispensable in the process of sense-perception, which he also understood as 
a kind of alteration. A comparable reading of Aristotle is attested in the works 
of Themisius (Blumenthal, 1990, 118).
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In contrast to Plato, Aristotle rejected the very possibility of the bifurcated 
human being, whose soul can go on existing without its body. In the third 
book of De anima he claims that although “in each case the sense-organ (τὸ 
νοῦν) is capable of receiving the sensible object (τὸ νούμενον) without its 
matter” yet “when the sensible objects are gone the sensings and imaginings 
continue to exist in the sense-organs”355 (DA 430a), therefore it is impossible 
to fully discharge the mind from the sensible images. 
I believe that Gregory generally supported the Aristotelian vision of the 
cognitive process and therefore I take his complaints about the burden of 
flesh simply as a confirmation of the fact that the human being was created 
as a compound of soul and body and that the annoying side effects of the 
carnal bonds he mentions should be interpreted in ethical and cognitive terms. 
Gregory affirmed that the degradation of the body caused by the fall of man 
had been redeemed by Christ, who himself from the moment of incarnation 
and forever onwards preserves his human body356 (why should he do this if it 
is such a wretched burden?). Thus, there is grave tension between the Platonic 
approach to the human body and hence to the bodily aspect of the cognitive 
process (i.e. the sense-perception, memory and imagination) and Gregory’s 
Christology, (a concept of the perfect humanity of Christ).357 
Gregory appealed to the practicalities of the cognitive process not only for 
polemical reasons but also in order to establish a reliable methodology of theo-
logical argumentation given the indispensable bodily conditions of the process. 
In light of this consideration it becomes clear that whenever he picked at the 
bonds of flesh, it was the basic cognitive limitedness of carnal nature which is 
meant to be overcome through the imitation of God understood as a complex 
mental-bodily praxis. I suggest that Gregory here chose to side with Aristotle358 
355 Here and afterwards transl. J.A. Smith, 1931, available on-line, unless otherwise 
mentioned.
356 Cf.: “For there is One God, and One Mediator between God and Man, the 
Man Christ Jesus. For He still pleads even now as Man for my salvation; for 
He continues to wear the Body which He assumed (μετὰ τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν)” 
(Greg., Or 30.14).
357 Although Beeley admited the fact that Gregory’s view of the human body is 
complicated and should not be conceived solely in Platonic terms, he did not 
detect Aristotelian teaching in the background of Gregory’s anthropology (Bee-
ley, 2008, 80).
358 Cf.: “let those discuss it (φιλοσοφείτωσαν) whose business it is; and let them 
ascend as far as possible in the examination (διασκέψεως)” (Or 28.12). The 
vocabulary of this passage suggests its Hellenic philosophical background. For 
instance, Gregory uses the verb φιλοσοφέω that he normally applyes when talk-
ing about Hellenic philosophy; he also used the term διάσκεψις – term. tech. 
for the scientific examination (cf. LSJ).
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because unlike Plato, who associated intellectual perfection (sc. σοφία) with 
theoretical knowledge (Meno 96d–100a), Aristotle valued practical wisdom 
(sc. φρόνησις) more highly than theoretical (NE 1141b3–9) and emphasised 
the importance of ethical virtue for achieving perfection:359 
Our function is achieved both through practical wisdom and through ethical 
virtue. For virtue makes the goal right, whereas practical wisdom makes what 
serves the goal right360 (NE 1144a7–9). 
This line of argumentation was helpful for the discussion with Eunomius 
and even more so for a polemic with Apollinaris, in which Gregory was 
simultaneously engaged. A Peripatetic approach to the cognitive process can 
be traced in Gregory’s criticism of Apollinaris’ interpretation of the famous 
saying from 1 Cor 2:16, “we have the νοῦς of Christ”. In his second letter 
to Cledonius, Gregory remarks: 
they who have purified their mind by the imitation of the mind which the Saviour 
took of us (οἱ τὸν ἑαυτῶν νοῦν καθήραντες μιμήσει τοῦ νοὸς ἐκείνου, ὃν 
ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ὁ Σωτὴρ ἀνεδέξατο), and, as far as may be, have attained con-
formity with it, are said to have the mind of Christ (πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥυθμίζοντες, 
ὡς ἐφικτόν, οὗτοι νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχειν λέγονται); just as they might be tes-
tified to have the flesh of Christ who have trained their flesh, and in this re-
spect have become of the same body and partakers of Christ (ὡς καὶ σάρκα 
Χριστοῦ μαρτυρηθεῖεν ἂν ἔχειν ἐκεῖνοι οἱ τὴν σάρκα παιδαγωγήσαντες 
καὶ σύσσωμοι καὶ συμμέτοχοι Χριστοῦ κατὰ τοῦτο γενόμενοι), as so he says 
“As we have borne the image of earth, we shall also bear the image of heaven” 
(Ὡς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, οὕτω, φησί, φορέσομεν τὴν εἰκόνα 
τοῦ ἐπουρανίου) (Ep 102.10f. = PG 37.332). 
This argument eliminates any objections against the bodily conditions of 
cognition (sc. the sense-perception and imagination), on the one hand, and 
at the same time affiliates the vision of cognitive and argumentative processes 
to anthropology, i.e. to the scientific study of the physiological conditions of 
the cognitive process. 
In my view an emphasis on the physiological strand of the cognitive process 
forms the basis of Gregory’s polemic with Eunomius. By the way of pinpoint-
ing the bodily conditions of cognition Gregory demonstrated simultaneously 
the limits of the human intellection and the paradoxical and miraculous 
divine design that calls human beings to seek understanding of the matters 
that surpass their mental capacities. Thus, the recognition of the hylomorphic 
nature of the human being that formed a watershed between Platonic and 
359 Cf. Kraut, R., Aristotle on Method and Moral Education, in: Gentzler, J. (ed.), 
Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford / New York 2001, 283.
360 Here and afterwards transl. H. Rackham, 1934, available on-line.
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Aristotelian doctrines at once married Gregory’s anthropology to Peripatetic 
teaching and divorced it from the teaching of Platonists. Gregory’s stylistic 
leaning towards the Platonic dialogues and his creative and liberal engage-
ment with the authoritative texts serve rather to demonstrate his familiarity 
with the routine practices of the philosophical schools. 
3.  Style and argumentative strategies of the theological orations
3.1  The objectives of the theological circle: Gregory’s  
explicit testimony 
The objectives of Gregory’s methodological framework are explicitly stated in 
the incipit of each of the five theological orations and accurately scrutinized 
in the following text. Thus the first speech (Oration 27) is concerned with 
the general external (time, place, audience) and internal (ethics, education, 
motivation) requirements for the theologian.361 Gregory affirms that philoso-
phising about God is not for everyone, nor is it for every occasion, or every 
audience; neither are all its aspects open to inquiry. 
Pondering rather uninspiring pedagogical instructions Gregory creates a 
vivid dramatic performance à la mode of the school Platonic dialogues. His 
strategy is to set down methodological instructions by pointing at the negative 
example of his opponents. Gregory uses the well-known Platonic caricature of 
the ignorant and greedy sophists. In his oration he creates an atmosphere of 
lively dialogue with his opponents, whose incompetence he mocks with eas-
ily recognizable Platonic irony. For example, he calls his opponents sophists 
and acrobats (σοφισταὶ καὶ κυβισταὶ362) who specialize in uncommon and 
paradoxical speeches (λόγων ἄτοποι καὶ παράδοξοι, Or 27.1). 
Alluding to the platonic image of the two successful sophists Euthyde-
mus and Dionysodorus (Plat., Euth.) — ex-champions of wrestling, who had 
come to exercise their fighting skills in eristic activity,363 Gregory compares 
361 Cf.: “…to philosophize about God belong not to everyone <…> and I will add, 
not before every audience, nor at all times, nor on all points; but on certain oc-
casions, and before certain persons, and within certain limits (οὐδὲ πάντοτε, 
οὐδὲ πᾶσιν, οὐδὲ πάντα, ἀλλ ἔστιν ὅτε, καὶ οἷς, καὶ ἐφ ὅσον)” (Greg., Or 
27.3). 
362 The word κυβιστης is rather rare, but we find it in Plato’s Symposium: “it 
went like our acrobats, whirling over and over with legs stuck out straight – i.e. 
androgyne (ὥσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες καὶ εἰς ὀρθὸν τὰ σκέλη περιφερόμενοι 
κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ)” (Symp 190a).
363 Besides, in the Sophista Plato mentioned “an athlete in contests of words, who 
had taken for his own the art of disputation” (τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ 
λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος, Soph 231d). 
To give an ironic characteristic of the sophist Plato put a rhetoric question: 
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his opponents with “the promoters of wrestling-bouts (οἱ τὰ παλαίσματα 
δημοσιεύοντες) in the theatres” (Or 27.2). Further on he develops this idea:
and not even the sort of bouts which are conducted in accordance with the rules 
of the sport… but the sort which are stage-managed to give the uncritical specta-
tors (τῶν ἀμαθῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα) visual sensations and compel their applause364 
(συναρπάζει τὸν ἐπαινέτην) (Or 27.2). 
Another famous Platonic characteristic of the sophists is their boasting. Greg-
ory hints at this topos by stating that his opponents:
profess to know all and teach all (οἳ πάντα εἰδέναι τε καὶ διδάσκειν 
ὑπισχνεῖσθε) – an attitude which is too naive and pretentious: I would not of-
fend you by saying stupid and arrogant365 (λίαν νεανικῶς καὶ γενναίως, ἵνα 
μὴ λυπῶ λέγων ἀμαθῶς καὶ θρασέως) (Or 27.2).
Moreover, when Gregory speaks of the capacity of reason, he applies a vivid 
Platonic metaphor of horses. He says: 
We must not be like fiery, unruly horses, (καθάπερ ἵπποι θερμοὶ καὶ 
δυσκάθεκτοι), throwing reason our rider (τὸν ἐπιβάτην λογισμὸν 
ἀπορρίψαντες), and spitting out the bit of discretion which so usefully restrains 
us, (τὴν καλῶς ἄγχουσαν εὐλάβειαν ἀποπτύσαντες), and running wide of 
the turning post (πόρρω τῆς νύσσης θέωμεν) (Or 27.5.1–10).
Although the Platonic background of the first theological oration is certainly 
compelling, I would warn against drawing a conclusion that the whole ora-
tion, and even the whole circle, are conceived in terms of Platonic philosophy. 
I suggest that Gregory uses the style of the Socratic dialogues in order to 
make a scenic and impressive introduction to theological practise. It seems 
clear to me that in the first oration Gregory employs the genre of dialexis 
which was widely used in the philosophical schools for the introduction to a 
philosophical discourse.366 
“And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another 
for a small price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?” (Τί δέ; τὴν 
τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερον ἂν διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ 
ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μῶν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον, Soph 234a; transl. B. Jowett, 
available on-line).
364 Transl. F. Williams / L. Wickham, 1991, 217.
365 Transl. F. Williams / L. Wickham, 1991, 218.
366 Frederic Norris suggested that the first theological oration (πρὸς Εὐνομιανοὺς 
προδιάληξις) is written in the invective genre (cf. Norris, 1991, 32). Indeed, in 
this speech Gregory mocked his opponents, but he did not abuse them. There 
can be no doubting Gregory’s capacity to abuse his opponents since he proved 
it in his orations against Julian the Emperor (Or 4–5). I see no good reason why 
Gregory would have chosen the genre of invective for his theological speeches, 
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As Papadogiannakis showed in his recent monograph367 devoted to the 
analysis of Theodoret of Cyrus’ dialexeis, this genre is characterised by an 
informal, conversational style, usage of popular literary and philosophical 
commonplaces, quotations from poets and philosophers, and involving a 
dialogical element bound up with Socratic form. As a result, the genre of 
dialexis was rather widely employed in the Christian literature: Theodoret of 
Cyrus, a young contemporary of Gregory, composed 12 dialexeis on different 
topics within his polemic with the pagans and heretics. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that Gregory chose the dialexis genre for the 
introduction to the theological cycle. By means of this beautiful rhetorical 
performance, he could at once entertain his sophisticated audience and meet 
their approval.
At the end of the oration Gregory criticises all the leading philosophical 
schools and hence distances his teaching from them and highlights his crea-
tive and innovative approach to the Hellenic heritage. A distinctive idea that 
features Gregory’s specificity and forms the climax of the first oration is a 
demand to “philosophize within our proper bounds (εἴσω τῶν ἡμετέρων 
ὅρων φιλοσοφῶμεν)” (Or 27.5). From the following orations of the circle 
it becomes clear that by bounds Gregory means to hear the physical condi-
tions of the human intellection. In such a way, Gregory introduces an ethical 
and ascetical topic that further on unfolds into an exhortation to observe a 
proper way of life. Thus, rather expectedly and in conformity with common 
demands of the philosophical schools, Gregory proclaims ethical excellence 
and purification as obligatory requirements and urges himself and his audi-
ence “to look to ourselves (πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἴδωμεν), and to smooth the 
theologian in us, like a statue, into beauty (ξέσωμεν εἰς κάλλος, ὥσπερ 
ἀνδριάντα, τὸν θεολόγον),” (Or 27.7). To strengthen the dramatic effect 
from his performance Gregory follows his own advice and makes a public 
confession before his audience, imputing to himself and other Nicene sup-
porters a lack of ethical soberness and an incautious methodological ap-
proach to the practice of theology, which had occasioned the controversy 
(cf. Or 27.7). 
The ethical discourse that Gregory introduces in the first oration is not just 
a trivial preaching of morals. Bearing in mind the explicit methodological 
goal of the oration we can see that ethical and anthropological issues should 
rather be considered in connection with the initially stated epistemological 
problems. That is to say, Gregory affirms that how people behave has a huge 
when he explicitly proclaimed that the goal of these compositions was pedagogi-
cal rather than vindictive (cf. Or 30.16).
367 Cf. Papadogiannakis, Y., Christianity and Hellenism in the Fifth-Century Greek 
East: Theodoret’s Apologetics Against the Greeks in Context. Washington 2013.
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influence on how they think. Hence, epistemological questions for Gregory 
vastly overlap with anthropological questions and the roots of this connection 
go deep in the divine design about creation. 
In the second theological oration Gregory gives the answer to the meth-
odological questions that he set up at the beginning of the previous speech. 
Thus, he contends that theological investigation requires a tolerable purity 
of the theologian (“as far as may be pure” – “ὡς οἷόν τε καθαρόν”), a con-
scious choice of interlocutors (“ought to consort with serious men” – “τοῖς 
ἐπιμελεστέροις”), a sober selection of a proper time for theological discourse 
(“when we have a calm within from the whirl of outward things” – “ὅταν 
γαλήνην ἔχωμεν ἔνδον ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξω περιφορᾶς”), and a prudent measur-
ing of one’s own noetic capability (“to advance in so far as we are [presently] 
advanced” – “ὅσον ἐχωρήσαμεν, ἢ χωρούμεθα,” Or 28.1).
This practical vision of the proper conditions of investigation point to the 
tradition of linking ethical and cognitive issues launched by the Aristotelian 
elaboration of Platonic topics. Aristotle cogently reasoned in his Nicoma-
chean Ethics that without good morals a student is unable to get the starting 
points right and therefore would either never engage in research or would 
not be able to acquire true knowledge.368 A compelling consideration, but 
apropos of scientific inquiry, is preserved in the famous last chapter of the 
second book of the Analytica Posteriora, where Aristotle makes the telling 
statement that νοῦς369 is a capacity to see starting-points, which is indispen-
sable for successful scientific research: 
νοῦς is not the means by which universals are formed in the soul, but an ability 
to see, in a given scientific context, which universals are suitable to function as 
explanatory starting-points for the explanandum in question (APo 2.19).
368 In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle distinguished between two kinds of starting-
points: those that are already known to the beginners of ethical studies, and 
that they use as the basis for their deliberation, and those that are unknown 
to the beginners and must be worked out (NE 1095a32–b4). Cf. Kraut, 1998, 
271–291.
369 Aristotle uses the term νοῦς with different connotations, which have puzzled 
Aristotelian commentators and scholars since the emergence of the Corpus 
Aristotelicum. In this book I translate the term νοῦς as mind, sense-perception 
and intellection. This translation tolerably satisfies my purposes because I am 
mostly interested in the contexts where Aristotle talks about νοῦς as a climax of 
the human cognitive capacity. In my understanding of νοῦς in Aristotle I gener-
ally follow the interpretation of Kurt Pritzl, who argued that “perception is the 
cognition of things in their particularity; intellection is the cognition of things 
in their universality” (Cf. Pritzl, K., Aristotle’s Door, in: Pritzl, K. [ed.], Truth, 
Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Washington 2010, 20). 
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Along these lines it becomes clear that good morals secure a sharp sense-
perception (sc. νοῦς), which provides a proper mental state for engaging in 
philosophical contemplation.370 
I suggest that Gregory’s exhortation to sustain good morals links into not 
merely the Platonic tradition but also the Aristotelian development of Platonic 
ethics into a cognitive theory. Thus, Gregory affirmed in the first theological 
oration that if the student did not acquire a proper noetic state before engag-
ing in theological research, he would surely go astray and this might even 
cause damage not only to him but also to his environment. 
As a consequence, Gregory’s methodological theological instructions were 
diversified and person-centred. In the second oration Gregory presents what 
may be roughly called a classification of the theologians. He defined the fol-
lowing six orders of theological practician: 
{1} if any be an Aaron, let him go up with me and enter within the cloud, and 
hold converse with God (θεῷ συγγένωμαι), for so God commands;
{2} if any be a Nadad or an Abihu, or an elder, let him too ascend, but stand 
further off, according to the value of his purification (στηκέτω πόρρωθεν, 
κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς καθάρσεως);
{3} if any be of the crowd and unfit as they are for so sublime contemplation 
of this height of contemplation (τις τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀναξίων ὕψους 
τοιούτου καὶ θεωρίας);
{4} if any be altogether unpurified let him not come nearer for it is not safe 
(ἄναγνος πάντῃ, μηδὲ προσίτω); 
{5} if any be temporally purified let him abide below and hear the voice and 
the trumpet (πρόσκαιρα γοῦν ἡγνισμένος, κάτω μενέτω);
{6} if any be an evil and savage beast, and altogether incapable of taking in the 
subject matter of contemplation and theology (τις θηρίον ἐστὶ πονηρὸν 
καὶ ἀνήμερον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον πάντῃ λόγων θεωρίας καὶ θεολογίας) 
let him not lurk in the woods, baneful and harmful (Or 28.2).
Taking into account the historical circumstances of Gregory’s preaching I sug-
gest that these classifications can be interpreted as follows. Within the first or-
der Gregory clearly denotes himself and most likely the Nicene hierarchs who 
shared his theological views. The second group is more confusing but with 
respect to the mentioned social position, I suggest that it denotes the Christian 
pro-Nicene aristocratic circles that invited Gregory to Constantinople. The 
third rank is pretty clearly marked by educational and social deficiency as 
 
370 Thus, good choice depends most of all on an eye for the relevant particulars. 
Practical intelligence is this eye: “we must have perception of particulars, and 
this immediate perception is νοῦς (τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ’ 
ἐστὶ νοῦς)” (NE 1144a29f.).
135
οἱ πολλοί – i.e. the majority of Christians with a tolerable yet not sufficient 
education and degree of purification; hence their part is to receive an adopted 
portion of theological knowledge. The fourth and fifth groups are defined 
respectfully by the baptismal rite; i.e. correspondingly – the unbaptized and 
the catechumen, each equally disqualified from theological contemplation. 
The last group clearly denotes the heretics, whom Gregory warns against 
approaching theological discipline. 
In view of the presented evidence, I think it safe to assume the methodo-
logical and pedagogical strand of the theological circle. It follows from this 
that the mode of argumentation that Gregory applies in the orations 28–31 
should also reflect the routine dialectics of the philosophical schools. In the 
following section I check this hypothesis.
3.2 Dialectical argumentation in the theological orations
Having presented his prolegomenous instructions in the first speech, Greg-
ory moves on to the investigation of the subject matter – the divine terrain 
(“νεώσαμεν ἑαυτοῖς θεῖα νεώματα,” Or 28.1). In such a way, in Oration 
28 (De theologia), which is traditionally considered as a second speech of the 
circle, he surveys the commonly known religious beliefs and most popular 
philosophical opinions concerning cosmogony, cosmology and the nature 
of divinity. Thereby, Gregory proceeds in his investigation in a dialectical 
manner. That is to say his discourse follows the classical three-stage dia-
lectical method formulated by Aristotle.371 Gregory starts by presenting an 
undisputable fact apparent for him through sense-perception. In such a way 
he claims that:
Now our very eyes and the law of nature teach us that God exists and that He 
is the efficient and maintaining cause of all things372 (Or 28.7)
371 Cf.: “As in our other discussions, we must first set out the way things appear to 
people, and then, having gone through the puzzles, proceed to prove the received 
opinions about these ways of being affected – at best, all of them, or, failing that, 
most, and the most authoritative. For if the problems are resolved, and received 
opinions remain, we shall have offered sufficient proof” (NE 1145b4f.).
372 Remarkably in this phrase Gregory not only approached the existence of God as 
if it were a phenomenon of the material world but also assimilated God to the 
efficient and maintaining cause of the universe. Thus, he placed the existence of 
God within the cause-and-effect relationship and hence legitimized the logical 
study of the divine matters. 
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Having presented the phenomenon of God’s existence373 Gregory discusses 
the most reputable opinions (sc. endoxa374) about the existence of God, ques-
tions them, and examines them and eventually arrives at a conclusion about 
a logical advantage of the Christian cause. 
Although he repeatedly affirms that the essence of God is beyond human 
comprehension, practically at the beginning of the oration he inquires how 
the divine being could be demonstrated i.e. reasoned by logical argumenta-
tion.375 This question is followed by a logical examination of the fundamental 
epistemological questions and popular opinions concerning the cognitive 
capacities of the human mind with respect to human physiology, the logical 
and linguistic settings of the process of cognition with respect to scientific 
study, theological reasoning and exegetical practice, and the chief ontological 
conceptions relevant to the correlation between the theological and scientific 
spheres of study. 
373 Although my description of Gregory’s statement of the existence of God as a 
phenomenon may arguably be questioned (because the existence of God is rather 
an interpretation of reality than a plain fact), I would argue the truth of my asser-
tion by pointing to the opinion of Gwilym Owen. In his famous article Tithenai 
ta phainomena he argued that Aristotle does not always start his investigation by 
appealing to the plain facts (sc. phainomena sensu stricto) but sometimes replaces 
them with endoxa (cf. Owen, G.E.L., Tithenai ta phainomena, in: Owen, G.E.L. 
[ed.], Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Lon-
don 1961, 239–251). In such a way, I suggest characterizng Gregory’s statement 
as an endoxic phenomenon. 
374 In a famous fragment from the Topics Aristotle maintained: “Those things are 
endoxa which seem so to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise – and either 
to all of them, or to the majority, or to the most notable and reputable among 
them” (Top 100b21–23; transl. R. Smith, 1997, 1, improved). A neat account 
of this controversial Aristotelian terminus technicus has been offered by Reñón 
Vega (cf. Vega Reñón, L., Aristotle’s Endoxa and Plausible Argumentation, 
in: Argumentation 12/1 [1998], 95–113). Vega affirmed that in the context of 
argumentative strategy endoxa can be understood as characteristic premises of 
dialectical syllogism. 
375 Namely, Gregory asked: “What is the proof?” (τίς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, Or 28.6). In 
the terms of Aristotelian logic ἀπόδειξις means “deductive proof by syllogism,” 
(APo 71b17, cf. LSJ).
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The dialectical procedure of running through endoxa,376 which Gregory 
applies in this oration,377 was commonly accepted as a proper introduction to 
scientific or philosophical inquiry.378 Occupied in this way with surveying the 
basic epistemological issues, Gregory at the same time continues his polemical 
argumentation contra the Eunomian syllogistic play and thereby maintains 
the dialogical mode of his deliberation.379
While the first theological oration serves as a prelude to the theological 
cycle, the second is an introduction (sc. εἰσαγωγή) to the epistemological 
principles of Christian doctrine. The characteristics of the Oration 28 sat-
isfy the traditional requirements of the school’s philosophical manual (sc. 
ἐγχειρίδιον, ἐπιτομή, εἰσαγωγή).380 
Among the typical characteristics of the manual peculiar to the Oration 
28 are: consecutive employment of the classical philosophical topoi, em-
ployment of a plain syllogistic argument, philosophical terminology and 
commonplaces,381 indicating a mixed Platonic, Stoic and Peripatetic back-
ground. Notably, almost half of the Oration 28 (§§ 21–31) constitutes a 
376 There is a keen scholarly discussion about the distinction between the methods 
of dialectic and demonstrative science. Terence Irwin in his classic Aristotle’s first 
principles pointed out that although Aristotle claimed in the Topics that dialectic 
leads towards the First Principles (Top 101b3f.), in other works he advocated 
the demonstrative science, which is more objective than dialectic can ever be 
because it refers to phenomena, while the domain of dialectic is endoxa. In the 
Metaphysics, difficulties with the universal research method become even more 
complex. Irwin solved them by distinguishing between ordinary dialectic based 
on common beliefs, and strong dialectic based on logically tested premises (cf. 
Irwin, T., Aristotles First Principles. Oxford 1988, 188).
377 Namely, Gregory runs through the proofs of the incorporeality of God, and the 
philosophical notions such as the fifth element, the beginning of motion, etc., 
which were the typical topics of philosophical discussions.
378 The research inquiry is a characteristic feature of the manual genre. Thus, the 
author usually questions some basic philosophical issues and explores them to-
gether with his readers. Gilles Dorival illustrated this strategy by referring to the 
works of Sallustius (De diis et mundo) and Iamblichus (De mysteriis), composed 
in the isagogic manner (cf. Dorival, 1975, 37).
379 Gregory made use of the word τεχνύδριον – a remarkable diminutive of τέχνη, 
which according to the TLG statistics is attested only in Plato’s Republic, when 
Plato juxtaposed true philosophers and the “the practitioners of the minor arts” 
(Resp 475e1).
380 Marguerite Harl and Gilles Dorival argued that Origen set his De principiis into 
a tradition of the school philosophical manual (cf. Harl, 1975, 12–32; Dorival, 
1975, 33–45). 
381 E.g., Gregory used the sun metaphor for divine knowledge (Or 28.3), the idea of 
bonds of flesh (Or 28.4), and the Stoic concept of the natural law (sc. ὁ φυσικὸς 
νόμος, Or 28.6), etc.
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survey of physical matters: a colourful description of the different spheres of 
the created world. This part might seem improper in a theological treatise 
but it is typical for a philosophical manual. Moreover, the way Gregory runs 
through physical matters is in itself rather peculiar for it represents a set of 
questions, the research issues presented in the form of inquiries. In such a 
way, Gregory rather frequently engages in pondering some fundamental theo-
logical, or even cosmological and anthropological, concepts which could not 
possibly have been provoked by the Eunomian teaching. Sometimes Gregory 
even attributed to his opponents concepts they never held. Thus in the Ora-
tion 28 he attributes to his opponents the odious conception of divine cor-
poreality (“a view which is more absurd and anile than even the atoms of 
Epicurus,” Or 28.8) and thereby equates the Eunomians with the advocates 
of materialism, just as he had equated them with the sophists in the previous 
speech. This of course can be regarded purely as a rhetorical trick but the 
contexts of the oration suggest that there is more to it. Seeking to establish a 
general epistemology of theological inquiry, Gregory had to run through the 
principal philosophical questions and apropos of this pursuit, the polemics 
with the Eunomians were as much a pressing necessity as the circumstantial 
dramatic output of his thought.
At the beginning of the third theological speech (Oration 29) Gregory again 
summarizes his examination of the philosophical endoxa by pronouncing that 
monarchy is a more reasonable and reliable religious concept than polyarchy 
or anarchy. Following this affirmation he engages in a philosophical recon-
ciliation of the idea of divine monarchy with the Trinitarian concept. Thus 
Gregory moves from the general epistemological and cosmological observa-
tions presented in oration 28, to his particular theological specialty and, in 
Oration 29, he commits himself to “bring forth to the light” his own concep-
tions about the godhead (Or 29.1). At the same time, he clearly enunciates a 
polemical scope of the oration: 
let us first of all state our own position, and then try to controvert that of our 
opponents so that our arguments may be taken in at a glance like those of the 
elementary treatises (λόγον εἰσαγωγικὸν) which they have devised to deceive 
simple or foolish persons (τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἢ εὐηθεστέρων)382 (Or 29.1). 
Gregory devotes the lion’s share of the oration to a logical argumentation 
concerning the divine nature of the Father and the Son, which he investigates 
from a pronounced logical and grammatical viewpoint, which suggests a 
382 By mentioning the simple and foolish persons who approve of the teaching of 
his opponents, Gregory hinted at his first theological oration, where he depicted 
the Eunomians as sophists whose audience was broadly known from Platonic 
dialogues as simple-minded and unsophisticated. 
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strong dependence on Aristotelian and Stoic logic and on the philological 
achievements of Origen and his Hellenic colleagues. In contrast with the first 
two orations, which are remarkably sophisticated and rhetorically decorated, 
the third speech appears more robust and straightforward. At the same time, 
it is in this speech that the main theological concepts are accurately reasoned 
through so that we can witness here how Gregory makes use of the meth-
odological principles that he had thus far developed. 
The investigation of the Father-Son relationship, and the wrestling with 
the arguments of the Eunomians, continues in the following speech (Or 30), 
performed, as Gregory specifically designated, in the genre of refutation.383 
It is noteworthy that he openly lays out his methodological pursuits in the 
incipit of each oration so that his audience would benefit not only from the 
content but also from a clear instruction about how to apply it. This peda-
gogical concern is also apparent from Gregory’s declared intention:
to state the explanations summarily, dividing them into numbers (κεφαλαιώσομεν 
εἰς ἀριθμοὺς διελόντες) for the sake of carrying them more easily in mind 
(ταύτας διὰ τὸ εὐμνημόνευτον) (Or 30.1).
Interestingly, Gregory mentions that he arranged his arguments in numeri-
cal sequence because of an anonymous request of some second person, to 
whom Gregory refers by using the second singular of the personal pronoun.384 
Although this statement may be taken for a simple rhetorical address to the 
audience it is remarkable that here Gregory uses the singular pronoun instead 
of his usual plural address to his listeners throughout the circle.385 
In addition, there are some other passages in the orations which seem to be 
either completely out of place or not quite fitting the logic of the argument. 
This particularly concerns remarks in the introductions and conclusions of 
each of the orations, which give the strong impression of later editorial inser-
tions for the sake of bridging the speeches in order to create a coherent com-
position within the circle. The most problematic is the place of the Oration 28: 
383 Namely, in the first paragraph of the oration Gregory denoted his speech as 
refutation by using the term λύσις, known as an Aristotelian terminus technicus 
(cf. LSJ).
384 Cf.: “since you demand of us (σὺ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἐπιζητεῖς)” (Greg., Or 30.1).
385 Besides, it is most unlikely that such a remark could be put in the incipit of oral 
presentation. We have evidence from Jerome (Ep 50.1; Ep 52.8), who stayed 
with Gregory for some time when he was in Constantinople, that he helped 
Gregory to revise his orations for publication after they had been presented in 
public. Whether this evidence is fully reliable remains to be inspected but it seems 
that the editorial scenario can easily explain the remark in question.
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either after the Oration 27 (direct sequence386), or after the Oration 30 (in-
direct sequence387). Although orations 27 and 28 are obviously bridged with 
one another, this cannot be said about the orations 28 and 29. Contrastingly, 
the beginning of the 29 speech echoes the chief message of the Oration 27. 
Thus, the Oration 27 stated that the unworthy speaker should not engage in 
theological discourse. Correspondingly, in the first paragraph of the Oration 
29 we read: 
This then, is what can be said to check our opponents’ propensity to engage in 
debate at the drop of a hat, with the consequent danger of over-hasty judgement 
in all matters but above all in discussions which have to do with God (Or 29.1).
I think that it is too difficult to arrive at a decisive solution of the sequence 
problem. Yet, I am personally inclined to suggest that the sequence of the 
orations within the circle was subject to editorial revision. 
The question of the sequence of the orations and of the coherent internal 
structure of the circle is particularly to the point apropos of the fifth speech 
(oratio 31), which does not always belong to the circle in the manuscript 
tradition.388 The purpose of the oration is postulated in the incipit as the 
objection389 to the disclaimers of the Holy Spirit. Gregory plainly affirms that 
his argument will follow a line of philosophical reasoning: “let me reason 
with you (φιλοσοφήσω σοι)” (Or 31.5); “let the syllogisms be woven (οἱ 
συλλογισμοὶ πλεκέσθωσαν)” (Or 31.7). Interestingly, Gregory makes this 
claim despite his repeated remarks about the incomprehensibility of the di-
vinity in Or 28.4, Or 29.21, Or 30.17 and Or 31.33. This evidence suggests 
that Gregory does not mean to banish thinking about God but, as he tells us, 
to observe a proper decorum in speech and silence (Or 27.5).
386 Some scholars have argued for the direct sequence of the cycle orations based 
primarily on the apparent link between the Oration 27 and the beginning of the 
Oration 28, where the answer to the methodological questions of the previous 
speech is provided (cf. Gallay, 1978, 8–10. Bernardi, 1968, 184f. Sinko, 1917, 
11f., 20f.).
387 Norris did not determine any special place for the Oration 28, but remarked 
that the direct order is not indisputable (cf. Norris 1991, 64). Sieben stated 
that the manuscript data allow the Oration 28 to be placed elsewhere: after the 
Oration 30 or at the end of the cycle (Sieben, J.H. von, Gregorius Nazianzenus. 
Orationes Theologicae. Freiburg 1996, 50).
388 I believe that owing to a number of distinct references to previous speeches, 
Oration 31 legitimately belongs to the circle. E.g., in the fifth paragraph Gregory 
remarked that “we have already discussed the Trinity (πρότερον διειλήφαμεν)” 
(Or 31.5). Besides, in the Oration 28.2–3 he used a vivid metaphor of the mi-
raculous Sinai revelation, which he also recalled in the Oration 31.3.
389 For the objection in Or 31.3, Gregory used the Aristotelian terminus technicus 
ἔνστασις (cf. LSJ).
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As far as Gregory’s argumentative strategy is concerned, in the theological 
circle he chiefly uses the Aristotelian (sc. not Platonic!) version of dialectic 
reasoning as defined in the Topics: 
method by which we will be able to reason deductively about any matter pro-
posed to us on the basis of endoxa, and to give an account of ourselves [when 
we are under examination by an interlocutor] without lapsing into contradic-
tion390 (Top 100a18–20). 
The mode of argumentation which Gregory performs conforms to the charac-
teristics of Peripatetic dialectic: he argues with his opponents in the first per-
son, and in most cases his argument is rather straightforward, and designed 
in the form of logical testing of certain opinions against obvious phenomena 
and logical principles. Besides, in most cases, Gregory builds his discourse 
around philosophical endoxa (in the Oration 28 and occasionally in the other 
speeches of the circle he also contrasts his opponent’s ideas with plain phe-
nomena), which he either examines or applies as indisputable and compatible 
with scriptural evidence. It is remarkable that although Gregory sometimes 
refers to the authority of the Bible as if it were unchallengeable, at other times 
he scrutinizes the scriptural evidence with grammatical accuracy and precision 
and even repeatedly urges that contextual grammatical analysis should be 
applied every time when biblical evidence is taken as a point of departure.391 
Norris also admitted that Gregory made use of Aristotelian rhetoric and 
logic.392 Yet, I believe that he goes further than this. In the following chapters 
I show that he was concerned not merely with logic but more deeply with 
the ontological and cognitive prerequisites of knowledge and, hence, he ap-
proached the problem of theological methodology from a different, more 
fundamental level than his opponents. 
3.3 Exegetic theology and Aristotelian categorial theory
The impact of the Peripatetic categorial system is clearly discernible not only 
in Gregory’s mode of argumentation but also in the way he classifies differ-
ent functions of the divine nature in accordance with their various relations 
(i.e. apropos of divine activity, and apropos of the life of the cosmos and of 
human beings). Here is how Gregory exemplified this distinction. He took 
390 Transl. R. Smith, 1997, 1, improved.
391 Cf.: “the task of examining (ἐξετάζειν) carefully and distinguishing (διαιρεῖσθαι) 
in how many senses the word Spirit or the word Holy is used and understood 
(νοεῖται καὶ λέγεται) in Holy Scripture, with the evidence suitable to such an 
enquiry; and of showing how besides these the combination of the two words – I 
mean, Holy Spirit – is used in a peculiar sense” (Greg., Or 31.2). 
392 Cf. Norris, 1998, 99. 
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the path of his predecessors (particularly Origen and Basil) and adopted the 
categorial distinction between common and proper qualities for his theologi-
cal interpretation of the “common names of the divinity” (sc. κοινὰ θεότητος 
τὰ ὀνόματα, Or 30.19) and the proper names of the divine hypostases393. In 
particular, in the third oration he denoted the “proper” (sc. ἄφετος) name of 
God (i.e. “he who is” [ὁ ὤν] as a special “name of his essence” [τῆς οὐσίας 
ὄνομα]; the individual names of the divine persons he distinguished with re-
gard to their “peculiar properties” [κατὰ τὰς ἰδιότητας] and also identified 
the so-called relative names, which manifest the relations of the divinity to 
the creation [τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων ἐστί]), (Or 29.18). 
The Eunomians themselves introduced thinking about the divine names 
in terms of categories. They claimed that the name of “the Father” denotes 
either essence or action (Or 30.16). Gregory turned this argument around 
by refusing to identify the name of the Father with either essence or action 
(οὔτε οὐσίας ὄνομα ὁ πατήρ, οὔτε ἐνεργείας), and suggesting instead that 
“it is the name of the relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the 
Son to the Father (σχέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὁ πατήρ, 
ἢ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα)” (Or 30.16). To clarify his statement Gregory 
provides the term “relation” with a typical explanation by which the Peripa-
tetics normally exemplify the category of relation (either on their own or in 
the Stoic system, for both teachings were agreed on this issue394). 
A telling example of the candid employment of categorial theory is pre-
served in Gregory’s fifth oration, where he reasons the divine dignity of the 
393 Cf.: “proper name (ἴδιον) of the unoriginated (τοῦ ἀνάρχου) is Father, and that 
of the unoriginately begotten (τοῦ ἀνάρχως γεννηθέντος) is Son, and that of 
the unbegottenly proceeding or going forth (τοῦ ἀγεννήτως προελθόντος, ἢ 
προιόντος) is the Holy Spirit” (Greg., Or 30.19).
394 Cf.: “…the mere idea of the Father – he says – still brings in the idea of the 
Son (ὁ πατήρ·συνεισάξει τὸν υἱόν)” and this fact of the relative connection 
between the ideas produces no changes in either of them, or as Gregory puts 
it “will not make it of a different nature, according to common ideas and the 
force of these names (οὐκ ἀλλοτριώσει, κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὴν 
τῶν κλήσεων τούτων δύναμιν)” (Greg., Or 30.16). Simplicius in his Com-
mentary on Categories explained the meaning of the category of relation in the 
Stoic doctrine: “they say that [thing] ‘in relation’ (πρός τι) – is something that 
is somehow disposed (διακείμενά πως) according to its peculiar characteris-
tics (κατ οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα) and inclines towards another (ἀπονεύει πρὸς 
ἕτερον), while [thing] ‘in the state of relation to’ (πρός τι δέ πως ἔχοντα) – is 
something that has a natural capacity to join or not to join something (πέφυκεν 
συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν), herewith not undergoing a process of 
change or alteration (ἄνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως), [it 
is] something that is considered in relation to the external (μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ 
ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν)” (Simpl., ComCat 8.166.15–27).
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Holy Spirit by means of logical argumentation. Interestingly he introduced 
his reasoning with a pledge not to enter into discussion “with those who do 
not even believe in his existence, nor with the Greek babblers”; instead he 
affirms that he will argue “with others”. Norris suggests that by “others” 
Gregory means his Eunomian opponents.395 Indeed, in light of the concepts 
he goes on to confront, one can hardly suppose otherwise but it is notable 
that although Gregory rejected the use of Greek philosophical conceptions 
for serious theological argumentation, nevertheless in this and following pas-
sages he formulated his own reasoning in full conformity with Aristotelian 
logic and even with a reference to it. For example, he begins his argument 
by proclaiming:
The Holy Spirit must be conceived of either as in the category of the self-existent 
(τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκότων), or as in that of the things which are con-
templated in another (τῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ θεωρουμένων); of which classes those 
who are skilled in such matters call the one substance (οὐσίαν) and the other 
accidental396 (Or 31.6). 
Proceeding by way of logical argumentation about the characteristics of the 
Holy Spirit, Gregory plainly admits his method by saying: 
let the syllogisms be woven (οἱ συλλογισμοὶ πλεκέσθωσαν). Either he is al-
together unbegotten, or else he is begotten. If he is unbegotten, there are two 
unoriginates. If he is begotten, you must make a further subdivision (Or 31.7). 
Another important instance of usage of the categorial theory for theological 
augmentation is evident in Gregory’s treatment of the scriptural names of 
Christ. Gregory classified these names as common names of the divine nature, 
which “are still common (κοινὰ) to Him who is above us (τοῦ τε ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς), 
and to Him who came for our sake (τοῦ δι’ ἡμᾶς). But others are peculiarly 
our own (ἃ δὲ ἰδίως ἡμέτερα), and belong to that nature which He assumed 
(τῆς ἐντεῦθεν προσλήψεως)” (Or 30.21). 
It is noteworthy that Gregory explained the divine names by virtue of 
the functions or relations of the divinity which these names denote. Of 
course, Gregory’s interpretation of the divine names, especially of the names 
of Christ, is not totally original: most evident parallels point to Origen’s 
commentaries,397 which to a remarkable extent hinged upon Alexandrian 
395 Cf. Norris, 1998, 190.
396 For the “accidental” Gregory used a characteristic Aristotelian terminus technicus 
συμβεβηκός, denoting the non-essential attribute; cf. Arist., Met 1029a10–14.
397 Origen explained the background of the distinction ranging from ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς 
to δι’ἡμᾶς or ἡμῖν by saying, with reference to a passage from 1Cor 1:30, that: 
“Since Christ became wisdom (and justice, and sanctification, and redemption) 
for us (ἡμῖν) from God, hence “the distinction has to be made between for us 
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exegetic methodology based mainly on Aristotelian literature theory.398 Ergo, 
it is simply natural to see similar accounts of the διὰ τί interpretations of the 
divine names in the works of Origen, Basil and Gregory. For instance, in the 
fourth theological oration: 
ἄνθρωπος μέν, οὐχ ἵνα χωρηθῇ μόνον διὰ σώματος σώμασιν, ἄλλως οὐκ 
ἂν χωρηθεὶς διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄληπτον· ἀλλ’ ἵνα καὶ ἁγιάσῃ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον … καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἑνώσας τὸ κατακριθὲν ὅλον λύσῃ 
τοῦ κατακρίματος, πάντα ὑπὲρ πάντων γενόμενος, ὅσα ἡμεῖς, πλὴν τῆς 
ἁμαρτίας, σῶμα, ψυχή, νοῦς, δι’ ὅσων ὁ θάνατος· τὸ κοινὸν ἐκ τούτων, 
ἄνθρωπος, θεὸς ὁρώμενος, διὰ τὸ νοούμενον.
So he is called man, not only because through his body he may be apprehended 
by the corporeal, whereas otherwise this would be impossible through his in-
comprehensible nature; but also in order to sanctify man through himself, so 
that after he unites the condemned [nature] to himself all that was condemned 
would be released from condemnation; our like in everything except sin: in body, 
soul, and mind – in all that death pervades. [Being as] man a share to these; [as] 
God he is perceived by mind alone (Or 30.21).399
It is important to note that the underlying assumption of this functional inter-
pretation of the names of God is the idea that these names truly correspond 
to the metaphysical reality of the divine plan about humanity. In such a way, 
while the names of God represent the characteristics of the divinity, perceived 
by the human soul and preserved in the human concept, the very process of 
understanding and thinking through these names favours a personal salva-
tion of the theologian.
This metaphysical account of exegetic practice first occurred in Origen’s 
teaching and I believe that the analogous conception of Gregory represents a 
trace of Origen’s influence.400 What is special about Gregory’s account of the 
divine names is that they not only manifest divine activities but that through 
these names the divine activities can be actualised in human beings by means 
of producing a certain psychological effect on human souls. Here is how 
Gregory expresses this thought: 
and the unqualified state (διασταλέντων τοῦ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς)” (Or., 
ComJn 1.34.251).
398 As I have already discussed in part one, chapter 2, section 1.
399 Transl. L. Wickham / F. Williams, 1991, 277, improved.
400 In the Homily On prayer we read: “Since therefore, though we all have some 
notion of God, conceiving of Him in various ways, but not all of what He is 
(ὅ ἐστι), for few and, be it said, fewer than few are they who comprehend His 
complete holiness – we are with good reason taught to attain to a holy concep-
tion of Him (ἔννοιαν περὶ θεοῦ) in order that we may see His holiness as crea-
tor, provider, judge, elector, abandoner, acceptor, rejector, rewarder and punisher 
of each according to his desert” (Orat 24.2).
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Of the other titles (Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων προσηγοριῶν), some are evidently names 
of his authority (αἱ δὲ τῆς οἰκονομίας), others of his government of the world 
(τῆς ἐξουσίας), and of this viewed under a twofold aspect, the one before the 
other in the incarnation (τῆς μὲν ὑπὲρ τὸ σῶμα, τῆς δὲ ἐν σώματι). … For 
since we are governed by these three things, the fear of punishment, the hope 
of salvation and of glory besides, and the practice of the virtues by which these 
are attained, the name of the God of vengeance governs fear, and that of the 
God of salvation our hope, and that of the God of virtues our practice; that 
whoever attains to any of these (ὁ τούτων τι κατορθῶν μᾶλλον) may, as car-
rying God in himself (ἵν’ ὡς τὸν θεὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρων), press on yet more 
unto perfection (ἐπείγηται πρὸς τὸ τέλειον), and to that affinity which arises 
out of virtues (καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρετῶν οἰκείωσιν) (Or 30.19).
In addition to the conspicuous functional (i.e. “for the sake of”) exegesis of 
the divine names, this passage and the way Gregory classifies the divine names 
in general manifest another telling methodological pattern. Gregory’s exegesis 
of the divine names provides an overview of the activities or functional char-
acteristics of the divine nature and thereby deduces “a fragmentary perception 
of it from its images” (μερικήν τινα φαντασίαν ἐκ τῶν εἰκασμάτων, Or 
28.13). Though Gregory fully admits to the uncertainty of this image,401 yet, 
in his opinion, this is as far as the human mind can reach, therefore it is better 
for those human beings engaged in research of divine matters to prudently 
confine themselves within their intellectual limits (Or 29.2) than to desire 
comprehension of the incomprehensible. 
Although one may reasonably doubt the accuracy and objectivity of the 
descriptive reasoning that Gregory presents here, no-one can totally deny its 
epistemic value. In this way, Aristotle criticised Plato’s overestimation of the 
method of division (sc. διαίρεσις). Aristotle claimed that as opposed to syl-
logism and scientific definition on the basis of demonstration, the inductive 
or descriptive definition on the basis of division does not yield knowledge.402 
Yet, Aristotle also admitted that “neither presumably does someone who gives 
401 Cf.: “What then is this deus ex machina (τίς οὖν ἡ μηχανὴ), which is of these, 
and yet is not these (ἐκ τούτων τε καὶ μὴ ταῦτα), or how can that unity which 
is in its nature uncomposite and incomparable, still be all of these, and each one 
of them perfectly (ἢ πῶς ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ τελείως ἕκαστον, τὸ ἓν τῇ φύσει 
ἀσύνθετον καὶ ἀνείκαστον)?” (Or 28.13).
402 Jonathan Barnes interpreted Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s method of division in 
the following way: “every step in the divider’s proof is an assumption and not 
an inference. Even when he could deduce the divider does not. Even if divider’s 
conclusion is true, he has no warrant for supposing that it gives a definition” (cf. 
Barnes, J. [ed., transl., com.], Aristotle, Posterior Analytics. Oxford 1975, 211).
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an induction (sc. ὁ ἐπάγων) demonstrate anything (sc. ἀποδείκνυσιν) – but 
he nevertheless shows something (sc. δηλοῖ τι)403” (APo 91b32–36). 
Aristotle also specified that in order to solve the inevitable difficulties of 
descriptive definitions, it is necessary to “assume everything in what the thing 
is (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι πάντα), make a division consecutive by postulating what 
is primitive (τὸ ἐφεξῆς τῇ διαιρέσει ποιεῖν, αἰτούμενον τὸ πρῶτον), and 
leave nothing out”404 (APo 91b28–31). In such a way Aristotle underscored 
two significant requirements for descriptive definitions: they should be as 
comprehensive as possible, and they should contain a classification of the 
qualitative items included in them. 
In conformity with this vision of the descriptive definition, Gregory, when 
considering why it is impossible to describe the essence of God (whilst the ac-
tivity of the divinity is available for inductive description), asserted that “com-
prehension (ἡ κατάληψις) is one form of circumscription (ἓν περιγραφῆς 
εἶδος)” (Or 28.10). I am inclined to take this and other methodological 
remarks that rather frequently occur in the theological orations as the hall-
marks of Gregory’s deep concern about the method of theological discourse. 
Thus, for instance, Gregory professed that although human imagination 
lacks an appropriate perceptive experience which could satisfy the require-
ments of a decent description of the divinity, yet God himself landmarked 
a way towards him. Gregory associated this way towards divinity with the 
divine paideia and argued that it is analogous to the method of theological 
contemplation. More concretely Gregory claimed that, before the incarna-
tion of the second hypostasis, the strategy of the divine paideia was similar to 
the method of medicine, where progress is reached by subtractions (ἐκ τῶν 
ὑφαιρέσεων ἡ μετάθεσις – e.g., elimination of symptoms); whereas the 
purpose of the New Testament paideia is perfection achieved by additions405 
(διὰ τῶν προσθηκῶν ἡ τελείωσις, Or 31.26). 
Gregory contends that the method of additions can be seen in the variety 
of manifestations of the divine paideia. Among these manifestations of the 
divine paideia Gregory lists the beautiful arrangement of nature, the provi-
dential events of Holy history and the gift of the Holy Scripture. Besides, 
Gregory asserts that God deliberately established, firstly, the human mind as 
the image of God and as an operative tool of approaching divine knowledge, 
403 Transl. J. Barnes, 1993, 53.
404 Transl. J. Barnes, 1993, 53.
405 By way of explanation, the key term used for the method of addition is 
προσθήκη – a word which in late antiquity had a specific grammatical and 
logical connotation. According to the Ars grammatica of the fourth century 
grammarian Dositheus Magister, προσθήκη denotes an additional qualification 
enabling one to distinguish between different meanings of homonyms (AG 25.8). 
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and secondly, a certain order or method in attaining knowledge about him, 
an order that Gregory himself observed in treating his disciples and that he 
expected them and their followers to follow.406 Analogous to this principle of 
the divine paideia, Gregory suggests that a certain order should be observed 
also in theology: 
You see lights breaking upon us, gradually (κατὰ μέρος); and the order of theol-
ogy (τάξιν θεολογίας), which is better for us to keep (ἡμᾶς τηρεῖν ἄμεινον), 
neither proclaiming things too suddenly (ἀθρόως ἐκφαίνοντας), nor yet keep-
ing them hidden to the end (εἰς τέλος κρύπτοντας). For the former course 
would be unscientific (ἄτεχνον), the latter atheistical (ἄθεον); and the former 
would be calculated to startle outsiders, the latter to alienate our own people 
(Or 31.27).
Chapter 2. The essential predication of the divine  
nature in the context of Eunomianism
Introduction
As I have already noted, the issue at stake in the Eunomian doctrine con-
cerned the correct definition of God. In terms of Aristotelian philosophy the 
issue at stake in Eunomius’ teaching is an essential predication of the divine 
substance.407 Eunomius claimed that God the Father is an unbegotten essence, 
while God the Son is a begotten essence.408 Since Eunomius and his master 
Aëtius constructed their theological system by means of syllogistic logic, in 
order to refute them there was no other way but to work through their ar-
guments following their path. Hence essential predication was certainly at 
the top of Gregory’s polemical agenda. Yet he approached the matter more 
thoroughly than a purely polemical logic might demand. 
Aristotle not only provided a logical and grammatical description of es-
sential predication but primarily investigated an ontological aspect of the 
406 In Gregory’s wording: Christ “gradually came to dwell in the disciples, measuring 
Himself out to them according to their capacity to receive Him (τοῖς μαθηταῖς 
κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδημεῖ, τῇ τῶν δεχομένων δυνάμει παραμετρούμενον)” 
(Or 31.26).
407 A basic account of the concept of essential predication is given in Met 1017α7–
30 and APo 83a1–4 and highlights a distinction between what is said about 
the substance in the virtue of itself (sc. κατ αὐτό) and coincidentally (sc. κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός). I personally am inclined to support the interpretation of Sebas-
tian F. Weiner, who pinpoints an ontological strand of the concept of essential 
predication (Weiner, S.F., Aristotle’s Metaphysics V.7 Revisited, in: Apeiron 48/4 
[2015], 407–426).
408 Cf. Eunom., A 8–10.
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concept.409 And quite reasonably so, because essential predication concerns 
a basic epistemological question: how can I know that the propositions that 
I make are true and not false?410 While in the Posterior Analytics 1.22 Ar-
istotle investigated the methodological aspects of essential predication and 
denoted the correlation between predication and demonstration,411 in De 
Anima, he considered the cognitive faculties that enable human beings to 
think and say truly or falsely about subjects.412 All in all, it is accurate to say 
that Aristotle provided a methodological and comprehensive description of 
essential predication. 
I intend to show in this section that Gregory, being far better versed in 
Aristotelian theory than his opponents, took advantage of his deep philo-
sophical knowledge not only to refute the Eunomians but also to build his 
own theological system on a firm epistemological foundation. His polemical 
strategy was simple: he claimed that his opponents used the tool of syllogism 
but did not have a grip on the mechanism which galvanizes this instrument of 
thought. Does this mean that Gregory was genuinely interested in following 
Aristotelian guidelines? I do not see why he necessarily should have been, 
409 Insofar as logic is concerned, Aristotle tells us that “to be” is said in many ways, 
e.g., to be of a certain substance, or a quality, or a relation, et al. categories (Met 
1027b31). From a grammatical perspective, Aristotle distinguished four types 
of correlation between the subject (sc. ὑποκείμενον) and the predicate (i.e. 
what is said of the subject – λεγόμενον) (Cat 1a20–b16). Importantly, in the 
Aristotelian account, the subject and predicate of the predication match reality 
(sc. τὰ ὄντα). With respect to this idea Charles Kahn has argued that in Aristo-
telian propositions the verb “to be” normally denotes the being (sc. existence) 
of the substance and the being of its predicate (cf. Kahn, C.H., Questions and 
Categories. Aristotle’s Doctrine of Categories in the Light of Modern Research, 
in: Hiz, H. [ed.], Questions. Dordrecht 1978, 227–278, [260]). 
410 One of the clearest passages, in which Aristotle approached the question of 
predication from an epistemological perspective is found in the Metaphysics: 
“‘to be’ and ‘is’ signify that a thing is true, and ‘not to be’ that it is not true but 
a falsehood, equally in the case of affirmation and of denial” (Met 1017a31–34; 
transl. L.J. Ackrill, 1989, 276). Unsurprisingly, the epistemological strand of 
essential predication is the subject of intensive scholarly debate (cf. Kahn, C., 
Retrospect on the Verb ‘To Be’ and the Concept of Being, in: Knuuttila, S. / 
Hintikka, J. [eds.], The Logic of Being. Dordrecht, 1986, 1–28).
411 Later in APo 99a20–25 Aristotle makes an important distinction between predi-
cations and definitions (sc. the identity statements). While a predicate asserts 
something of the subject, a definition simply identifies it or as Sarabji puts it, 
“refers to the same thing twice” (cf. Sorabji, R., Myths about Non-Propositional 
Thought, in: Schofield, M. / Nussbaum, M.C. [eds.], Language and Logos. Cam-
bridge 1982, 141).
412 In such a way, Aristotle claims that sense-perception is for the most part true 
and a mistake might come when the intellect goes astray (DA 430a27f.).
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but I think it quite natural that, in order to formulate a strong alternative 
to the Eunomian cause, he worked through the syllogistic arguments of his 
opponents and supplemented his philosophical edifice with the strong points 
of the Peripatetic doctrine.413 
Moreover, since one of the crucial points of Aristotelian philosophy consti-
tuted the study of “being qua being” (i.e. the issue at stake in the Metaphysics 
6.1) and of its different shapes, manifestations and relations, and the most 
explicit and undeniable biblical self-identifier of God was ὁ ὢν – the two 
teachings had a positive chance for a productive dialogue. Besides, Aristotle 
did not simply theorize about being but studied it systematically and with 
a particular focus on the methodology of the scientific inquiry. In a word, 
there are considerable grounds to believe that Aristotelian doctrine might 
have appeared rather beneficial for Gregory regarding the hitherto described 
challenges he faced.
Authoritative Aristotelian methodology could help him to disprove the 
Eunomians not only due to its peculiar persuasiveness and clarity but also 
because by using it he could defeat his rivals with their own weapon and thus 
highlight their lack of syllogistic competence – a popular rhetorical technique. 
Besides, Aristotelian epistemology was commonly recognized as a reliable and 
tolerably independent instrument for both philosophical and scientific inquir-
ies (logic and grammar as instrumental disciplines); therefore a scholar who 
chose to pursue it was not necessary associated with the Peripatetic school. 
Last but not least, the chief position secured for metaphysics in Aristotelian 
philosophy matched the universalistic claims of Christian theology as a sci-
ence of sciences, which were established by Origen and adopted by the Cap-
padocians.414 Regarding these advantages of Aristotelian doctrine, the ample 
textual and semantic parallels between the theological orations and the works 
of the Stagirite, and the abundant examples of syllogistic reasoning applied 
by Gregory, which are observed below, I suggest it reasonable to read the 
theological orations in the light of Aristotelian epistemology. 
In doing so I do not attempt to affiliate definitively Gregory’s teaching to 
the Aristotelian or any other school of philosophy, nor do I entertain the 
possibility of discovering the genuine sources of his thought. This attempt 
is as unachievable as it is unreasonable due to the generally utilitarian ap-
proach taken by Christian authors to the classical heritage and their tendency 
to merge and modify philosophical concepts. The similarities between the 
thoughts of Gregory and Aristotle which I trace in this chapter should not be 
413 Whether Gregory took directly from Aristotle or from some of his commentators 
or later handbooks should be analysed on a case-by-case basis.
414 Cf. Origen is talking about theology as “the science of sciences” in ComJn 
13.303.
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taken as an attempt to argue that Gregory directly borrowed from the Corpus 
Aristotelicum. I cannot say with sufficient accuracy what texts, commentar-
ies, or paraphrases Gregory used in his work but I believe it is possible to 
distinguish the basic methodological, ideological and stylistic components of 
his compositions – and this is what I am going to do. 
1. Aristotelian epistemology and the essential predication theory
1.1 An ontological account of essential predication 
Now going back to the crux of the theological orations, as I have already men-
tioned it was the question about the essence of God. What is God? How to 
define God? Indeed, naturally enough, all theological reasoning should start 
from this inquiry. Yet, this question cannot be answered or even approached 
without first demarcating the epistemological principles of the research. 
The Aristotelian study of the matter suggested a multivocal approach to 
the “what is it” question. Still, a point of departure was straightforwardly 
defined: Aristotle regarded the “what is it” question as an inquiry about 
substance of the thing. In other words, the inquiry about the nature of the 
thing (Met 1051b30–33). 
The “what is it” inquiry equally applies to logic and grammar, where sub-
stance is denoted as the first category and the subject of the proposition.415 
Aristotle affirms that the “what is it” indicates the substance, rather than 
the other categories of being.416 In book Γ of the Metaphysics Aristotle sym-
metrically married the “what” of the thing to its substance (sc. τί ἐστι) or to 
its being (sc. τὸ ὂν) and further argued that it (sc. the substance) should be 
distinguished from the qualities of the thing (sc. τὸ ποιὸν): 
The term ‘being’ (τὸ ὂν) has several senses (λέγεται πολλαχῶς), which we 
have classified in our discussion of the number of senses in which terms are 
used. It denotes first the ‘what is’ of a thing (τί ἐστι), i.e. the individuality (τι); 
415 Cf. a comparable vision of the subject of proposition in Apollonius’ De Con-
structione: “When inquiring [about] the identity (ὕπαρξις) of some subject we 
say ‘Who is moving?’ ‘Who is walking?’ ‘Who is speaking?’… To this we find 
nominal answers, common nouns or proper nouns — and proper nouns also 
convey the generic essence. And since all the attributes or qualities are not made 
clear by the suggested nominal answers (for by itself the word who inquires 
only about the essence (οὐσία), to which quality and quantity apply), the ad-
ditional device was invented of interrogation about these matters, so that when 
we ask about quality we say ποῖος (what sort?), and about quantity πόσος (how 
much?)” (Constr 1.31f.; transl. F.W. Householder, 1981, 29).
416 In Met 1043b32–34 and 1044a2–9, where Aristotle says that substance is one 
and a unit, but not a unit like a number, since, unlike a number it is “a complete 
reality and a definite nature” (cf. Pritzl, 2010, 198).
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and then the quality or quantity (ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν) or any other such category 
(ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων) (Met 1028a12f.). 
At first glance, the way Aristotle treats the “what is it” question might seem 
somewhat tautological.417 Indeed, it is planted in the question “what is it” 
that “it” somehow exists, therefore to say that at least one of the plausible 
answers to the “what is it” (sc. τί ἐστι) inquiry refers to the being of the thing 
(sc. τὸ ὂν) – is a little disappointing. In other words, the answer would be: it 
is something that is, something that has a certain being – period. Tautological 
as it might seem, I take it that for Aristotle, this pause after the identifica-
tion of the substance of the thing with the nature of the thing or the basis 
for unity of the thing’s characteristics made all the meaning.418 And here is 
the reason for this. 
Aristotle was the natural philosopher par excellence, whose main research 
interest was in living organisms that belong to the real world. Thus, Aris-
totle made a categorial distinction between the substance or “being” of the 
thing (i.e. τὸ τί ἐστιν, or τὸ ὂν) and the “being” of its characteristics, for, he 
states, that just as a living organism, however complicated it might be, still 
is one, the substance of this organism must also be one, rather than a cluster 
of characteristics (Met 1040b7). Hence, the substance of the thing is a basis 
for its unity, that is to say, for the unity of the characteristics or qualities of 
the thing. This is how Aristotle himself puts it: 
Now of all these senses which ‘being’ has, the primary sense is clearly the ‘what 
is it,’ (τὸ τί ἐστιν) which denotes the first substance (πρῶτον ὂν) because 
when we describe the quality of a particular thing we say that it is ‘good or 
bad,’ and not ‘five feet high’ or ’man’; but when we describe what it is, we say 
not that it is ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘five feet high,’ but that it is ‘a man’ or ‘a god’ 
(Met 1028a13–15). 
417 Owen has argued that for Aristotle “‘to be’ is always ‘to be something or other’” 
(cf. Owen, G.E.L., Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology, in: Bambrough, R. 
[ed.], New Essays in Plato and Aristotle. London 1965, 69–95, 76). I take this 
statement to denote Aristotle’s vision of discursive thinking. Yet, I believe that 
there could be no doubt that Aristotle recognized the distinction between being 
and being something, and that he saw the latter as the dominion of discursive 
thought while he approached the former as a subject of noetic contact that in 
Pritzl’s definition is “pre-discursive and pre-propositional, is outside of and prior 
to this logical space proper to propositional truth” (cf. Pritzl, 2010, 38).
418 Aristotle even demolished his opponents for loose dialectical reasoning that 
was due to their perfunctory approach to the understanding of being qua being. 
Cf.: “In general our opponents do away with substance and essence, since they 
must say that everything is a coincident and that there is no such thing as being 
essentially man or being essentially animal” (Met 1007a20–b1).
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It becomes clear from this passage that it is in the virtue of the substance that 
the thing can be denoted. In other words, the substance understood as the 
basis for unity of the characteristics of the thing possesses an explanatory 
power which is required in the definition.419 Yet it is not totally clear how to 
denote the nature of a concrete living being. 
To explain this, Aristotle invented an operative mechanism of the correla-
tion between the actuality and potentiality of the thing, which in short may 
be presented in the following way. The identity (sc. the “what is”) and the 
substance (sc. οὐσία) of the thing refer to its actuality (sc. ἐντελέχεια)420 and 
also to its functional or final (the “what for,” or the διὰ τί) cause. A detailed 
account of this intricate interconnection between substance-actuality-cause 
of the thing can be found in De anima, where Aristotle exemplified the soul-
body relationships to illustrate how the soul qua form of a natural body is 
its substance and its actuality:421 
The soul (τὴν ψυχὴν) must, then, be substance (οὐσίαν εἶναι) qua form of a 
natural body (ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ) which has life potentially (δυνάμει 
ζωὴν ἔχοντος), and substance qua form is actuality (ἡ δ’οὐσία ἐντελέχεια) 
(DA 412a19–22). 
That is to say, just as soul is the basis for unity of the bodily characteristics, 
and thereby the source of life of the ὀργανικὸν σώμα (DA 412b1), in a 
similar way the substance per se has actuality or entelechy as its form, or to 
put it differently the substance per se just is the source of life per se, i.e. the 
source of “being”. 
Aristotle explained this matter perhaps a little more clearly in another part 
of De anima, where he applied an eloquent analogy of actual-potential being 
to actual-potential knowledge. In the second book of De anima we read: 
But ‘actuality’ (ἐντελέχεια) is so spoken of in two ways, on the one hand as 
knowledge is (ὡς ἐπιστήμη), and on the other as attaining knowledge (ὡς τὸ 
θεωρεῖν) is” (DA 412a22f.). 
419 In such a way Aristotle identified thinking of a proposition with thinking of a 
unity (DA 430a26–b20). Pondering this Aristotelian statement Pritzl argued that 
“Thinking expands or unfolds the meanings of things in themselves and in their 
interrelations” (cf. Pritzl, 2010, 39).
420 Jonathan Beere has argued that εντελέχεια or ἐνέργεια understood as the ful-
fillment of an ergon can be safely associated with the telos of the thing. In support 
of his argument Beere refers to DA 417a16f., 431a6f., and Phys 201b31–33. (cf. 
Beere, J., Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta. 
Oxford 2009, 204, note 63).
421 Cf.: “Hence the soul is the first actuality (εντελέχεια ἡ πρωτή) of a natural 
body which has life potentially” (DA 412a27f.). 
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So, what Aristotle is saying here is that the process of thinking or of attain-
ing knowledge should be distinguished from knowledge itself, which is the 
goal or the final cause of thinking and eo ipso the substance of the process. 
The one who aims at attaining knowledge obviously has it potentially but 
it is only when he has succeeded in his pursuit that his potential knowledge 
becomes actual, and this actualized knowledge, so to speak, possesses an 
explanatory power to the whole process of knowing.422 Thus, actuality of 
the thing is married to its function, so that practically to identify the thing 
we should know its functional cause which provides an explanation of the 
thing, which is its proper scientific definition. In other words, according to 
Aristotelian epistemology, in order to know the “what is” of the thing the 
scholar has to know the “what for” of the thing, which is the basis for unity 
of the characteristics of the thing and also its actuality: 
For, while unity and being are so spoken of in many ways, that which is most 
properly (ὅλως) so spoken of is actuality (DA 412b8). 
1.2 An epistemological account of essential predication 
It is noteworthy in this passage that Aristotle uses one of the forms of the 
word καθόλου – his terminus technicus for essential predication (cf. APo 
73b26). Additionally, it should be noted here that in Aristotelian physical 
theory (i.e. studies of the natural organisms), the final cause (i.e. “what for?”) 
is closely interwoven with the efficient cause (i.e. “where from?”), forasmuch 
as the form is interwoven with body (cf. Phys 199a20–32). Therefore, when it 
comes to epistemology Aristotelian discourse about these two causes may be 
ambiguous. Namely, although it follows from the set of the hitherto presented 
arguments that knowledge of a thing depends on knowledge of its final (i.e. 
functional) cause, it is also true that simple knowledge of a thing stands on 
the recognition of its efficient cause. 
It was Plato who, in his Meno, affiliated simple knowledge about a thing to 
the recognition of its efficient cause. He professed that “a true belief becomes 
knowledge when secured by reasoning out of the cause” (Meno 97e–98a). 
Aristotle elaborated this principle and made a distinction between simple and 
scientific knowledge. Apropos of simple (or accidental) knowledge Aristotle 
affirmed in the Posterior Analytics that a man knows a thing simply if he 
knows that it exists and also “knows its efficient cause (sc. the cause on which 
the fact depends (τήν τ’ αἰτίαν δι’ ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν)” (APo 71b9–16). 
422 In the words of Kurt Pritzl: “The drive of the intellect, its telos, is the full ar-
ticulation of specific intelligibilities, given to it as unarticulated wholes, in the 
foundational intellectual grasp of things achieved through the reception of form” 
(cf. Pritzl, 2010, 34).
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With regard to scientific knowledge he contends in the Nicomachean Ethics 
that: 
… a man knows a thing scientifically [sic not-accidentally] when he possesses 
a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which 
that conviction rests are known to him with certainty (EN 1139b20f.). 
Here Aristotle talks of the final cause of the thing, which is not always appar-
ent and often needs to be reasoned out by means of scientific demonstration 
(sc. ἀπόδειξις, APo 71b17). 
From this short account of the Aristotelian treatment of the identity ques-
tion it is clear that ontological issues in his system are tightly interwoven 
with logical and grammatical issues (and also physical and anthropological 
issues, which I address later) and that in every case the explanation of this 
complexity can be found in the sphere of epistemology, which in practice 
represents a middle ground between different disciplines. This comprehensive 
and methodological Aristotelian vision of epistemological issues matched the 
horizon of Gregory’s approach to theological knowledge. In the following 
sections I demonstrate how Gregory took advantage of the Aristotelian theory 
of knowledge in his polemics with the Eunomians.
2. Essential predication in Gregory’s system
2.1  Disproving the Eunomians: scientific accuracy in theological 
reasoning 
I have hitherto observed only a few aspects of Aristotelian epistemological 
concepts and I will return to them later on. For now I shall show how the 
described ideas resonated in Gregory’s polemics with the Eunomians (i.e. 
concerning the problem of essential predication) as well as in his independent 
discourse concerning a proper concept of God. 
In the fifth theological oration Gregory applied a genuine Aristotelian 
vocabulary to make an ironic remark pointing at his opponent’s ignorance 
of logical commonplaces (i.e. the concept of essential predication): 
Do you not know that every number indicates the quantity of what is included 
under it (τῆς ποσότητος τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ δηλωτικός423), and not the 
nature of the things (οὐ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων)? (Or 31.18).
What Gregory apparently hints at here is a categorial distinction between 
essential or universal (sc. καθόλου) and accidental predication (sc. καθ’ 
ἕκαστον, κατὰ μέρος), which formed one of the chief conceptions of the 
423 In Aristotle’s lexicon δηλωτικός means “indicative,” cf. Arist. Physiognomica 
808b30 (cf. LSJ).
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Organon (APo 24a17), where Aristotle observed the issue from a logical and 
grammatical viewpoint, and also of the Metaphysics, where he addressed its 
ontological aspects (Met 1003a). 
Now this negative assessment of the Eunomian position logically demands 
an alternative, which Gregory should propose instead of the “incorrect” argu-
ment. To do so he has to ponder a possibility of the substantial predication 
to the divine essence. I believe that working through this issue led Gregory 
to make his crucial move to Aristotelian being-oriented theory. It must have 
been rather convenient for him to proceed with this theory because the only 
explicit biblical self-identification of God is “he who is” (sc. ὁ ὢν) and tak-
ing this identifier as a point of departure Gregory developed his theological 
system. In the Supremum vale (Or 42) he argued against the Eunomian as-
sertion that the unbegotten is an essential predicate to God. Contemplating 
the nature of essential predication he asserted: 
That which is without beginning (ἄναρχον), and is the beginning (ἀρχὴ), and 
is with the beginning (τὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς), is the one God (εἷς Θεός). For the 
nature of that which is without beginning does not consist in being without 
beginning or being unbegotten (οὔτε τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἄναρχον φύσις, ἢ τὸ 
ἀγέννητον), for the nature of anything lies, not in what it is not (οὐδεμία γὰρ 
φύσις ὅ τι μὴ τόδε ἐστὶν) but in what it is (ἀλλ’ ὅ τι τόδε)424 (Or 42.15 = PG 
36, 476.12). 
The context of the passage suggests that Gregory’s idea here not only refers to 
the Aristotelian possession-deprivation concept425, but also to a more funda-
mental inspection of the essence of the substance per se, which is, as we noted 
earlier, its actuality or entelechy understood as the on-going completeness of 
the functional cause (sc. τέλος). 
With respect to the lexically and conceptually flagged Peripatetic back-
ground of the passage, it is clear that neither ἄναρχον (sc. without begin-
ning), nor ἀγέννητον could serve as essential predicate of the divine or, in 
424 In a comparable way Aristotle in the Metaphysics after having demolished his 
opponents for doing away with the substance explicated his position: “For if 
something is essentially man, this will not be being not man or not being man; 
but these are the denials of being man. For there is, as we saw, one thing signi-
fied, and this is the substance of something” (Met 1007a20–b1).
425 Like Basil (cf. AE 1.9) Gregory directly referred to the Aristotelian concept of 
possession in his polemical argument in the third oration: “And again, since 
begotten and unbegotten are contradictories (ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ 
γεννητὸν ἀντίκειται ἀλλήλοις), like possession and deprivation (ὡς ἕξις καὶ 
στέρησις), it would follow that contradictory essences would co-exist (ἀνάγκη 
καὶ οὐσίας εἰσαχθῆναι ἀντικειμένας ἀλλήλαις), which is impossible (ὅπερ 
οὐ δέδοται)” (Or 29.12). 
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fact, of any other nature because owing to their putative nature these terms 
are relative, they have no independent meaning (each of them entails the exist-
ence of its opposite). Besides, they can hardly procure a basis for unity of the 
inherent characteristics, because there would be apparent logical problems to 
think that “without beginning” or “unbegotten” could in any case provide 
a reasonable answer to the “what for” inquiry. I take it that “to be without 
beginning” or “to be unbegotten” can hardly be a τέλος of anything, for what 
should then be the completeness or the actuality of this thing? Apparently, 
there is no applicable, operative or functional implication of these terms. 
Pondering an appropriate predication of the divine nature, Gregory admits 
to the logical basics established in the Prior Analytics (24a16), where Aristotle 
introduces the proposition (sc. πρότασις), i.e. an assertion where one thing 
(sc. predicate) is said of another (sc. subject) in a form of either affirmation 
or negation.426 He asserts that:
Just as predicating ‘is body’ or ‘is begotten’ of something … is not enough to set 
out and to describe the thing (οὐκ ἀρκεῖ ‘τὸ σῶμα’ εἰπεῖν, ἢ ‘τὸ γεγεννῆσθαι’) 
but you must also, and if you wish to display a thing signified (τὸ νοούμενον) 
with adequate clarity, give the predicates their subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον τούτοις 
εἰπεῖν) (Or 28.9).
Moreover, taking advantage of the Aristotelian distinction between the kinds 
of definitions, Gregory goes on to say that:
… an inquirer into the nature of a real being (ὁ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος πολυπραγμονῶν 
φύσιν) cannot stop short at saying what it is not but must add to his denials a 
positive affirmation (πρὸς τῷ εἰπεῖν ἃ μή ἐστι καὶ ὅ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν) (Or 28.9).
This statement of Gregory satisfies the Aristotelian vision of the definition 
(ὁρισμὸς) of an immediate item, which “is an indemonstrable account of 
what something is (λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος)427” (APo 94a1–15). 
Aristotle stipulates an indemonstrable account because, as he specifies in the 
seventh chapter of the book β of the Posterior Analytics, “everything which 
a thing is must be proved through a demonstration – except its essence”428 
(APo 92b13f.). 
Subsequently, by way of explanation Aristotle verified that there are three 
types of definitions, where the first one constitutes “an account of what the 
name means (λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα)429” (APo 93b30). From the 
426 In the Posterior Analytics (72a5f.) he supplements this notion by stating that 
immediate propositions constitute a principle of demonstration (ἀρχὴ δ ἐστὶν 
ἀποδείξεως πρότασις ἄμεσος).
427 Transl. J. Barnes, 1993, 59.
428 Transl. J. Barnes, 1993, 56.
429 Ibid.
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following explanation it is clear that the name signifies the existence of the 
thing, which is not identical with the essence of the thing. It is in the power 
of the second type of definition to denote the essence of the thing because it 
“shows why something exists (διὰ τί ἔστιν)”, and thus represents “a quasi-
demonstration of what something is (οἷον ἀπόδειξις τοῦ τί ἐστι)”. As for 
the third type of definition he describes it as “a conclusion of the demonstra-
tion of what something is (τῆς τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀποδείξεως συμπέρασμα)430” 
(APo 94a1–15). 
Thus, from the viewpoint of Aristotelian logic it is totally legitimate to 
deliberate on the definition of God taking as a point of departure the biblical 
name of God.431 As follows from the Aristotelian account of the definitions, 
the result of this deliberation does not go further than denoting the existence 
of God; it does not aim at grasping the divine essence. To get a grip on the 
essence of the divinity it would be necessary to perceive the τέλος of God, 
but this task is nonsensical because God is self-sufficient, a complete perfec-
tion (sc. τελειότης or τελείωσις) in itself.432 Yet, it is possible to talk about 
the functional goal of divine activity for the sake of his creation because it 
is conspicuous and available in human experience. Naturally, pursuing this 
approach, the focus of the theological discussion dwells on the activity of 
Christ. This is why Gregory asserts in the fourth theological oration that 
Christ “relates to God the Father (ἔχει πρὸς τὸν πατέρα) as word (λόγος) 
to mind (πρὸς νοῦν) or as definition (ὅρος) to the thing defined (πρὸς τὸ 
ὁριζόμενον)” (Or 30.20).
2.2 “Being” as a predicate of the divine nature
An alternative which Gregory suggests to the Eunomian predicates is “be-
ing” (sc. τὸ εἶναι) as an essential predicate to the divine nature. Although the 
identification of the divine nature which results from this predication might 
seem somewhat tautological, Gregory makes a rich set of inferences from 
430 Transl. J. Barnes, 1993, 59.
431 Jonathan Barnes contended that though definition and demonstration come very 
close to each other, Aristotle insisted on their distinction (cf. Barnes, 1993, 225). 
It follows from this that denoted as quasi-demonstration definition is based on 
analysis of the name of the thing and this is precisely what Gregory tried to do. 
432 Cf. Gregory’s speculation on the name of the Holy Spirit in the fifth theologi-
cal oration, where he identified the terms ἡ ἁγιότης and ἡ τελείωσις: “And 
how can that be perfect (τελεία δὲ πῶς) which lacks something of perfection 
(ᾗ λείπει τι πρὸς τελείωσιν)? And surely there is something lacking if it has 
not the Holy (μὴ ἐχούσῃ τὸ ἅγιον), and how would it have this if it were with-
out the Spirit?” (Or 31.4). In the Oration 41 (In pentecosten, PG 36, 433.40) 
Gregory calls Christ a pure perfection (ἡ καθαρὰ τελειότης).
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this tautology. Having denoted the divine nature by one of the cognates of 
“being,” Gregory, in one shot, satisfied the requirements of simplicity, self-
identity and independence of the divine nature, and at the same time planted 
the concept of god as a creator (and a maintainer) of the universe in the 
biblical identifier of God. Apropos of simplicity Gregory, in the above-cited 
passage of the Supremum vale, makes an important assertion:433 
… those whose simple substance (ἁπλῆ φύσις) is identical with their being (τὸ 
εἶναι ταυτὸν) essentially (κύριον) are the one (τὸ ἓν)434 (Or 42.15 = PG 36, 
476.12).
It is important to note here that habitually essential predication in the text 
in Gregory’s discourse is marked by the cognates and synonyms of the Aris-
totelian terminus technicus κυρίως, i.e. in the proper sense (EN 1157a31), 
which flags the substance of the thing, i.e. the basis of its unity, its actuality:
It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not neces-
sary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the 
matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. For even if one 
and being are spoken of in several ways (πλεοναχῶς λέγεται), what is properly 
(κυρίως) so spoken of is the actuality (DA 412b6–9).
This Aristotelian linkage between the substance of the thing and the actual-
ity of the thing understood as the basis for unity of the thing’s compounds 
is discernable in the background of Gregory’s contemplation on the famous 
biblical identifier of God preserved in the fourth theological oration. Gregory 
contends there:
‘He Who Is’ (ὁ μὲν ὤν), and ‘God’ (καὶ ὁ θεός), are the special names of his 
substance (μᾶλλόν πως τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματα); and of these especially ‘He Who 
Is’ (καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁ ὤν) (Or 30.18).
In what follows he supported this assertion with a typical Aristotelian ar-
gument, i.e. saying that “being (τὸ ὂν) in a proper sense denotes God” 
(ὅλον ὄντως θεοῦ, cf. Aristotelian terminus technicus καθόλου for essen-
tial predication), because being, like God, is in all senses identical to itself: 
ontologically – as the self-identical substance, logically – as a primary sub-
stance, which “has nothing before or after it” (μήτε τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, μήτε τῷ 
μετ’ αὐτόν), and grammatically – as an everlasting “is” (participium presentis 
activi), “without any ‘was’ or ‘will be’” (οὐ ἦν, ἢ ἔσται) (Or 30.18). 
433 Cf. an Aristotelian contemplation on the essential predicate of the substance 
from the book Γ of the Metaphysics: “…things whose substance is one have also 
one essence and are themselves one” (Met 1038b).
434 Translation mine.
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I take the last statement of this rich assertion, namely that God is an ev-
erlasting “is”, to be a marker of a rather powerful idea, which surfaced in 
the Aristotelian philosophical project and also significantly shaped Gregory’s 
theology. Namely, although “He who Is” says nothing about the divine es-
sence, it still constitutes a significant epistemological notion, and by virtue 
of epistemology it also penetrates the domains of logic, linguistics, ontology, 
metaphysics, anthropology and natural sciences. Although the interdepend-
ence of the different scientific and philosophical disciplines was in different 
ways deliberated by different philosophical schools, yet the noteworthy fea-
ture of the Peripatetic school consisted in a particular focus on the studies 
of natural data.435 As I have noted, Aristotelian thought in general revolved 
around the studies of different aspects of the life of living beings, and this is 
why, on the one hand, his philosophy is in a certain sense a scientific philoso-
phy yet, on the other hand, many of his concepts are ambiguous and relative 
(for this is an inevitable consequence of dealing with empirical data). When 
Gregory said that God is an everlasting “is,” he simultaneously linked his 
theology, on the one hand, to the incomprehensible sphere of eternity (for 
nothing everlasting is known in the universe436), and, at the same time, to hu-
man philosophy, which is identical, in the Aristotelian system, with a broadly 
understood natural philosophy, – because after all it is all about how living 
embodied human beings think about this or that matter.437 In the subsequent 
sections I show that this particular approach to philosophical and theological 
theorizing, as an instance of broadly understood studies of being, resonated in 
Gregory’s thought. Whether Gregory adopted this research approach directly 
from Peripatetic teaching, or whether it took a somewhat peculiar path before 
appearing in Gregory’s thought, remains to be seen.
435 Thus, for instance, Alexander of Aphrodisias in his treatise On the Soul firstly 
expounded the distinction between matter and form and then surveyed nature 
in general, starting with the four elements and rising through inanimate sub-
stances, plants, animals, and finally humans (DA 8.17–11.13; cf. Caston, V. 
[transl. introd., com.], Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the Soul: Part I. London 
2012, 3f.).
436 Cf.: “…we cannot set forth that which is above time, if we avoid as we desire 
any expression which conveys the idea of time. For such expressions as when 
and before and after and from the beginning are not timeless, however much 
we may force them” (Or 29.3).
437 In such a way Aristotle claims in Met 1037a14 that the investigation of sensible 
substances belongs to physics or secondary philosophy. Yet, he contends that 
the physicist must know not only about the matter, but also about the substance 
according to the formula. Therefore, the subject of first philosophy is equally 
important for the physicist and hence physics may be seen as an extension of 
the Metaphysics rather than a more limited discipline.
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Whether inspired by Aristotelian thought or not, Gregory did develop the 
logical implications contained in his using a cognate of “being” as predicate 
of the divine nature. Namely, he was committed to supporting natural theol-
ogy and tended to analyse his systematic and biblical theological reasoning 
with respect to the psychological conditions of the cognitive process. I will 
elaborate on these matters later. For now, having bridged the homonymous 
Aristotelian conception of substance with Gregory’s thought on the essential 
predicate to the divine nature, the following should be clarified.
2.3  The efficient and final causes and the hypostatic relationships
Is the Aristotelian vision of the actuality-potentiality mechanism, which as 
we have observed is one of the key-principles of Peripatetic epistemology, 
reflected in Gregory’s theory? Aristotle stated that, although universally ac-
tuality is prior to potentiality, apropos of a particular living being actuality 
functions as its τέλος,438 i.e. final cause, which contains an explanation of 
this living being (i.e. as the efficient and final cause of the living being).439 
Then, how (if at all) is this supposed to work with respect to Gregory’s quasi 
definition440 of divine nature? The answer to this question is ambiguous. From 
one angle, that is, talking of divine nature in a proper sense, the answer is 
obviously that it does not. There can be no place for potentiality and final 
cause because, as Gregory repeatedly affirms, God himself is a full perfection, 
source and τέλος of his own being (Or 31.23). 
Yet, in another sense, i.e. when it comes to the internal relationships be-
tween the three hypostases of the Holy Trinity, Gregory says (Or 29.3) that 
although the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit “are coeternal,” the Son 
and the Holy Spirit “are from the Father, though not after Him”; there-
fore, he continues, “in respect of a cause (τὸ ἀίδιον δέ) they [sc. the two 
hypostases] are not altogether unoriginated (οὐ πάντως ἄναρχον) as long as 
it may be referred to the Father as a cause (ἕως ἂν εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀναφέρηται 
τὸν πατέρα)”. In the fifth theological oration Gregory summarized the 
438 Gregory applied this idea in his polemical argument stating as a matter of course 
that “cause (τὸ αἴτιον) is not always prior to its effects (πρεσβύτερον τῶν ὧν 
ἐστιν αἴτιον)” (Or 29.3).
439 In De anima Aristotle explained how is it possible to think of the soul as the 
cause and source of the living body. He said that cause and source are meant 
in many ways [or are homonymous]. Similarly, the soul is a cause because it is 
the source of motion [=the efficient cause], that for the sake of which [=the final 
cause], and the substance of ensouled bodies (DA 415b8–14).
440 This is to say that it is intolerable to see in Gregory’s assertion concerning divine 
nature a fully-fledged definition because it does not designate the cause of God, 
nor is it deduced from the first principles.
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Trinitarian concept by rephrasing Apostle Paul’s slogan from the Epistle to 
Romans 11:36: “For of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things 
(ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα)”. Gregory also uses three 
prepositions used with the same pronoun, yet unlike Paul who speaks of the 
whole creation, Gregory applies this phrase to the inter-hypostatic relation-
ship: “of whom (ἐξ οὗ), and by whom (διʹ οὗ), and in whom (ἐν ᾧ)”, where 
the causal relations of the Father and the Son resonate in the causalis function 
of ἐξ and διά (Or 31.20). 
2.3.1 The causal relationships of the divine hypostases
This causal relationship of the hypostases obviously calls for justification. 
Although it seems prima facie that the causal relationship of the hypostases 
provides some kind of causal explanation of the Trinitarian concept, it is 
important to qualify this explanation. Does this knowledge about the causal 
interrelation between the divine hypostases truly reveal something about the 
genuine essence of God, and if so, what does it reveal? Should it be taken as 
relative knowledge, i.e. one which reveals not how things are in themselves 
but how they are in relation to some other things, in our case, in relation to 
cognizing subjects, i.e. to human beings? Besides, it might be also supposed 
that this causal interrelationship between hypostases should be interpreted 
metaphorically. 
Now, as I expect the reader has rightly imagined, Gregory argues for the 
relative interpretation of the Trinitarian concept and before I show how he 
argued for this choice let me describe how he dismissed two the other op-
tions. The first one is easy. Gregory repeatedly claims that divine essence is 
incomprehensible and unspeakable.441 Paraphrasing Plato’s statement442 he 
contends that “whereas it is difficult to conceive of God (θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν 
χαλεπόν), yet to verbalize him is impossible (φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον)…” (Or 
28.4). Moreover, Gregory asserts that even metaphorical descriptions can 
441 Cf.: “The weakness of the argument (τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ λόγου) makes the mystery 
look weak, and thus eloquence empties (τὸ τοῦ λόγου κομψὸν) the cross of 
its power, as Paul thought. For faith is what completes our argument (πίστις 
τοῦ καθ ἡμᾶς λόγου πλήρωσις)” (Or 29.21). Cf.: “The divine nature cannot 
be expressed by any name (τὸ θεῖον ἀκατονόμαστον). And this is proved not 
only by argument (οἱ λογισμοὶ), but also by the wisest and most ancient of the 
Hebrews, so far as they have given us reason for conjecture (sc. Tetragramma-
ton)” (Or 30.17). 
442 Gregory explicitly refers to a passage from Plato’s Timaeus: “…as one of the 
Greek theologians taught – not unskilfully, it seems to me…” (Or 28.4), Cf.: 
“Now to discover (εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον) the Maker and Father of this Universe were 
a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were a 
thing impossible (ἀδύνατον λέγειν)” (Tim 28c).
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never express the divine nature for they only allude to different nuances of 
the divine being. At the end of the fourth theological oration (Or 30.31–33) 
he lists different symbols which in one way or another touch upon certain 
characteristics of divinity but he concludes his survey by proving this way of 
thinking unreliable.443 
Thus, we are left with the last option, which suggests treating the causal 
relationships of the divine hypostases as relative knowledge, whose domain 
is the relative and not the absolute truth. In other words, relative knowledge 
reveals some partial truth about subject, and the cognizing object by getting 
a grip on the mechanism of cognition. Or to put it differently, it is by vir-
tue of the participation of the cognizing subject and cognizing object in the 
process of cognition that relative knowledge is possible about those parts of 
their nature which are practically interacting in the process. Hence, accord-
ing to this concept, there could be no overestimation of the epistemological 
and methodological issues, because as far as the logic of this argument goes, 
method is what it is all about. This is how Gregory puts this thought in the 
third theological oration, where he ponders the true (i.e. in a sense of the 
absolute truth) meaning of the hypostatic names and their correlations: 
These names [sic of God] do not belong to us in the absolute sense (τὰ γὰρ 
ἡμέτερα οὐ κυρίως), because we are both (ἄμφω), and not one more than the 
other; and we are of both (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἡμεῖς), and not of one only; and so we 
are divided, and by degrees become men (κατ’ ὀλίγον ἄνθρωποι), and perhaps 
not even men (ἴσως οὐδὲ ἄνθρωποι), and such as we did not desire (οἷοι μὴ 
τεθελήμεθα), leaving and being left (ἀφιέντες καὶ ἀφιέμενοι), so that only the 
relations remain, without the underlying facts (μόνας τὰς σχέσεις λείπεσθαι 
ὀρφανὰς τῶν πραγμάτων) (Or 29.5).
This passage, rich and enigmatic as it is, tells us many important things, there-
fore I will refer to it several times in the following text. For now a couple of 
things should be noted for the sake of the present argument. 
First, the passage clearly argues for the relativity of the hypostatic names 
and hence of all theological conceptions built on them. Second, it affiliates 
this relativity to the cognizing subject, i.e. to the human being. It is because 
of the mental and physical conditions which every human being has, that 
full comprehension of whatever a particular object is impossible,444 yet the 
443 Cf.: “Finally, it seems best to me to let the images and the shadows go, as being 
deceitful and falling very far short of the truth, and to attach myself to the more 
reverent conception (τῆς εὐσεβεστέρας ἐννοίας), relying on few words, using 
the guidance of the Holy Ghost…” (Or 31.33).
444 Several times throughout the theological circle Gregory goes through a set of 
anthropological questions about how the process of cognition works, and how 
it is possible to understand the things in the world. Although he suggests certain 
163
human ability to interact with external objects and thereby experience how 
they function, i.e. how they manifest themselves in life, – this ability allows 
a human being to know how things are not with themselves but with human 
beings, i.e. in relation to, or in interaction with human beings. It follows from 
this idea that relative knowledge shows not only, so to speak, the functional 
side of things but also a certain side of human beings, namely, the side re-
sponsible for cognition. And this is why Gregory, it seems, unexpectedly and 
abruptly shifts his focus from the divine hypostases to the nature of human 
beings. Therefore we too have to bring anthropological and cognitive matters 
into our discourse, but before we do this, let us finalize the main line of the 
present argument. 
The passage suggests that we should understand the hypostatic names of 
God and hence the interconnections they bring as bearing knowledge not 
about God himself but about his relation to his creation, and specifically, 
to human beings. Consequently, the object of theological studies is strictly 
speaking not the nature of God or any of his qualities (whether anything 
predicated of him may or may not exist in a proper sense), that has to do 
with God in the proper sense, but rather the interrelation between God and 
human beings, the divine activity apropos of the universe, the manifestations 
of divine nature in the life of the created cosmos. The result of theological 
studies focused in this way is relative knowledge about the relations between 
God and men, which are possible by virtue of certain characteristics peculiar 
to God and men. 
Having deduced from Gregory’s statement this understanding of the hypo-
static interrelationships, we are now in a position to inquire how to address 
the concept of the Trinity itself. One thing that Gregory says categorically 
and explicitly about the Trinitarian concept is that it is a paradox, which I 
am inclined to take as a meaningful statement and not as an implicit hint as 
to the incomprehensibility of the divine essence. This is how Gregory puts 
this thought: 
… one illumination may come upon us from the One God (μᾶλλον δὲ μίαν 
ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος γενέσθαι τὴν ἔλλαμψιν), One in diversity (ἑνικῶς 
διαιρουμένην), diverse in Unity (καὶ συναπτομένην διαιρέτως), wherein is 
a paradox (ὃ καὶ παράδοξον) (Or 28.15) 
answers, he nevertheless emphasizes that this is but a partial and relative knowl-
edge. In such a way, Gregory regards epistemological issues from an anthro-
pological and cognitive perspective and asserts that complete understanding 
of the phenomena cannot be achieved as long as there is a lack of knowledge 
about the human being and human mind (for the details on this issue cf. later, 
chapter 3, section 2). 
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But does this assertion represent a taboo against thinking about God; does 
incomprehensible also mean unthinkable? With respect to this question Greg-
ory was perfectly explicit and stated that thinking about God is certainly 
necessary for the purification, perfection and salvation of the human being. 
Moreover, it is due to divine design that a human being should seek salvation 
by means of his intellect. In the second oration he claims that:
Reason that proceeds from God (ὁ ἐκ θεοῦ λόγος), that is implanted in all 
from the beginning (πᾶσι σύμφυτος) and is the first law in us (πρῶτος ἐν ἡμῖν 
νόμος), and is bound up in all, leads us up to God (ἐπὶ θεὸν ἡμᾶς ἀνήγαγεν) 
through visible things (Or 28.15).
Ergo, it is pretty obvious that for Gregory God is thinkable. He even claims 
that “we ought to think of God even more often than we draw our breath; 
and if the expression is permissible, we ought to do nothing else” (Or 27.5). 
Then we may reasonably inquire, what is the secret meaning of this “thinking 
a paradox” business? Since Gregory never directly addresses this question, I 
venture to suggest the following interpretation of this matter. I take paradox 
to be a symbol of a never attainable an intellectual pursuit towards a never 
attainable goal and therefore never ceases to engage someone into action 
which, far from being a total waste of time, is a useful mental exercise whose 
purpose is to refine and to perfect one’s cognizing. Therefore, it is accurate to 
regard thinking as a teleological process, whose τέλος is not the knowledge 
itself but thinking the knowledge.
This idea radiates throughout the whole body of the theological orations 
and more clearly and decisively in the following passages. At the end of the 
fourth oration, after a long set of exegetical observations concerning the 
biblical names of Christ, which Gregory makes using grammatical, logical 
and philological (sc. the cross-references and parallels in the scriptural texts) 
arguments, he concludes that: 
We sketch him by his attributes (ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν σκιαγραφοῦντες 
τὰ κατ’ αὐτὸν), and so deduce a certain faint and feeble and partial idea con-
cerning him (ἀμυδράν τινα καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἄλλην ἀπ’ ἄλλου φαντασίαν 
συλλέγομεν), and our best theologian is he who has (καὶ οὗτος ἄριστος ἡμῖν 
θεολόγος), not indeed discovered the whole (οὐχ ὃς εὗρε τὸ πᾶν), for our 
present chain does not allow of our seeing the whole (οὐδὲ γὰρ δέχεται τὸ 
πᾶν ὁ δεσμός), but conceived of him to a greater extent than another (ἀλλ’ ὃς 
ἂν ἄλλου φαντασθῇ πλέον), and gathered in himself more of the likeness or 
adumbration of the truth (καὶ πλεῖον ἐν ἑαυτῷ συναγάγῃ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἴνδαλμα, ἢ ἀποσκίασμα)445 (Or 30.17).
445 This is then the highest stage of advancing in theological knowledge, which, 
however, should not be conceived as final in the chronological and doctrinal 
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The clear emphasis on the personal progress of a theologian which is dis-
cernable in this passage may, naturally enough, call into question the whole 
enterprise of theological practice and threatens to drown it in relative un-
certainty. If theology fully depends on the individual achievements of the 
practitioners of the discipline then, it seems, no room is left for valid concepts 
or any epistemological theorizing. In fact, Gregory does explicitly say that 
theological knowledge should not be understood as an absolute truth but as 
a relative superiority.446 
Given that Gregory himself admitted to a relativism of theological knowl-
edge, one may ask why did he then bother about the heretics? Where is the 
basis for unity in such a system? Or maybe it is not a system at all but a 
multitude of unverified religious axioms, and all the quasi logical arguments 
that we have observed hitherto are just rhetorical camouflage of the faith that 
never wanted a reasonable justification? I do not think so, and the reason why 
we are again faced with the similar puzzle we started with is that, in Gregory’s 
thought, God really is, in an ordinary way, incomprehensible (that is to say, 
he cannot be understood in a way in which natural phenomena or abstract 
objects can be understood). This is why none of the logical or philosophical 
axioms or rules (like actuality-potentiality mechanism, or logical causality) 
can be expected to facilitate thinking about his unthinkable essence. But 
once the fact is accepted, once all necessary precautions are taken and the 
indispensable limits imposed by human nature (i.e. the cognitive limits) are 
clearly recognized, then, I suggest, a scholar might discover that it is his hu-
man nature that contains the solution to the greater part of these puzzles. 
What is more, once recognized, cognitive limits will no longer preclude us 
from using philosophical and scientific concepts and theories. On the con-
trary, according to this logic, the more verified and methodologically tested 
concepts are mostly welcome to enrich Christian theological discourse. This 
is why Gregory saw no harm in explaining the Trinitarian internal relations 
in the terms of logical causality and447 by means of the grammatical causalis. 
He plainly verbalized his principle of theological argumentation in the fol-
lowing statement:
sense but rather in a sequential sense, meaning that normally this stage cannot 
be achieved without implementing the previous two. 
446 Cf.: “the relative superiority (τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τέλειον) is spoken of as if it 
were absolute knowledge (οὐ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ), not because it is really such, but 
by comparison with the power of that other (τῇ δὲ τοῦ πλησίον δυνάμει 
παραμετρούμενον)” (Or 28.17).
447 He even emphasized his purely instrumental approach to the matter by allowing 
himself to “play a little upon this word Father (προσπαίξω καὶ τὸν πατέρα)” 
(Or 29.7). 
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Therefore let us confine ourselves within our limits (διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἡμετέρων ὅρων ἱστάμενοι), and speak of the unbegotten and the begotten 
and that which proceeds from the Father (τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰσάγομεν, καὶ τὸ 
γεννητόν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον) (Or 29.2). 
This statement prompts one to inquire about the limits of employment of 
philosophical concepts for theological reasoning. As follows from Nazianzen’s 
hitherto described reasoning, none of the philosophical concepts can be used 
for theorizing about the divine essence. However, all tested philosophical and 
scientific concepts are applicable to the investigation of those issues which 
belong to the domain of theologia naturalis, which in Gregory’s view denotes 
a broadly understood Christian philosophy with its various apologetic, po-
lemic, ethical and other fields: 
Attack the silence of Pythagoras, and the Orphic beans… the ideas of Plato… 
the atheism of Epicurus … or Aristotle’s petty providence… the supercilious-
ness of the Stoa, or the greed and vulgarity of the Cynic … Philosophize about 
the world or worlds; about matter; about soul; about natures endowed with 
reason, good or bad; about resurrection, about judgment, about reward, or the 
Sufferings of Christ (Or 27.9).
Norris takes this passage to be a call Gregory makes to his antagonists “to 
turn their immature dialectical skills against” the pagan philosophers.448 I 
do not think this is a key message in this passage. The Christian philosophi-
cal doctrine, though quite immature at that time, was clearly on its way to 
philosophical recognition.449 Therefore, it would seem to be logically con-
tradictory to suppose that Gregory, first, was interested in dethroning Hel-
lenic philosophy (whose doctrines he so often applied in his discourse), and, 
second, delegated such a task to his opponents, whom he indeed regarded 
as unskillful and insufficiently qualified philosophers. Rather, I am inclined 
to regard his antagonistic pose as a normal and typical sign of a perfectly 
educated intellectual, who knows his professional field well enough to reason-
ably choose what suits his goals. In addition I do not believe that Gregory 
could surrender philosophizing about theological matters to those whom he 
considered unskillful philosophers. The very topics he listed (resurrection, 
448 Cf. Norris, 1991, 99.
449 At least, it was an explicit pursuit of many Christian intellectuals at that time, as 
I have shown earlier (cf. part one, chapter 1, section 2). As for Gregory, in this 
passage he, as a matter of course, showed his familiarity with the philosophical 
theories and the peculiar philosophical discussion between different schools 
apropos of these theories. Thus, I take it to be a sign of his intention to converse 
with his philosophical colleagues rather than to withdraw under a pretext of his 
beliefs, or to hand over this task to those whom he considered heretics (unless 
they choose to follow his methodological recommendations).
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judgment, reward, and the sufferings of Christ) could hardly be regarded as 
minute issues for a “light” theological discourse. Besides, he did not suggest 
any alternative, i.e. any appropriate list of topics for “hard-core” theological 
reasoning. What he says at the end of the passage (and it is the end of the 
whole speech) is: 
with God we shall have converse, in this life only a little (νῦν μὲν ὀλίγα); while a 
bit later (μικρὸν δὲ ὕστερον), maybe more perfectly (ἴσως τελεώτερον) (Or 27.9). 
It is apparent from this statement that there is not going to be any new list 
of exquisite topics for better skilled theologians, it is only the degree of com-
prehension of the same matters that Gregory expects to be refined, i.e. it is all 
in all about the cognizing subject and not about an object of cognition. The 
object of cognition is altogether the same for Christians, heretics and pagan 
philosophers, therefore there is no need to feed animosity between thinkers, 
when there is agreement about the concepts.450 
If we accept my interpretation of this final passage of the first theologi-
cal speech, we can easily detect the relevance of the sequence of arguments 
in the following four orations. That is, Gregory puts together the typical 
philosophical and theological puzzles, observing a proper sequence that is 
philosophia – in prolegomena, theologia – a headmistress of the studies. 
Yet this sequence should not be understood as an alienating divide because 
one of the tasks of philosophy is to suggest epistemological principles and 
instruments for studies, therefore the relationships between the two disci-
plines are, figuratively speaking, not like that of colleagues but rather that 
of twin-sisters. This idea about a close interconnection and collaboration 
between philosophy (including natural philosophy) and theology maybe 
even more sharply surfaces in Gregory’s vision of natural theology, where 
a background assumption is that God is the efficient and maintaining cause 
of the universe.
450 In many cases Gregory attested an agreement even about some crucial mat-
ters. For instance, Gregory expressed his approval of the concept of external or 
separable mind, which is a characteristic Aristotelian notion (cf.: “Χωριστὸς δὲ 
λέγεται ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς,” Aristocles, Fragm., fr. 4.138). He asserted that some 
“most theological men amongst Hellenes (Ἑλλήνων δὲ οἱ θεολογικώτεροι)” 
have rightly denoted the name of God when they called him “the external mind 
(τὸν θύραθεν νοῦν)” (Or 31.5). Alexander of Aphrodisias explicated the con-
cept of the external mind by saying that the immortal intellect only comes to 
be in humans from outside and that it is not itself a part or disposition of the 
human soul (DA 90.23–91.4; cf. Caston, 2012, 108). 
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3. God as a primary nature and a cause of the universe
3.1 The Peripatetic definition of primary nature
Now I would like to observe how the Aristotelian concept of the actuality-
potentiality mechanism echoed in Gregory’s theologia naturalis. To dem-
onstrate this connection I firstly present the Peripatetic vision of primary 
nature, – one of the key-terms of the Physics and Metaphysics, and one which 
Gregory employs in his discourse. Gregory’s contemplation of primary nature 
demonstrates his familiarity with the Aristotelian concept and exemplifies 
how he makes use of the actuality-potentiality mechanism, and of efficient 
and final causes, for the sake of his argument. An apt explication of primary 
nature is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the book Δ of 
the Metaphysics. Alexander starts by citing the definition of primary nature 
from the Metaphysics, where Aristotle contends:
… the nature that is primary and that is said to be such in the proper sense is 
the substance of those things that have a beginning of movement in themselves 
qua themselves (Arist., Met 1015a13 in Alex., ComMet 360.1–5). 
Then Alexander also adds a relevant passage from the Physics saying that:
… nature in the proper sense is the enmattered (enulos) form, from which the 
composite has the beginning of its movement … and nature in this sense is the 
beginning of the movement of natural things, being present in them in some 
way … either potentially or actually – potentially, as the soul is in the ejected 
semen; actually when there is finally a living thing. (Arist., Phys 193b3–8, in 
Alex., ComMet 360.5–10)
Alexander’s reading of the passages goes as follows:
… the beginning of movement for all natural things is the enmattered form; 
this later, then, is rightly (called) nature in the primary sense, for nature was 
the beginning of movement.451 
From this rich set of observations452 we may assume that primary nature in 
the proper sense is to be understood as the enmattered form and the beginning 
of movement of all natural things, which is present in them either potentially 
451 Cf. Dooley, W.E., Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5. Ithaca / 
New York 1994, 30f.
452 A meticulous scholar of Aristotle, Alexander also made an important remark: “It 
should be noted, however, that when Aristotle distinguishes each of the things 
that is expressed in various ways, he treats it not as equivocal, but as derived 
from one thing and related to one thing” (ComMet 360.12–15, transl. W.E. 
Dooley, 1994, 31). 
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or actually.453 I suggest that this conception is at the background of Gregory’s 
reflection about God as a cause of the universe. 
3.2 Gregory’s understanding of primary nature
In the second theological oration Gregory, after pondering the faculty of im-
agination, which bestows natural limitations on the cognitive process, sets up 
a series of examples. He lists the famous biblical symbols454, which were often 
used as the names of God (i.e. spirit, fire, light, love, wisdom, righteousness, 
mind and reason), and perhaps a little unexpectedly inquires whether these 
are “the names of the first nature (αἱ προσηγορίαι τῆς πρώτης φύσεως)?” 
The text which follows, initially, drifts further away from biblical vocabulary 
towards the scientific and philosophical lexicon and at this point, the linkage 
between the biblical names and the Aristotelian concept of primary nature 
becomes clearer. Gregory associates the primary nature with the primary 
cause of the universe, i.e. with the Creator, whom he in an earlier passage 
explicitly addressed as “God, the efficient and maintaining cause of the uni-
verse” (“θεόν, καὶ τὴν πάντων ποιητικήν τε καὶ συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν,”455 
Or 28.6). 
This is how Gregory performs his sophisticated play on the Hellenic and 
biblical allusions. He explains biblical symbols in the terms of Hellenic phi-
losophy456 and thus shows that for human reason, which is framed by its own 
natural processual conditions, there is no way but to arrive at certain defini-
tions of natural facts457, which should not in the proper sense be predicated 
453 William Dooley has noted Alexander’s interpretation of substance as the form 
of natural things, so that he thus understood form as the intrinsic principle of 
movement, the fundamental sense of nature (cf. Dooley 1994, 137).
454 The relevant references to the biblical passages where these names are mentioned 
have been detected by the SC editors. E.g.: “Spirit” (John 4:24), “light” (1 John 
1:5), “love” (1 John 4:16), “wisdom” (Job 12:13), “righteousness” (John 17:25), 
“mind” (Isa 40:13), “reason” (John 1:1).
455 Of note is that both terms in use here (i.e. ποιητική et συνεκτικὴ αἰτία) belong 
to the Peripatetic lexicon; ἡ τῶν ὅλων σ. αἰτία is mentioned in De Mundo 
397b9, which according to Norris, Gregory probably attributed to Aristotle (cf. 
Norris, 1991, 118).
456 Wyss and Moreschini mentioned an apparent allusion to the Stoic concept of 
the inner discourse (cf. Wyss, B., Gregor II [Gregor von Nazianz], in: RAC 12 
[1988], 831. Moreschini, 2004, 72, n. 76). I suggest that the descriptions of the 
πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ καὶ φῶς allude to Aristotelian theories of natural motion and 
natural place (sc. air is characterized by motion and diffusion, fire – by upward 
motion, light – by its blending with light). 
457 Cf.: “… for usage (τὸ ἔθος) when confirmed by time (χρόνῳ βεβαιωθὲν) was 
held to be law (νόμος)” (Or 28.14).
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of the divine nature because the divine nature is principally different from 
the created nature. As is evident from the following text Gregory denotes the 
divine nature as primary nature in the sense of the cause of the universe:458 
…rational nature (λογικὴ φύσις) longs for the first cause (τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας) 
… faint with desire … through ignorance of the first nature (τῆς πρώτης 
φύσεως) … it tries a second course, either to look at visible things and out of 
some of them to make a god (Or 28.13–14).
In sum, what Gregory does in this passage is to tightly interweave Hellenic sci-
entific and Christian biblical and theological contexts. I regard his treatment 
of this background material not just as a measure of polemical strategy but as 
a deliberate pursuit of a comprehensive research framework. This should not 
be taken as an example of a sketchy employment of philosophical terminol-
ogy for the sake of a sophistic show. Gregory repeatedly noted that this was 
a strategy of his opponents, who armed themselves with syllogisms without 
doing a proper study of the underlying epistemology on which Peripatetic 
logic relied. It would be in grave tension with common reason to imagine 
that, having condemned the Eunomians for a lack of professional consistency 
and accuracy, Gregory himself yielded to the same flaw. 
I also want to disprove a possible impression that there is nothing in com-
mon between the concept of God the Creator and the Peripatetic complex 
notion of primary nature, except for a surface and depthless similarity. Logi-
cally, if Gregory not only made use of the terminological camouflage but 
also got a grip on the underlying concept, then we should expect to find in 
his discourse the same inferences from the concept of primary nature which 
are conspicuous in Alexander’s reasoning. And indeed we can find them. 
It is plainly stated in the cited passage from Alexander’s commentary that 
far from being just, so to speak, a starting point or a beginning of motion 
of natural things, primary nature serves as a principle of the life of things. 
Therefore whenever a researcher investigates a thing, he practically studies 
the primary nature of this particular thing, hence, studies of primary nature 
per se galvanize the whole institution of human knowledge and procure the 
epistemological basis for it. 
A perfect match to this idea is easily discernible in Gregory’s thought. 
Gregory plainly states that God is an ontological and epistemological princi-
ple of creation in general and of every created thing in particular.459 Therefore, 
458 Note that in the Carmina moralia Gregory directly calls Christ “the greatest 
mind and the first nature (Νοῦς ὢν μέγιστος, καὶ νοὸς πρώτη φύσις)” (Moral 
720.11).
459 Cf.: “Likewise for us, He who made and moves and preserves all created things (τὸ 
ποιητικὸν, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τηροῦν τὰ πεποιημένα) is manifested (δῆλον), 
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a purpose of Gregory’s natural theology is not just to sketch the natural 
proofs of the divine existence460 but to fulfil the final goal embedded into 
living beings as their operative mechanism. To put it plainly, it is not God 
who needs to be detected in the life of living beings, it is living beings who, in 
order to perform their lives in a proper way, i.e. according to their functional 
designations, need to recognise in God the principle of their being.461 In other 
words, according to Gregory knowledge about God (or about primary nature) 
provides the operative instructions for the life of living beings, which explain 
to them how to fulfil their τέλοι, i.e. how to function in harmony with the 
given natural conditions of their organisms. Thus, instead of creating a fixed 
conception of God, Gregory formulated an operative mechanism of the theo-
logical praxis which, according to his theory, has to be performed by every 
rational soul willing to succeed in its life. In the subsequent sections I describe 
the details of this theological practice, which Gregory thoroughly outlined 
in his theological orations. Now for the sake of the present ontological and 
metaphysical discourse I concentrate on the basic theoretical recommenda-
tions for theologians provided by Gregory. 
The evidence presented above allows us to argue that Gregory deliber-
ately employed the Peripatetic term of primary nature because he thereby 
underscored that God is the cause of the universe and hence that theological 
studies form a legitimate part of the general studies of living beings. Yet, 
the question remains, how is this research is supposed to be done? How to 
methodologically distinguish different branches of philosophical, theological 
and scientific studies?
Apropos of the first question I want to refer to a beautiful passage from 
the oration 28, where Gregory gives a metaphorical description of spiritual 
contemplation while speaking of the Sinai theophany. This short fragment 
even if He is not comprehended by the mind (μὴ διανοίᾳ περιλαμβάνηται)” 
(Or 28.6). 
460 Cf.: “And very wanting in sense is he who will not willingly go thus far (i.e. 
reaching an understanding of God is not only Creator but also maintainer of the 
universe, who is always present in his creation) in following natural proofs (ταῖς 
φυσικαῖς ἀποδείξεσιν)”. Gregory emphasizes however that neither natural 
proofs nor human argumentation could reveal any side of the divine essence” 
(Or 28.6).
461 Cf.: “Who was it who thus opened his minds mouth and drew in the Spirit, that 
by the Spirit which searches out and knows Gods depths he might comprehend 
God, might stand in no need of further progress as owning already the ultimate 
object of desire (τὸ ἔσχατον ὀρεκτὸν) towards which speeds all the higher 
order and the intelligence (εἰς ὃ πᾶσα σπεύδει καὶ πολιτεία τοῦ ὑψηλοῦ καὶ 
διάνοια)?” (Or 28.6).
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describes the whole of Gregory’s system of theological knowledge by means 
of symbolic performance: 
But when I directed my gaze I scarcely saw the averted figure of God (μόλις εἶδον 
θεοῦ τὰ ὀπίσθια — cf. Ex 33:23), and this whilst sheltering in the rock (καὶ 
τοῦτο τῇ πέτρᾳ σκεπασθείς), God the word incarnate for us (τῷ σαρκωθέντι 
δι’ ἡμᾶς θεῷ Λόγῳ). Peering in I saw not the nature prime (οὐ τὴν πρώτην 
τε καὶ ἀκήρατον φύσιν), self-apprehended (by ‘self’ I mean the Trinity), the 
nature as it abides within the first veil (ὅση τοῦ πρώτου καταπετάσματος 
εἴσω μένει) and is hidden by the Cherubim, but as it reaches us at its furthest 
remove from God (ὅση τελευταία καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς φθάνουσα), being, so far as 
I can understand, the grandeur… inherent in the created things he has brought 
forth and governs. All these indications of himself which he has left behind 
him (μετ’ ἐκεῖνον ἐκείνου γνωρίσματα) are God’s ‘averted figure’ (θεοῦ τὰ 
ὀπίσθια) (Or 28.3).
Evidently enough by “prime nature” in this passage Gregory denotes God’s 
essence, while God’s “averted figure” signifies his activity, which emerges 
from the essence and indicates it in the form of a trace or something “left 
behind him” (sc. γνωρίσμα). The creation of the world manifests the divin-
ity, so that learning the world’s principles (sc. φυσικοὶ νόμοι) contributes 
to approaching the divine knowledge.462 Gregory negates the perception of 
the divine essence; but instead suggests the perception of the divine activities 
sketched out in the regular arrangement of the natural living beings (par-
ticularly in the human beings), and in the Holy Scripture (sc. particularly the 
exegesis of the divine names). 
These different aspects of divine activity imply different modes of theologi-
cal practice: natural theology and exegetic theology. At the bottom of these 
two branches of theological practise lies the practice of ascesis and prayer that 
makes theology not only a theoretical but also a practical and individually 
oriented or embodied discipline.
462 Applying the Stoic concept of the natural law (ὁ φυσικὸς νόμος), Gregory 
argues that the reasonable and logical structure of the universe calls forth its 
logical perception: “… that God, the creative and sustaining cause of all, ex-
ists, sight and instinctive law (ὁ φυσικὸς νόμος) inform us … instinctive law, 
which infers their author through the things seen in their orderliness (διὰ τῶν 
ὁρωμένων καὶ τεταγμένων τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τούτων συλλογιζόμενος)” (Or 
28.6). Basil also featured this concept in his Homilies on the Hexameron, where 
he synonymously used the terms φυσικὸς νόμος/λόγος. In the fifth homily 
we read: “… every created thing (ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν γενομένων) in the whole 
creation has some peculiar reason (ἴδιόν τινα λόγον) … As soon as the saying 
of those time and the first command became a sort of natural law (οἷον νόμος 




Gregory distinguished between the essential and accidental definition of the 
thing and also differentiated simple belief from scientific definition. It is ac-
curate to say that from the viewpoint of Aristotelian epistemology the formal 
construction of the Eunomian essential predication of God falls under simple 
belief rather than scientific definition. Eunomius denoted God the Father and 
God the Son with regard to their efficient cause, i.e. pointing at the absence 
of the source for the Father, and at Father as the source of the Son. Gregory 
agrees with Aristotle that simple belief, for which it is enough to register the 
existence of a thing and its efficient cause, differs from scientific definition 
which reveals the substance of a thing by detection of the final cause of the 
thing.463 And although according to Gregory there could be no scientific defi-
nition (sc. demonstration) of God because the essence of God is incomprehen-
sible, yet a kind of such definition he deduces from the activity of God which 
is manifest in creation. Thus, to put it plainly, while in Aristotelian theory 
the substance is denoted by virtue of the chief function of the thing and the 
name is given by virtue of the substance: in Gregory’s idea, the substance per 
se (i.e. the substance of God) is beyond names and functions but in relation 
to human beings the functions of God are discernible, hence the divine names 
are given by virtue of the relative functions of God (i.e. apropos of creation). 
Similarly to Aristotelian epistemology, where the underlying issue at stake 
is the substance, in Gregory’s system the essential predication of “being” to 
God, and the association of the divine nature with primary nature, which 
(in one of the senses of the term) is understood as the efficient, maintaining 
and final cause of the universe – provided a foundation for epistemological 
theory. 
Chapter 3. The physiological and anthropological aspects of 
epistemological theory
Introduction
What is a proper definition of God or how can a Christian theologian define 
and denote God? These questions were raised to the top of the fourth cen-
tury theological agenda by the Eunomians. Confronted with them, Gregory 
of Nazianzus preferred, instead of giving a direct answer, to investigate the 
463 Having said that God is ὁ ὤν – a true being – Gregory similarly to Aristotle re-
marks that “it is one thing to be persuaded of the existence of a thing, and quite 
another to know what it is” (πλεῖστον γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ εἶναί τι πεπεῖσθαι 
τὸ τί ποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο εἰδέναι) (Or 28.5). Cf.: “to define what a unit is is not 
the same as to affirm its existence” (Arist., APo 1.2).
174
epistemic side of the problem. He started by inquiring how human knowl-
edge is possible; how it correlates with reality; and, with regard to this, how 
a man can know anything about God; and whether it is possible to utter 
this knowledge. Naturally this set of questions, since it inquired about the 
anthropological seeds of human knowledge, leaned towards philosophical 
and psychological domains. Hence Gregory in developing his theory broadly 
dwelled on the contemporary achievements of these disciplines. Taking for 
granted some of the anthropological and epistemological concepts Gregory 
embedded them into his theory in transformed and transfigured state. In such 
a way he simultaneously distanced himself from the Hellenic scholars and 
eased his own task by making a philosophical diaeresis instead of a scientific 
treatise. 
A major common premise of Christian and Peripatetic epistemological 
theorizing, which inspired Gregory’s philosophical speculations, consists in 
the recognition of the exquisite and substantial dignity of human intellective 
capacity, which distinguishes human beings from the other animals.464 Al-
though different Hellenic philosophical schools admitted to the exceptional 
value of the human intellect, inclination towards balanced studies of mate-
rial constituents and a theoretical framework of cognition was a genuinely 
Peripatetic one.465 
The Peripatetics understood the process of perception as an interaction be-
tween the object of perception and the perceiving subject. According to their 
theory, both actors of the process actively engage in interaction so that a per-
ceived image of a real object is a result of this mutual subject-object activity. 
For the Platonists and Stoics the process of perception was fully determined 
464 The author of the treatise On the creation of man attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, 
argued that the human mind constitutes a coherent and indivisible unity with 
the body so that the mind has no perception without the material, nor can there 
be perception without intellectual capacity. Basil of Caesarea in his Homilies 
on Hexaemeron also devoted particular attention to the study of physiological 
aspects of intellection. Later Nemesius of Emesa in his On the nature of man – a 
treatise that investigates the physiology and cognitive capacities of the human 
being, ventured to reconcile Christian theology with medical and philosophi-
cal anthropology. Philoponus in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima also 
devoted particular attention to intellection (esp., ComDA 3.4–8), and tried to 
harmonize Aristotelian theory with Christian theology.
465 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam have shown in their reply to Myles Burn-
yeat that unlike Platonic idealism and materialistic reductionism Aristotelian 
realism is characterized by the studies of “the natural and organic unity of 
the intentional with its constitutive matter” (Cf. Nussbaum, M. / Putnam, H., 
Changing Aristotle’s Mind, in: Nussbaum, M.C. / Rorty, A.O. [eds.], Essays on 
Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford / New York 1995, 30–59).
175
by the perceiving subject, therefore the studies of natural compounds of the 
process were less relevant for their agenda.466 
I am intending to show that apropos of the theory of perception Gregory 
sided with the Peripatetic teaching, which consequently shaped his episte-
mological concepts. Besides, as I have shown previously, Gregory generally 
consented to the Peripatetic association of the major ontological category, 
i.e. “being,” with the major epistemological category, i.e. substance (sc. 
“what is it”). It follows from this that he was predisposed to accept that 
the cognitive process is somehow interconnected with the physical reality 
of the natural life.467 
Hitherto I have surveyed the logical and ontological aspects of Gregory’s 
epistemological theory. Now I concentrate on the physiological side of the 
theory and show, first, the interconnections between the ontological and phys-
iological aspects of the cognitive process and, second, the practical mechanism 
of cognition, and the way it is performed by a human being composed of the 
soul and body.
1. The epistemological aspects of the Aristotelian theory of the soul
Jonathan Beere in his insightful investigation of the Metaphysics Theta has 
highlighted an important connection between the Aristotelian understanding 
of activity (sc. ἐνέργεια) and the notion of a capacity. He has argued:
There are not only capacities for change, but also capacities for living, thinking, 
and other energeiai that are not changes. For instance, any body of theoretical 
knowledge constitutes such a capacity: it is the capacity to engage in the sort 
of thinking that is understanding the relevant objects—in the case of geometry, 
geometrical figures. In no case is such thinking changing.468
It follows from this that for Aristotle knowledge is not fully dependent on 
but very tightly linked to the physiology of cognition and it is by means of 
the actuality-potentiality mechanism that Aristotle establishes this linkage. 
466 A detailed and sharp account of the Aristotelian theory of perception and its 
difference from the other philosophical schools was provided by Beere (cf. Beere, 
J., Doing and Being: An interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta. Oxford 
2009, 6, 44, 103–108).
467 This correspondence is quite clearly marked in Aristotle’s contemplation about 
the soul of the living beings preserved in De anima: “That it is a cause as sub-
stance (ὡς οὐσία) is clear, for substance is the cause of being for all things (αἴτιον 
τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία), and for living things, being is life (τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς 
ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν), and the soul is also the cause and source of life (αἰτία δὲ 
καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή)” (DA 415b8–14).
468 Cf. Beere, 2009, 13.
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He contended that actuality refers to potentiality as form refers to matter, 
as soul (or substance) refers to body (cf. DA 415b8–14, Phys 255a36–10). 
This crucial constraint provided a firm interconnection between the theo-
retical and empirical fields of studies. Yet the roots of this analogy deepen 
into the studies of nature, and particularly the investigation of the correlation 
between matter understood as a physical body of a thing, and form under-
stood as the soul or substance of a thing, i.e. something that delineates the 
thing’s identity,469 something that persists through change (Met 1024b30–1). 
Aristotle contended that as long as a thing is presented in reality as a coherent 
unity (sc. τὸ τί εἶναι), its identity should not be reduced to a cluster of its 
characteristics (Interp 20b16–19). He spotted the basis for unity of a thing 
in its immaterial substance, which differs from its body (material constituent) 
and at the same time is united with it, and cannot exist without it. The genuine 
Aristotelian concept of hylomorphism distinguished Peripatetic anthropologi-
cal teaching from analogous philosophical theories.470 It also had a significant 
impact on the epistemological and cognitive theories. 
The concept of hylomorphism (sc. a coherent unity of matter and form) 
entitled Aristotle to claim that although the human mind is not mixed with the 
body,471 it nevertheless cannot exist without the body.472 Moreover, Aristotle 
469 Gareth B. Matthews suggested a fresh look at Aristotle’s approach to the identity 
problem, which Matthews labelled as a doctrine of kooky objects. He has shown 
that although Aristotle sees identity as the oneness of an individual substance, 
he also investigates the instances of accidental unities. The whole conundrum 
makes a good case for the correlation between empirical and theoretical studies 
(cf. Matthews, G.B., Accidental unities, in: Schofield, M. / Nussbaum, M. [eds.], 
Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L. 
Owen. London / New York, 1982, 223–241).
470 In other words, although the soul is the source of life of the human being, neither 
soul nor body can exist without each other, therefore the bodily conditions of 
the cognitive process are positively primordial and inevitable. There is no reason 
to try to escape them; rather the human being should study and exercise them 
because this is his functional goal or τέλος of his life.
471 That is to say that there is no particular organ in the human body which is 
responsible for intellection, although some faculties of the human body, like 
perception and imagination, provide a basis for intellection (cf. DA 411b14–19).
472 A sharp functionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s hylomorphism and its correla-
tion with the theory of mind, which I tend to support, has been given by Marc 
Cohen. He has argued that although a mental state may be realized by several 
different physical states or processes, it nonetheless cannot be reduced to physi-
cal states. Thus mental states are, rather, “functional states of the physical sys-
tems that realize them” (cf. Cohen, S.M., Hylomorphism and Functionalism, in: 
Nussbaum, M.C. / Rorty, A.O. [eds.], Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford / 
New York 1995, 62).
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also claims that immaterial as it is the human mind can achieve true knowl-
edge about real material things and how they are out there in the world. Even 
more so, Aristotle contends that true knowledge about reality is not just a 
goal of theoretical inquiry, but that it is, so to say, a functional goal of the 
human mind (Met 993b20–21). 
In book three of De anima Aristotle professed that ”the actuality of the 
sensible object is one and the same with that of the sense, though taken in the 
abstract, sensible object and the sense are not the same”473 (DA 426a21–25). 
In other words, the human organs of sense are arranged in such a way that 
they are able to be affected by sensible objects and thereby to receive infor-
mation about the sensible objects.474 This is why Aristotle says that sense-
perception “seems to be a kind of alteration” since “perception comes about 
with [an organ’s] being changed and affected” (DA 416b33f.). 
In line with his general account of alteration, Aristotle treats perception as 
a case of interaction between two suitable agents: objects capable of acting 
and capacities capable of being affected. This mechanistic account of percep-
tion entitles Aristotle to claim that a somewhat reliable picture of reality can 
occur in a human’s mind, yet the question remains as to the extent to which 
knowledge depends on sense-perception and how to distinguish between 
sense-perception and intellection.475 
At the beginning of De anima, where Aristotle surveyed the opinions of 
his predecessors (Platonists and Atomists) on the subject, he argued that the 
ancients assimilated intellection to perception because for them truth is what 
appears (DA 404a25–404b5). That is to say, the information received by 
the organs of sense really corresponds to what exists in reality and therefore 
the truth about the things is available to everyone who endorses it. This 
doctrine Aristotle attributed to Democritus, Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras and 
Empedocles. 
Interestingly enough Aristotle then claimed that similarly to Empedocles 
“Plato in the Timaeus fashions the soul out of this elements; for like, he 
holds, is known by like (τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον), and things are formed out of 
473 Cf.: “the actual knowledge is identical with the thing known (Τὸ δ αὐτό ἐστιν 
ἡ κατ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι)” (DA 431a1).
474 Christopher Shields in his commentary to DA 417a2f., where Aristotle admit-
ted his puzzling about the sense-perception, contends that “the sensory faculty 
is in potentiality, and that just as the combustible requires an actual spark to 
ignite into fire, so perception requires an actual external object as its object” (cf. 
Shields, C. [transl., intr., com.], Aristotle, De anima. Oxford 2016, 214).
475 Beere has argued that Aristotle treated perception as a non-rational power. He 
claimed that “rational powers have a two-component structure, involving both 
knowledge and a soul, whereas non-rational powers do not” (cf. Beere, 2009, 
140f.).
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the principles or elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων), so that soul must be so too” 
(DA 404b15–20). Thus, Aristotle asserted that Plato deduced his theory of 
the soul from the same assumptions as the Atomists, and that he supported 
the idea that like is known by like. 
This equation of the Platonic concept with the views of Empedocles may 
seem somewhat problematic because we know from the Theaetetus (160e5–
186e12) that in contrast to the Atomists, Plato opposed truth to appear-
ances. In his view, it is not the object of cognition that determines the result 
of sense-perception but rather the cognizing subject. In the Timaeus Plato 
gives details of the process of seeing. He asserted that “light-bearing eyes” 
(φωσφόρα ὄμματα, Plat., Tim 45bc) see sensible objects whenever “sur-
rounded by midday light” with the result that “like becomes conjoint with 
like” (ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον συμπαγὲς γενόμενον, ibid.). 
In view of this evidence, the question arises, why Aristotle associates the 
doctrines of Empedocles and Plato? Themistius in his Paraphrase of De anima 
helps us to understand Aristotle’s argument. He maintains that “both Timaeus 
in Plato, and Plato himself, explained our grasp of existing things through 
the soul’s affinity with the first principles” (Paraph 12.28, [DA 404b27–30]), 
and then, Themistius concludes that both Empedocles and Plato “posited 
knowing as belonging to the soul and thereby constituted it out of the first 
principles”476 (ibid.). Later, Plotinus attested Platonic emphasis on the deter-
minative role of the cognizing subject in the process of perception. Thus, he 
asserted that contrary to Aristotle, Plato thought that “the vision sees not 
through some medium but by and through itself alone (οὐ δι’ ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ 
δι’ αὑτῆς, Plotinus, Enn 5.3.8)”. 
As opposed to the Platonic and Atomistic accounts of sense-perception 
Aristotle contended that a mediatory contact and interaction between the 
cognizing subject and the object of cognition is indispensible in the process of 
the sense-perception. The result of this interaction is that the object of percep-
tion alters the organs of sense. Thus, Aristotle defined sense-perception as a 
sort of alteration (ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι, DA 416b33–35). That is to say, when 
the eye sees a colour of a thing, what happens practically is that the organ 
of sight changes in such a way that it takes on this particular colour, though 
by doing so it does not undergo a quantitative change because by taking on 
a certain colour sense-perception simply realises its function (DA 417b3–4). 
Thus, the sense-organs when they receive sensible information become like 
the objects of sense, because “the perceptive faculty is in potentiality such as 
the object of perception already is in actuality” (DA 418a3–6).
Aristotle distinguished three stages of the perceptive process: first, when 
the objects of sense are received by the organs of sense; “next comes the 
476 Transl. R. Todd, 2014, 27.
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perception that they are attributes (ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων), and at this 
point error may come in … thirdly, there is a perception of the common 
attributes (τῶν κοινῶν)” (DA 428b18). The task of the imagination is to 
transform sensible information into mental images, which are, as Aristotle 
asserted, “like present sensations, except that they are immaterial (τὰ γὰρ 
φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης DA 432a10)”. Ar-
istotle distinguished between sense-perception, imagination and thinking.477 
He assumed that “as without sensation a man would not learn or understand 
anything, so at the very time when he is actually thinking he must have an 
image before him” (DA 432a7f.). Nevertheless, “the simplest notions differ 
in character from mental images,” although “they cannot dispense with im-
ages” (DA 432a12f.). 
The concept of the sense-perception held an important role in Aristotelian 
cognitive theory because he modelled his concept of intellection on that of 
sense-perception478. That is to say that like sense-perception, the process of 
intellection is operated by the actuality-potentiality mechanism. In Aristo-
telian words the human mind is nothing in actuality before it thinks (DA 
429a22–24). And what happens with the mind thinking a thing is that it 
becomes like479 the object of thought and the result of this interaction is that 
“the actual knowledge (ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη) is identical (τὸ δ’ αὐτό 
ἐστιν) with the thing known (τῷ πράγματι)” (DA 431a1). Thus, the active 
intellect reconstitutes in itself an animated picture of reality, even though it 
receives from sense-perception nothing but sensory information about the 
characteristics of things.480 
A similar sort of interaction and change that accompanies the process of the 
sense-perception, according to Aristotle, galvanizes the process of intellection 
477 He claimed that imagination is not identical with thinking, or, in his words, “is 
distinct from affirmation and negation, because it needs a combination of notions 
to constitute truth or falsehood” (DA 432a11f.).
478 Here is how Themistius expounded this idea: “imagination is [active] towards 
the form, the imprint of which sense-perception has received. Thus actual sense-
perception becomes for imagination precisely what the object of perception is 
for sense-perception” (Paraph 92.4; transl. R. Todd, 2014, 115).
479 Here is how Aristotle expounded the concept of knowing like by like: “it [the 
sense-perception] is affected while being unlike what affects it, but when it has 
been affected, it has been made like it and is such as what affected it is” (DA 
418a5f.).
480 Shields has suggested that if we accept Bywater’s (1888) conjecture to the pas-
sage, “mind is a form of forms” (432a2) and read it as “mind is a form of 
intelligible forms”, then “we would come closer to completing the parallel with 
perception which follows immediately (432a2f.), since perception is said to be 
a form of the objects of perception” (cf. Shields, 2016, 344).
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in such a way that the thinking intellect gets in contact with the substance of 
the object (Met 1072b21). Kurt Pritzl expounded this Aristotelian concept 
through the analogy of touch: “The mind’s contact with its object is a passive 
touching, a holding; the object, given here as the ousia, is active in touching 
the mind”.481 
In this theory ousia is understood as an immaterial basis for unity of the 
characteristics of the thing. In Aristotle’s explanation the substance of a thing 
is not something material that belongs to the thing because all the parts of 
the human body collected and properly arranged together do not make of a 
human body a certain living person. Aristotle contended that there should 
be something more than just a cluster of material constituents. This some-
thing more is the immaterial substance, which determines not only the thing’s 
shape but also its life and functional purpose. The human mind thinks these 
substances because it thinks things as indivisible entities,482 i.e. as they are 
in reality,483 and not a bunch of categorial properties. Remarkably by think-
ing many substances, the human mind does not undergo either division or 
quantitative change but maintains its “oneness”.484 
Thus, according to Aristotle the subject and object of sense-perception 
and even the environment where the process takes place determine its result. 
Hence, human intellection is severely restricted by bodily states and both 
external and internal conditions. Nevertheless, Aristotle emphasized that 
the bodily prerequisites of intellection do not prevent a human being from 
acquiring the true understanding of reality. On the contrary, only by means 
of bodily interaction is a true engagement of subject and object possible. 
Martha Nussbaum has argued that by saying “goodbye” to Platonic forms 
Aristotle distanced his philosophical position from idealism. She affirmed that 
for Aristotle “appearances and truth are not opposed, as Plato believed they 
were. We can have truth only inside the circle of the appearances, because only 
there can we communicate, even refer, at all.” Nussbaum defined Aristotle’s 
position as internal realism “that articulates very carefully the limits within 
which any realism must live.”485 
481 Cf. Pritzl, 2010, 27.
482 Cf.: “the mind thinks in an indivisible unit of time and by an indivisible mental 
act” (DA 430b15).
483 Cf. DA 418a3–6; 424a17–21.
484 Themistius explained the oneness of intellect by affirming that the active intellect 
whenever it thinks other things it thinks itself too: the intellect, when inactive, is 
said to have the ἕξις of thoughts, but when active towards one of its thoughts 
is at that time identical with what is being thought, and by thinking that thing 
thinks itself too (Paraph 95.21; transl. R. Todd, 2014, 119). 
485 Cf. Nussbaum, M., Saving Aristotle’s Appearances, in: Schofield, M. / Nuss-
baum, M. (eds.), Language and Logos. Cambridge 1982, 290f.
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Along the lines of this logic, Aristotle claimed that thinking starts from 
the experience of life, from the starting points perceived by induction,486 and 
it ends in life487 because actual knowledge is a process, a process of thinking, 
which can (and in Aristotelian thought, should) master the life of the human 
being. That is to say, the human being can either follow the guidance of his 
mind or the guidance of his corporeal desires. One way of acting would be 
in conformity with the animal side of his nature, another – with his exquisite 
human side. 
Aristotelian anthropology revolved around the idea that it is by virtue of 
mind that the human being has his special dignity throughout the animal 
kingdom (DA 414b18). Ergo, the faculty of intellection constitutes an essen-
tial feature of the human being488. Similarly to animals, who cannot survive 
without the faculty of sensation, human beings cease to be who they are with-
out intellection (DA 429a6f.). Since this faculty is less developed in a child 
than in an adult, and acknowledging the fact that due to mental deficiencies 
some human beings are not capable of intellection, Aristotle claimed that it 
is the functional goal, the τέλος, of a human being to engage in intellection. 
With this, my epistemological survey has finally come full circle. I started 
by inquiring how, according to Aristotelian thought, knowledge is possible, 
and have now arrived at a recognition that knowledge is not only possible 
but is sui generis a duty of human beings. Peripatetic theory suggests that 
the faculty of intellection is for the human being a substantial capacity. That 
486 Aristotle professed that all explanations rely on first principles, which in turn are 
grasped by perception via induction: “all teaching (πᾶσα διδασκαλία) starts 
from facts previously known (ἐκ προγινωσκομένων) … since it proceeds ei-
ther by way of induction (δι ἐπαγωγῆς), or else by way of deduction (ἣ δὲ 
συλλογισμῷ). Now induction supplies a first principle or universal (ἡ μὲν δὴ 
ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου), deduction works from universals (ὁ δὲ 
συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου); therefore there are first principles from which 
deduction starts (ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός), which cannot be proved by 
deduction (ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός); therefore they are reached by induction 
(ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα)” (NE 1139b25—30).
487 As opposed to Plato, who made no difference between wisdom (sc. σοφία) and 
practical wisdom (sc. φρόνησις) and associated wisdom primarily with theo-
retical knowledge (Meno 96d–100a), Aristotle deemed practical wisdom higher 
than theoretical wisdom (NE 1141b3–9) and even claimed that practical wisdom 
stands opposite to theoretical wisdom (NE 1142a25).
488 In a puzzling passage from De Anima Aristotle even claims that intellection 
is “a kind of an essence” and that “it does not perish” (cf.: ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν 
ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι; DA 408b18–29). Christopher 
Shields has suggested interpreting this fragment indirectly, and by means of anal-
ogy with sensation, which depends on sense-organs, while intellection appears 
to be free of such dependence (cf. Shields, 2016, 145). 
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is to say that the faculty of intellection (sc. νοῦς) is the basis for the unity of 
the human being understood as the hylomorphic unit of matter and form, 
i.e. body and soul. Now, after this schematic survey of the psychological and 
cognitive aspects of Aristotelian epistemology, I return to Gregory’s reflection 
about theological knowledge preserved in his orations. 
2.  Gregory on the theory of knowledge and the intellective  
faculties of the human being
A principal characteristic of Gregory’s epistemology is that the process of 
knowing is determined neither by cognizing subject nor by object of cognition 
but that it is a mutual and dynamic interaction of both. Aristotle emphasized 
the importance of contact and exchange in sense-perception and intellection. 
Apostle Paul associated the process of knowing Christ with interaction be-
tween the believer and God. One of Paul’s key expressions about the process 
of knowing – a passage from the 1 Cor 13:12, – “then shall I know, even as 
also I am known” (ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην) – a phrase that 
Paul repeats in Gal 4:9489 and that echoes a saying from John 10:14 “I know 
my own and my own know me”.490 Gregory put this slogan at the centre of 
his epistemological theory (cf. Or 28.17) and opposed the interactive method 
of acquiring knowledge to the rationalistic approach of Eunomius. I suggest 
that although Gregory’s primary source of inspiration was in Paul, he also 
took advantage of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge and particularly of 
the connection between epistemology and physics that characterizes Aristo-
telian thought.
Like the Peripatetics Gregory inquired about epistemological puzzles from 
the perspective of studying nature, and especially from the anthropological 
viewpoint. It is remarkable that a few times throughout the theological circle 
Gregory devotes a fair bit of his text to a brief survey of the chief research 
questions of contemporary anthropological studies.491 In the second theologi-
cal oration Gregory inquires:
… consider myself and the whole nature and constitution of man (τὴν 
ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ σύμπηξιν), and how we are mingled, and what is 
our movement, and how the mortal was compounded with the immortal (τὸ 
ἀθάνατον τῷ θνητῷ συνεκράθη) … and how it gives life and shares in feelings 
489 Cf.: “But now after ye have known God, or rather are known of God, how turn 
you again to the weak and beggarly elements where unto ye desire again to be 
in bondage?” (Gal 4:9; transl. KJV).
490 Cf.: “I am the good shepherd; I know my own sheep, and they know me” (John 
10:14; transl. KJV,corr.).
491 Namely, Or 28.21–22, Or 29.8, Or 31.15.
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(ζωὴν δίδωσι, καὶ πάθους μεταλαμβάνει) … what was our first moulding 
and composition (ἡ πρώτη πλάσις ἡμῶν καὶ σύστασις492) in the workshop of 
nature, and what is our last formation and completion (ἡ τελευταία μόρφωσις 
καὶ τελείωσις)?.. How is it that species are permanent, and are different in their 
characteristics (ἑστηκότα τε τὰ εἴδη καὶ τοῖς χαρακτῆρσι διεστηκότα, ὧν 
τοσούτων ὄντων αἱ ἰδιότητες ἀνέφικτοι493) … and in a word, all by which this 
little world called Man is swayed (ὅσοις ὁ μικρὸς οὗτος κόσμος διοικεῖται, 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος) (Or 28.22).
Two important things should be noted with regard to this fragment. First, 
the questions which Gregory raises here demonstrate his awareness of the 
particular biological issues which were discussed in the philosophical and 
scientific milieus of his time.494 Second, the fact that Gregory briefly repeats 
these questions in other places in the theological circle and also in his other 
works shows his continuous interest in biological matters.495 Looking more 
closely at these rhetorical questions, we can see a concise form of contem-
porary scientific theories about human intellection that Gregory is ready 
to accept. 
In the third theological oration Gregory again touches upon biological 
and especially anthropological matters likewise by means of rhetorical inter-
rogation. He inquires: 
… you have no knowledge of your generation … and you have to discover the 
laws of composition and formation (συμπήξεως, μορφώσεως) … and the tie 
of the soul to body (ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα δεσμόν) and mind to soul (νοῦ πρὸς 
ψυχήν) and reason to mind (λόγου πρὸς νοῦν), movement (κίνησιν), in-
crease (αὔξησιν), assimilation of food (τροφῆς ἐξομοίωσιν), sense-perception 
(αἴσθησιν), memory (μνήμην), recollection (ἀνάμνησιν), and all the rest of the 
492 Both πλάσις and σύστασις are termini technici of Aristotle’s biological cor-
pus, where the highest frequency of these terms throughout the TLG corpus is 
detected. E.g., in De generatione animalium he speaks of “the first conforma-
tion (πρώτῃ συστάσει) of the parts from the seminal secretion” (GA 744b29), 
and about the the first formation of the embryo (πλάσιν τοῦ ἐμβρύου)” (GA 
776a33).
493 It is also in De generatione animalium where Aristotle speaks in great detail about 
different species of animals (including human beings), their characteristics, etc.
494 Similarly to the Peripatetics Gregory explicitly defined man as “a rational animal 
(ζῶον λογικὸν) from a mixture of rational and irrational elements (ἐκ λογικοῦ 
τε καὶ ἀλόγου κράματος)” (Or 32.9 = PG 36, 184.50).
495 Cf. in the Or 28.23 he inquires about the distinctions among different animals 
(τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων διαφορὰς πρός τε ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα) and the 
distinctions among plants (φυτῶν διαφοράς). Galen in his treatise De alimen-
torum facultatibus devotes a section to “the distinctions between the domestic 
and wild animals” (Aliment 3.680.18) and to “the distinctions between the parts 
of the edible plants” (Aliment 645.1).
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parts of which you are compounded (τἄλλα ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκας); and which of 
them belongs to the soul and body together, and which to each independently 
of the other, and which is received from each other496 (Or 29.8). 
The distinction that Gregory makes in this fragment (and elsewhere in his 
works outside the theological circle497) between different mental faculties and 
their interrelation with the soul and body conforms to Aristotelian theory. In 
the Carmina moralia he explicitly formalizes the basic notions of cognitive 
theory in agreement with the Peripatetic teaching. He professes that:
The soul is the nature, which gives and maintains life (Ψυχὴ δὲ, φύσις ζωτικὴ, 
φέρουσά τε); as for my soul [sic. the human soul], it is commingled with reason 
and mind (Λόγος δὲ καὶ νοῦς τῇ γ’ ἐμῇ συνεκράθη); Mind is the internal and 
indescribable sight (Νοῦς δ’ ἔστιν ὄψις ἔνδον, οὐ περίγραφος); The function 
of mind is intellection and [the capacity to be] enformed (Νοῦ δ’ ἔργον, ἡ 
νόησις, ἐκτύπωμά τε); Reason is the search for intelligible forms (Λόγος δ’ 
ἔρευνα τῶν νοὸς τυπωμάτων), which you pronounce by your speech organs 
(Ὃν ἐκλαλήσεις ὀργάνοις φωνητικοῖς); The sense-perception is a kind of 
reception of the external (Αἴσθησίς ἐστιν εἰσδοχή τις ἔκτοθεν)498 (Moral 
947.10–948.1). 
Clearly enough these definitions generally lean towards the Aristotelian vision 
of the soul, reason, intellection, and sense-perception that I have discussed 
earlier. Like Aristotle, Gregory distinguished between the faculties of sense-
perception (sc. αἴσθησις), imagination (sc. φαντασία), reasoning (sc. λόγος) 
and intellection (sc. νοῦς). He also regarded sense-perception as a mechanistic 
process which he labelled, like the Peripatetics, “a kind of alteration” that 
implies a certain change of mind, which becomes enformed by the intelligible 
form that it thinks. In such a way he asserted that the human mind is “some-
thing dwelling in another (τὸν ἐν ἄλλῳ)”, something whose “movements are 
thoughts (κινήματα τὰ διανοήματα)” either “silent or spoken (ἠρεμοῦντα 
ἢ προβαλλόμενα)”; that reason is something that accompanies silent or 
spoken [thoughts], while wisdom is “a kind of habit of mind (τίνα παρὰ τὴν 
ἕξιν)” … and justice and love are praiseworthy dispositions (διαθέσεις), the 
496 A comparable list of questions we can found at the beginning of book I of De 
anima where Aristotle inquires, whether the soul is a unity or a compound of the 
elements, what maintains the unity of soul and body, how is the soul a source of 
life, what are the attributes and functions of the soul, how is it connected with 
the body and how does this connection shape the functional characteristics of 
the soul?
497 Cf.: “Mind (νοῦς), then, and sense (αἴσθησις), thus distinguished from each 
other, had held their own definitions (τῶν ἰδίων ὅρων ἐντὸς), and bore in 
themselves the magnificence of the Creator-Word” (Or 38.11).
498 Translation mine.
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one opposed to injustice, the other to hate … “which make us what we are, 
and change us as colours do bodies (ὅλως ποιούσας ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλοιούσας, 
ὥσπερ αἱ χρόαι τὰ σώματα)?”499 (Or 28.13). 
Similar to the Peripatetic teaching, Gregory professed that each time the 
mind thinks, it entertains images before it, and although intellection is not 
identical with the imagination, without imagination intellection is not pos-
sible.500 It logically follows from this idea that imagination and intellection 
can hardly serve as acceptable tools for a researcher trying to understand 
divine nature. Common sense dictates that the unoriginated nature of God 
differs from the originated nature of the universe. Whilst the latter is available 
to human sense-perception and feeds the imagination, the first is beyond the 
reach of human senses (cf. “carnal minds bring in carnal images,” Or 29.13). 
Whatever methods and techniques of thinking the scholar might apply, his 
thinking apparatus is arranged in such way that it cannot function other than 
according to its arrangement. 
Gregory insists, however, that unable to overcome its natural operative 
mechanism, the human mind can nevertheless transcend it to a certain ex-
tent, in that it can recognize its own limitation. And this, Gregory insists is 
what is special about the human mind. In Gregory’s own words: “you have 
known reason by knowing the things that are beyond reason (λόγον ἔγνως 
τὸ γνῶναι τὰ ὑπὲρ λόγον)” (Or 28.28). A characteristic capacity of self-
introspection distinguishes intellection from other cognitive capacities. Thus, 
sense-perception cannot perceive sense-perception; the imagination cannot, 
strictly speaking, imagine the imagination (though the mind can think about 
imagination as well as about other capacities, abstract concepts and catego-
ries). Unlike these faculties, human intellect can think itself and even spot its 
own limitations. 
499 Themistius in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s De anima stated: “since the soul is the 
cause and first principle of the living body” (Paraph 50.26, [DA 415b8–12]), “it 
is from the soul that comes two kinds of movement: and movement in respect of 
place, and movement in respect of alteration (for sense-perception is considered 
an alteration)” (Paraph 50.29 = 415b21–27). He also talked about the disposi-
tion (διάθεσις) for knowledge (Paraph 55.29, [DA 417b2–8]) and ἕξις as the 
movement from ignorance to knowledge (Paraph 55.15, [DA 417a21–b2]). 
Robert Todd has noted that Themistius understands ἕξις as the precondition for 
thinking exemplified by someone thoroughly acquainted with a body of knowl-
edge and able to actualize it at will (cf. Todd, R. [transl., com.], Themistius On 
Aristotle On the Soul. London / New York 1996, 192).
500 Cf.: “…our mind fails to transcend corporeal images” (οὕτω κάμνει ἐκβῆναι 
τὰ σωματικὰ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς), and to consort with the incorporeal, stripped 
of all clothing of corporeal ideas…” (Or 28.13, cf. DA 432a).
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In such a way Gregory maintains that intellection is a unique human ca-
pacity that distinguishes the human being from other animals. Gregory’s 
natural philosophical approach to cognitive issues is no wonder if we take 
into account his surroundings. Gregory’s brother Caesarius was a renowned 
physician, Gregory’s friend Basil devoted special attention to the studies of 
nature, and Gregory’s correspondent Themistius wrote many commentaries 
on Aristotelian treatises (inter alia, on the Parva naturalia; Suda also men-
tions his epitome of the Physics, in eight books). Thus, it seems natural that 
Gregory was himself tolerably well versed in the contemporary cognitive and 
anthropological definitions debated by members of the philosophical schools. 
In the fifth theological oration after a brief exposition of key anthropological 
concepts, Gregory explicitly mentions Aristotelian biological treatises, i.e. The 
History of animals and On generation (τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις; τῆς περὶ 
ζώων ἱστορίας, Or 31.10). 
It is no surprise that Gregory read some biological texts, more interesting, 
however is that having taken advantage of philosophical cognitive theories 
Gregory modelled his account of the process of knowing Christ on the process 
of intellection. 
In such a way, Gregory emphasised the analogy between the human mind 
and body and the mind and body of Christ. He asserted that in following 
the direction of νοῦς of Christ, human beings can actualise their potential. 
Thus, in the Oration 32, having briefly described the functions of the eye, 
foot, tongue, ear, nose and hand, Gregory assumes: 
the mind directs them all (νοῦς δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμὼν) since it is the source 
of sensory perception (παρ’ οὗ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι) and the locus to which sense 
impressions are channeled (εἰς ὃν ἡ αἴσθησις): so it is with us as well, as with 
the common body of Christ (οὕτω καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν, τῷ κοινῷ Χριστοῦ σώματι) 
(Or 32.10).
For Gregory this bodily narrative turned out to be particularly important be-
cause he affirmed that the degradation of the body caused by the fall of man 
had been redeemed by Christ, who himself from the moment of incarnation 
and forever onwards preserves his human body:
For there is One God, and One Mediator between God and Man, the Man Christ 
Jesus. For He still pleads even now as Man for my salvation; for He continues 
to wear the Body which He assumed (μετὰ τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν) (Or 30.14).
Thus, it is fair to say that in Gregory’s view, neither intellection nor salvation 
are possible without body. Moreover, the very process of approaching God, 
i.e. the imitatio Dei practice implies an embodied contact and interaction, 
whose expected result is a change of mind or in Gregory’s words an ascension 
of the human mind to its divine archetype:
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In my opinion it [sc. the essence and nature of God] will be discovered when that 
within us which is godlike and divine (τὸ θεοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ θεῖον), I mean 
our mind and reason (τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον), shall have mingled 
with its like (τῷ οἰκείῳ προσμίξῃ), and the image shall have ascended to the 
archetype (ἡ εἰκὼν ἀνέλθῃ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον), of which it has now the 
desire (οὗ νῦν ἔχει τὴν ἔφεσιν) (Or 28.17).
Althogh in this passage Gregory speaks about the future, he elsewhere asserts 
that the process of knowing Christ should be started in the present. Gregory 
assimilates the practice of thinking of God to taking on the likeness to divin-
ity. More concretely, it means that since the process of knowing is mutual, 
when the human mind thinks of God through thinking his divine manifesta-
tions or images it reassembles them into a united picture, or in Gregory’s 
words, into a sketch of truth:
But we sketch him by his attributes (ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν σκιαγραφοῦντες 
τὰ κατ’ αὐτὸν), and so deduce a certain faint and feeble and partial idea con-
cerning him (ἀμυδράν τινα καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἄλλην ἀπ’ ἄλλου φαντασίαν 
συλλέγομεν), and our best theologian is he who has (καὶ οὗτος ἄριστος ἡμῖν 
θεολόγος), not indeed discovered the whole (οὐχ ὃς εὗρε τὸ πᾶν), for our 
present chain does not allow of our seeing the whole (οὐδὲ γὰρ δέχεται τὸ 
πᾶν ὁ δεσμός), but conceived of him to a greater extent than another (ἀλλ’ ὃς 
ἂν ἄλλου φαντασθῇ πλέον), and gathered in himself more of the likeness or 
adumbration of the truth (καὶ πλεῖον ἐν ἑαυτῷ συναγάγῃ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἴνδαλμα, ἢ ἀποσκίασμα) (Or 30.17)
Importantly, Gregory identifies this sketch with the mind of Christ, which 
is the archetype of the human mind. Thus, we can assume that by the way 
of thinking of God the human mind also thinks its own archetype. In this 
context, Gregory argues, it is possible to grasp the meaning of Paul’s famous 
phrase: “we shall know as far as we are known.” As I understand it, we shall 
know as far as we are engaged in knowing, i.e. in the mutual and dynamic 
exchange with God, which cannot be fulfilled because it is a process. Else-
where in the theological circle Gregory repeats this idea by saying that when 
the human mind thinks of God at the same time God gets to know the human 
being and the Holy Spirit actualises this mutual exchange: 
Be reconciled to God (καταλλάγητε τῷ θεῷ, 2 Cor 5:20) and quench not the 
Spirit (1 Thess 5:19) or rather, may Christ be reconciled to you (μᾶλλον δέ, 
καταλλαγείη Χριστὸς ὑμῖν), and may the Spirit enlighten you” (Or 29.21).
Remarkably, Gregory says here that he understands the process of knowing 
as a kind of interactive exchange between the human being and Christ in 
which both parties are actively engaged, that is to say, both parties undergo a 
non-quantitative change because in this system that true knowledge is mutual, 
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i.e. it requires contact and collaboration (which is why the bodily aspect of 
engagement is crucially important). 
The fragment tells us that the value of understanding the attributes of 
divinity cannot be classified among pure intellectual achievements like the 
discovery of a mathematical or astronomical law, but should rather be re-
garded as an instance of the personal improvement of the theologian. The 
knowledge that the theologian gains should prove beneficial for his own life. 
This ethical and didactic commitment of epistemological theory was very 
important for Gregory. Thus, he made it a pronounced goal for his orations 
to provide some general recommendations for the appropriate conduct of 
theological contemplation. He framed his argumentation in such a way that 
it could serve as “a sort of foundation and memorandum (ὅσον ῥίζα τις 
εἶναι καὶ ὑπόμνημα) for the use of those who are better able to conduct 
the enquiry to a more complete working out (τοῖς ἐξεταστικωτέροις τῆς 
τελεωτέρας ἐξεργασίας)” (Or 30.16).
This passage, and the explicit promise of clear instructions for theological 
argumentation, is followed by exegetic guidance, which touches upon the 
dogmatic and ethical or soteriological domains. Gregory asserts: 
What is lofty you are to apply to the Godhead (ἑνὶ δὲ κεφαλαίῳ, τὰ μὲν 
ὑψηλότερα πρόσαγε τῇ θεότητι), and to that nature in him which is superior 
to sufferings and incorporeal (καὶ τῇ κρείττονι φύσει παθῶν καὶ σώματος); 
but all that is lowly to the composite condition of him who for your sakes made 
himself of no reputation and was incarnate (τὰ δὲ ταπεινότερα τῷ συνθέτῳ, 
καὶ τῷ διὰ σὲ κενωθέντι καὶ σαρκωθέντι) … The result will be that you will 
abandon these carnal and groveling doctrines, and learn to be more sublime 
(ἵνα σὺ τὸ τῶν δογμάτων σου σαρκικὸν καὶ χαμαιπετὲς καταλύσας μάθῃς 
ὑψηλότερος εἶναι), and to ascend with his godhead (καὶ συνανιέναι θεότητι), 
and you will not remain permanently among the sensible images (καὶ μὴ τοῖς 
ὁρωμένοις ἐναπομένοις), but will rise up with him to the meanings of the 
things (ἀλλὰ συνεπαίρῃ τοῖς νοουμένοις, καὶ γινώσκῃς), and come to know 
which passages refer to his nature, and which to his assumption of human (τίς 
μὲν φύσεως λόγος, τίς δὲ λόγος οἰκονομίας) (Or 29.18) 
It is pretty clearly marked in this passage that Gregory thinks through the 
process of theological contemplation in parallel with the process of intellec-
tion so that the background assumption here would be that his addressee is 
familiar with the terminology and concepts he uses in his discourse. I think 
it is in any way impossible or difficult to suppose that the well-educated 
audience in front of which he delivered his speeches was unaware of the key 
epistemological doctrines of the time. This general familiarity with the topical 
philosophical discussions that we may safely assume in Gregory’s audience, 
I think, had motivated him to freely use philosophical and scientific termini 
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technici as well as numerous allusions to various Hellenic and Christian 
contexts and to weave them into a beautiful tissue of theological concepts. 
3. God as maintainer and rationale of the universe 
Gregory maintained that accurate knowledge of nature is desirable for the 
Christian theologian. Exegetic and dogmatic theology and the carrying out 
on a practical level of church rituals should not, Gregory argued, be in any 
way opposed to natural theology, because these are different branches of the 
same knowledge. The subject of this knowledge, according to Gregory, is the 
divine activity featured in the heavenly bestowed natural law that galvanizes 
the whole universe and that enables human cognition of the universe and 
mastery over creation.
With regard to these epistemic prerequisites it would be accurate to assume 
that Gregory conceived of theology as the study of life in all its fullness and 
variety of manifestations. Consequently, he was committed to applying vari-
ous scientific and philosophical research methods as well as contemplative 
and ascetic practices. 
These epistemological principles, which Gregory supplied, resonated with 
the Christian vision of God as creator, maintainer and τέλος of the universe. 
In Gregory’s own words: “God gave substance (τὸ πᾶν οὐσιοῦτο τῷ Θεῷ) 
and existence (ὑφίστατο) to the whole” (Or 32.10). Gregory argued that God 
has instilled in human beings a longing for God that surpasses the earthly 
longing of the flesh (Or 32.9). In his De moderatione in disputando Gregory 
articulated a conception of the orderly organization of the universe, which is 
mirrored in the systematic organization of the cognitive process:
There is an order in elements (Τάξις ἐν στοιχείοις), which constitute the bodies 
(ἐξ ὧν τὰ σώματα) … It is through order that all things have been given their 
arrangement (Τάξει τὰ πάντα διεκοσμήθη), and Logos who has done the 
arranging… It is order that holds together the things of heaven and the things 
of earth; order among the things we perceive with our minds; order among 
those we perceive with our senses (τάξις ἐν νοητοῖς·τάξις ἐν αἰσθητοῖς)501 
(Or 32.7–8).
Having proclaimed the regular organisation of the universe, Gregory im-
mediately explains that it is for the sake of the intellective capacity, which 
human beings possess and are designed to exercise, that God shaped the 
universe in such an intelligible way. Gregory argued that the intellective ca-
pacity is the most God-like and divine502 (sc. τὸ θεοειδὲς καὶ θεῖον, Or 
501 Transl. M. Vinson, 2003, 196.
502 E.g., in the Or 28.17 Gregory explicitly says that “the mind and reason” (τὸν 
ἡμέτερον νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον) constitutes the image of God in human beings.
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28.17) and contended that engaging in intellection is no less than a τέλος or 
functional goal of human beings. He also noted that since human capacities 
correspond to a certain natural arrangement of the bodily properties, there-
fore, instructions for a proper exercise of intellection should resonate with 
knowledge about human nature. Pondering the proper investigation of the 
law of nature Gregory evinced in De moderatione in disputando:
How can this be achieved? By investigating the universe (Ἐὰν εἰδῶμεν κόσμον) 
and respecting the law of nature (ἐπαινῶμεν φύσεως νόμον), by using reason 
as one’s guide (ἑπώμεθα λόγῳ) and refusing to disrespect the standard of order 
(μὴ ἀτιμάζωμεν εὐταξίαν)503 (Or 32.7f.).
Interestingly enough a comparable way of reasoning and adherence to “the 
standard of order” characterized Origen’s teaching, though for him the notion 
of order had a less pronounced holographic meaning. That is to say that while 
Gregory urged the discovery of analogical regularities in different spheres of 
the universe, Origen mainly concerned with those philological regularities, 
which could prove effective for his exegesis. Yet, I suppose that there is a 
discernible trace of Origen’s thought in Gregory’s concept of order, especially 
when he comes to talk about the applicability of rules of Greek syntaxis to 
the interpretation of divine names.504 
Having observed the regularities in various spheres: from the physical and 
biological world and Greek syntaxis to the properties of the divine persons, 
Gregory acknowledged a correspondence between the research methods of 
the theological and secular disciplines. These disciplines, in Gregory’s opinion, 
should form a compulsory part of the complex of theological studies:
But reason (ὁ λόγος) took us up in our desire for God, in our refusal to travel 
without guide or helmsman. Reason looked on the visible world, lighted on 
things primeval yet did not make us stop at these (for reason will grant no 
superiority to things as much objects of sense as we are (τοῖς ὁμοτίμοις κατὰ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν) but leads us on through them to what transcends them, the 
very means of their continued existence (δι’ οὗ τούτοις τὸ εἶναι περίεστιν) 
(Or 28.16). 
One thing that I should briefly note here is that the term reason (sc. λόγος) 
in Gregory’s vocabulary is multivocal. In this passage not only does it refer 
to the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity but also denotes human intellec-
tion. Elsewhere Gregory also used this term for the designation of scientific 
503 Transl. M. Vinson, 197.
504 To give a short example, in the Commentary on John Origen affirmed that the 
whole Bible is one body, whose parts form a harmonious unity that is the word 
of God, which “consists of many ideas each of which is a part of the whole 
word” (ComJn 10.107). 
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discourse and the scientific laws in general. Notably, in the second theological 
speech, Gregory coined a definition of science which markedly matches the 
description of science from the nineteenth chapter of the second book of the 
Posterior Analytics.505 
Having thereby encouraged the investigation of the divine design in nature, 
Gregory himself engages in this research and gives an overall survey of the 
Christian approach towards the main issues of different natural disciplines. 
The second part of the Or 28.22–32 is devoted to a vivid description of the 
different spheres of the universe: stars, the sky and birds, oceans and fish, the 
earth and animals, plants and insects and of course – humans. 
In comparison with Basil’s Hexaemeron, Gregory’s excursus in the sci-
ence of nature is more rhetorical speculation than serious research.506 Yet, I 
believe that even this superficial presentation clearly marks the didactic and 
methodological drift of Gregory’s orations because an overview of natural 
phenomena normally formed a part of the philosophical manuals. Moreover, 
as Richard Sarabji has pointed out, the issue of whether God was causally 
responsible for the existence of the physical world was actively debated by 
philosophers, who tried to harmonise Platonic and Peripatetic teachings. 
Sarabji also noted that Hierocles (fifth century), who contended that Plato 
and Aristotle agreed on the subject of creation, traced the general thesis of 
harmony back to Plutarch and Ammonius Saccas, who in the third century 
taught Plotinus and probably Origen. In the fifth century, Syrianus and Pro-
clus developed the idea of harmony between Plato and Aristotle; and later 
on, a pupil of Proclus, Ammonius Hermiae, again claimed no contradiction 
between Plato and Aristotle on the issue of creation. Sarabji argued that 
Ammonius went so far as to affirm that “Aristotle accepted Plato’s Ideas at 
least in the form of principles (sc. λόγοι) in the divine Intellect, and these 
principles were in turn causally responsible for the beginningless existence 
of the physical world”. Ammonius pushed forward a thesis that Aristotle’s 
God was an efficient cause of the world’s existence. In view of this evidence, 
I think, it comes as no surprise that in the fourth century Gregory pondered 
505 Gregory asserts that the process of scientific investigation consists of cer-
tain stages: “an observation of some movement (ἀλλὰ κινήσεώς τινος 
ἐπιτήρησις), which, when confirmed by longer practice (ἣ πλείονι γυμνασίᾳ 
βεβαιωθεῖσα), and drawing the observations of many individuals into one gen-
eralization (εἰς ἓν ἀγαγοῦσα τὰ τηρηθέντα πλείοσιν), and thence deducing 
a law (εἶτα λόγον ἐπινοήσασα), has acquired the name of Science (ἐπιστήμη 
προσηγορεύθη)”·(Or 28.29). The same components in the same sequence are 
listed by Aristotle in his deliberation about science in APo 99b35–100a15.
506 Like Basil, Gregory admires the hardworking bees and spiders, the geometry of 
cobwebs and honeycombs, the grasshoppers’ form, different kinds of birds, fish 
and animals. Cf. Greg., Or 28.24f. and Bas., Hexaem. 8.
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the topic of God as Sustainer of the universe not only from a perspective of 
Christian teaching but also with regard to the current philosophical debates, 
and that these debates echoed in his conception. 
4.  Intellection as the image of God and τέλος  
of the human being
As I have argued above, Gregory supported a complex approach to theologi-
cal studies, and regarded natural theology from a rather broad philosophical 
perspective. The starting points of his dogmatic and exegetic reasoning hinged 
upon the epistemological and physiological understanding of the cognitive 
process. To illustrate this statement I wish to return to a fascinating passage 
from the third oration that we read earlier and to underpin the anthropologi-
cal message of this text (Or 29.5). 
Gregory says in the passage that the names of the Father and the Son and 
the Holy Spirit “do not belong to us in the absolute sense (τὰ γὰρ ἡμέτερα 
οὐ κυρίως)”, and then by way of explanation he provides a rather enigmatic 
description of human nature. He tells us that: 
… we are both (ἄμφω), and not one more than the other (οὐ γὰρ τόδε μᾶλλον 
ἢ τόδε); and we are of both (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἡμεῖς), and not of one only (οὐχ ἑνός); 
and so we are arranged (ὥστε μερίζεσθαι) (Or 29.5).
It is quite obvious that in this passage Gregory is talking about human nature, 
which is a compound of the soul and body – no surprises on this score, but 
then he goes on to describe how this complex mechanism functions as a unit, 
and here the ambiguity surfaces: 
… and by degrees become men (κατ’ ὀλίγον ἄνθρωποι), and perhaps not 
even men (ἴσως οὐδὲ ἄνθρωποι), and such as we did not desire (οἷοι μὴ 
τεθελήμεθα), pulling away and being dismissed (ἀφιέντες καὶ ἀφιέμενοι), 
so that only the relations remain (μόνας τὰς σχέσεις λείπεσθαι), without the 
underlying facts (ὀρφανὰς τῶν πραγμάτων) (Or 29.5).
What does he mean by this? How is it that human beings become men by 
degree? What do they pull away from? How is it contrary to their desire? 
To answer these questions we have to examine Aristotelian ethics because 
it is my firm conviction that Gregory made this statement with Peripatetic 
teaching in mind. 
Aristotle contended that it is inherent in the nature of the virtuous man to 
live in accordance with his nature, i.e. to desire only what is genuinely good 
for his nature, what brings him happiness and a functional self-realization:
For the good man is of one mind with himself (ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ), and de-
sires the same things with his whole soul (τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν 
τὴν ψυχήν). Also he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent (ἑαυτῷ 
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τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα507), and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a 
good man to exert himself actively for the good; and he does so for his own sake 
(for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself (τοῦ διανοητικοῦ 
χάριν), and this appears to be a man’s real self (ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ). Also he 
desires his own life and security (ζῆν … ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι), and especially 
that of his rational part (NE 1166a15–20). 
Natural goodness (sc. εὐφυΐα) enables the human being to make the right 
choice.508 Possession of εὐφυΐα is a token of a clear mental eye, which is 
able to discern bad from good and to judge well.509 Logically, all the right 
choices that the clear mental eye makes, sustain a chain leading to a major 
right choice, i.e. the choice of the right end (sc. τέλος). Thus, possessing 
εὐφυΐα ensures the proper functioning of the whole human organism, whose 
purpose is happiness (sc. εὐδαιμονία) understood as the human good (NE 
1114a31–b1). 
Moreover, the capability to judge well relates as much to moral choice as 
to scholarly research.510 Interestingly enough, the capacity of judging well is 
imparted not “by process of reasoning, but by virtue, whether natural or ac-
quired by training in right opinion as to the first principle” (NE 1151a15–19). 
Aristotle professed that it is virtue that sustains the true beliefs about the good 
(NE 1114b21–25), while reason can sometimes misguide researchers and 
as a result they: “do many things contrary to their habits and their nature, 
because of reason, if they are persuaded that it is better to do otherwise” (Pol 
507 Elsewhere Aristotle specifies that “unconditionally and in truth, what is wished 
for is the good, although to each person what is wished for is the apparent good” 
(NE 1113a23–5). Gregory also refers to apparent and real virtue in the Or 32.6.
508 Cf.: “Where knowledge (γνῶσιν) and philosophical wisdom (φιλοσοφίαν 
φρόνησιν) are concerned, the ability to discern and hold in one view the con-
sequences of either hypothesis is no insignificant tool, since then it only remains 
to make a correct choice of one of them. But a task of this sort requires εὐφυΐα. 
And true εὐφυΐα consists in just this – the ability to choose the true and avoid 
the false (καλῶς ἑλέσθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος). Naturally good 
men are the very ones who can do this well…” (Top 163b9–16). 
509 Cf.: “…rather he must by nature have a sort of natural eye to make him judge 
(ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς) well and choose what is really good. Whoever 
by nature has this eye in good condition has a good nature (ἔστιν εὐφυὴς)” 
(NE 1114b5–12).
510 E.g., with regard to mathematical investigation: “For virtue preserves the fun-
damental principle, vice destroys it, and the first principle or starting-point in 
matters of conduct is the end proposed, which corresponds to the hypotheses 
of mathematics” (NE 1151a15–19). Gregory similarly claims that what “order 
does, disorder undoes” and that the synonyms of disorder are sins in the soul, 
diseases in the body, tidal waves in the sea, thunderbolts in cities and earthquakes 
in the land (Or 32.8).
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1332b6–8). An underlying issue at stake here is that people who are used 
to following their passions cannot, even when presented with true concepts, 
appreciate them because they conflict with their personal experience. Their 
bad habits make them insensitive and blind towards the truth, although they 
may be well-educated and smart.511 Alternatively to the bad habits a human 
being who is committed to achieving his final goal can exercise the capacity 
of right judgement.
In the De generatione animalium Aristotle explains at length the final goal 
of the human being from a biological viewpoint. He contends that the male 
parent is actually what the offspring comes to be (i.e. is potentially); the form 
whose realization is the goal of the reproductive process is actually present 
in the male parent (GA 734b35–36). And since intellective capacity is sub-
stantial (i.e. it is the basis for unity of the human being and the quality which 
distinguishes them from the other animals) for human beings, the perfection 
of this capacity, aimed at the acquiring of wisdom and εὐφυΐα, constitutes a 
teleological horizon of homo sapiens. 
Now, I suggest returning to the puzzling phrase from the third theological 
oration that I have cited above (Or 29.5), bearing in mind the Aristotelian 
vision of the goal and gradual development of the human being. Gregory as-
serted that human beings “by degrees become men (κατ’ ὀλίγον ἄνθρωποι)” 
that I take to be a general biological observation.512 He continued: “…and 
perhaps not even men (ἴσως οὐδὲ ἄνθρωποι), and such as we did not desire 
(οἷοι μὴ τεθελήμεθα)”. This remark, I believe, implies a similar meaning to 
the ethical conception of good-natured man who is able to pursue what is right 
for him. What is special about the good-natured man is that he possesses a 
clear mental eye that enables him to hit the mark of being human εὐδαιμονία. 
Although all people desire happiness, not all of them can find their way to it 
and thus they pull away and dismiss themselves from their life task. 
The first theological oration contains many applications of this concept. 
This is how Gregory describes his opponents, as those who:
… neglect every path of righteousness, and look only to this one point, namely, 
which of the propositions submitted to them they shall bind or loose (δήσουσιν 
ἢ λύσουσι) … since, I say this is so, the evil is intolerable and unendurable, and 
our great mystery is in danger of being made a petty device (τεχνύδριον). … For 
511 “Our function is achieved both through practical wisdom and through ethical 
virtue. For virtue makes the goal right, whereas practical wisdom makes what 
serves the goal right” (NE 1144a7–9).
512 It is clear that Gregory was familiar with the basic biological doctrines of his 
time. Thus, in the third oration he contends: “For those parts whose maturity 
comes later (ὧν ὕστερον ἡ τελείωσις), yet received their laws at the time of 
genesis (τούτων οἱ λόγοι μετὰ τῆς γεννήσεως)” (Or 29.8).
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either we shall have spoken in the ears of them that will hear, and our word will 
bear some fruit, namely an advantage to you (although the sower sows the word 
upon every kind of mind (πᾶσαν διάνοιαν), yet only and the good and fertile 
bears fruit), or else you will depart despising this discourse of ours, and having 
drawn from it further material for contradiction (ὕλην ἀντιλογίας) (Or 27.2).
In this passage Gregory depicts his opponents as incapable of digesting true 
knowledge because of their devotion to the devious way and scope of reason-
ing, which renders all their efforts infertile and conclusions – erroneous. To 
put it briefly, although every human being is granted a mind, i.e. the image 
of God, not everyone knows how to make use of it, therefore everyone needs 
instruction and to provide this instruction is a task of philosophy and theol-
ogy. In such a way, I believe that Gregory implies in this passage that human 
beings have to engage in a certain activity in order to realize their inherent 
potential and thus fulfil the goal of their lives.
With respect to the concluding phrase of the cited passage saying that “only 
the relations remain (μόνας τὰς σχέσεις λείπεσθαι), without the underlying 
facts (ὀρφανὰς τῶν πραγμάτων)”, I want to delve more deeply into the 
context of De generatione animalium. Aristotle maintained in this treatise 
that in the offspring the form of a mature animal with all its relevant fully 
developed capacities exists potentially as an expected goal (GA 734b35–36). 
Consequently, Aristotle argued, the vocabulary which scholars apply to de-
scribe the offspring consists of relative terms, that is to say, of terms which 
cannot be properly applied to the offspring due to his immaturity.513 This 
Aristotelian observation sharply underpins the relative nature of human lan-
guage. I suggest that when Gregory asserts about those humans who fail to 
fulfil their goal that in their case “only the relations remain without underly-
ing facts,” he merely points to their failure to realise their potential. What 
was expected to be true about these people has not been realised, therefore 
in their case “only relations remain without underlying facts.” 
Conclusion
While the first part of this monograph is generally devoted to setting the 
theological orations in various historical, philosophical and institutional con-
texts, in the second part I undertook analysis of Gregory’s texts. Thus, the 
513 Of note is the fact that when Gregory talks about the good Christians who fulfil 
their life goal he uses the adjective perfect (sc. τέλειος). The first meaning of this 
term is mature, fully grown, complete (cf. LSJ). Paul has used this term in both 
senses and coined the phrase “perfect man” as a synonym for a Christian saint, 
i.e. a person who, under the instructions of Jesus, has acquired a clear mental eye 
capable of right judgement (cf. Col 1:28, Rom 12:2, Eph 4:13, and also Heb 5:14).
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results of my investigation are of a methodological, historico-philosophical 
and philological nature. 
Apropos of method, I suggest that it is necessary to study Gregory’s heritage 
with regard to the institutional and socio-cultural trends of Late Antiquity as 
well as relevant historical events and scientific and philosophical discussions. 
In such a way, I found it beneficial to examine the impact of contemporary 
philosophical and scientific discussions on Gregory’s thought as well as of 
the educational trends and the socio-cultural controversies pushed forward 
by the legalization of Christianity and the social policy of Julian the Emperor. 
Thus, in the context of the fourth century a stricto sensu theological contro-
versy brought up by Eunomius provoked an acute methodological debate that 
was deeply concerned with the how-questions maybe even more significantly 
than the what-questions. That is to say, the main issues at stake in Gregory’s 
theological orations were: firstly, how is it possible to have knowledge, and 
secondly how is it possible to have knowledge about God? Gregory empha-
sized the anthropological and cognitive conditions of human intellection: he 
inquired how human beings receive information from the sense-organs and 
transform it into concepts, how language can convey human thoughts, and 
how people can understand each other. These epistemological questions were 
in the background of Gregory’s theological discourse; hence his theology 
turned out to be closely interwoven with anthropology and cognitive theory. 
Importantly, a comparable correspondence between ontology, logic, lin-
guistic, cosmology, anthropology and biology bound up with epistemologi-
cal and cognitive theories was a distinctive feature of Peripatetic thought. 
Although these epistemological issues were on the agenda of all philosophical 
schools unlike other traditions, the Aristotelian school featured a concep-
tion of hylomorphism and a characteristic vision of the processes of sense-
perception and intellection as instances of interaction between subject and 
object. These important components prevented Peripatetic thought from 
falling into either idealism or materialism. Instead Aristotelians inclined to 
support a balanced realistic approach to the studies of physical, linguistic and 
logical limitations within which the human mind does its amazing work of 
acquiring true knowledge about the world. 
I believe that Gregory was familiar with the principal logical and some 
biological works of Aristotle as well as with some works and teachings of 
the Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic commentators on Aristotle. In tune with 
the reception paradigm of the contemporary philosophical schools Gregory 
applied various philosophical materials for various purposes. Thus, he vastly 
borrowed from the Platonic topoi and style, he applied some conceptions 
of the Stoics (probably, via intermediaries of Basil and Origen) and he took 
advantage of Aristotelian logic, anthropology, ontology and epistemology in 
elaboration of his theological teaching. In his polemics with the Eunomians 
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Gregory made use of the Aristotelian theory of essential predication. He ar-
gued that his opponents failed to understand the true meaning of the logical 
concepts they applied. In such a way Gregory pinpointed an ontological strand 
of essential predication and suggested considering biblical moto “He who is” 
(ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν; Ex 3:14) as the most fitting predicate to the divine nature. 
Taking this definition as his point of departure and also following the logic 
of Aristotelian epistemology Gregory demonstrated how his identification of 
the divine nature with being per se really helps to understand various aspects 
of Christian doctrine (e.g., God as the cause, maintainer and goal of the uni-
verse). These concepts prompted Gregory’s vision of natural theology whose 
purpose was not in apology of Christianity but in studying the world of God 
and approaching the creator. Although Gregory applied logical categories, 
syllogisms and the key-concepts of contemporary science such as scientific 
definition, demonstration, accidental and essential quality, etc. – I think that 
his main focus dwelled not on the theoretical proof of theological dogmas 
but on the investigation of the human capacity of engaging with God by the 
means of thinking God. 
At the heart of Gregory’s theory is the human being and more precisely, 
the human mind as a bearer of the image of God. Gregory is particularly 
interested in investigation of the epistemological and cognitive issues. In his 
definitions of the human being, human soul, reason, sense-perception, im-
agination, intellection, an influence of the Peripatetic approach is clearly 
discernable. Namely, Gregory asserted that when the mind thinks it dwells in 
the object of thought, hence when the mind thinks, about the characteristics 
of God it elevates the human being and directs his or her life by having a 
certain impact on his or her choices and decision making. Gregory stresses 
that approaching God and imitating God ought to be understood as a prima 
facie noetic activity. Yet, he contends that far from being a purely theoreti-
cal activity the process of thinking is an embodied practice. That is to say, 
it involves the whole compound of the human being: the faculties of sense-
perception, imagination without which intellection is impossible, and also 
the practical or ethical aspect of actual living theological knowledge. This 
approach emphasizes the individual responsibility of a theologian, whose 
intellectual-practical life becomes a necessary prerequisite of engaging with 
the divine knowledge. Thus, Gregory affirms that thinking about God is not 
simply a desideratum but a duty of the human being.
Although Gregory regularly employs philosophical concepts (especially 
those of Peripatetic epistemology and cognitive theory), he finds his inspira-
tion in Scripture and particularly in the teaching of Apostle Paul, whose at-
tention to the theory of knowledge is pervasive. I am committed to looking 
at Gregory’s heritage as a good example of a dynamic and productive alliance 
of various intellectual and socio-cultural contexts, which, I think may be 
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interesting not only for Patristic studies but also in a broader context of the 
history of philosophy and educational institutions. In such a way, Gregory’s 
attempt to outline the Christian contact theory of knowledge appears to be 
in beautiful concord with some contemporary epistemological conceptions. 
In conclusion and to illustrate my idea I would like to draw an explication of 
epistemological contact from a book Retrieving Realism by Charles Taylor 
and Hubert Dreyfus:
The contact here is not achieved on the level of Ideas, but is rather something 
primordial, something we never escape. It is the contact of living, active beings, 
whose life form involves acting in and on a world which also acts on them. These 
beings are at grips with a world and each other; this original contact provides 
the sense-making context for all their knowledge constructions, which, however 
much they are based on mediating depictions, rely for their meaning on this 
primordial and indissoluble involvement in the surrounding reality.514
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